A Western attack will not want for firepower or targets—but it will need to be finely judged if it is to work

British and French aircraft flying out of Incirlik in 

AS WAR-CRIES go, “There are no good options” leaves something to be desired. But punishing the Syrian regime for the chemical attack on August 21st is not easy to get right. The response must be big enough to be taken seriously, in Syria and elsewhere—no one wants a repeat of the desultory and misguided attack on a Sudanese drug factory in 1998—if it is to have the desired effect. At the same time it must not be seen as making the attackers party to the war the regime is fighting, or escalating the conflict across the region. Such calibration may be too fine a task to achieve with the blunt instruments of war.

As The Economist went to press, it seemed clear how the attack would begin, if not when. Four American Arleigh Burke destroyers stand ready in the eastern Mediterranean, the 1,600km range of their Tomahawk land-attack missiles allowing them to stay well beyond the 300km range of Syria’s Yakhont anti-shipping missiles. There are doubtless American submarines in the area, too, and a British one may be on its way. Christopher Harmer of the Institute for the Study of War, a think-tank, says the destroyers should have about 45 Tomahawks each. Add in the submarines and there are about 200 available to make precision strikes, roughly twice the number used against Libya in 2011.

Turkey, which has said it will support such missions, or Akrotiri, the British base in Cyprus, might be used too; this may be the only way for French forces to participate. They would probably also launch cruise missiles, as getting close to targets would mean being in range of the Syrian air-defence system, which is a great deal more capable than was Libya’s. Heavier ordnance, including bombs needed to destroy underground bunkers, could be delivered by stealthy B-2 bombers flying directly from America.

What might all this fire-power be aimed at? In a letter to Congress this July the chairman of America’s joint chiefs of staff, Martin Dempsey, wrote that stand-off weapons could be used to “strike targets that…include high-value regime air defence, air, ground, missile and naval forces, as well as military facilities and command nodes.” The problem will be choosing which ones to hit. As Mr Harmer puts it: “‘Punitive strikes’…do not translate so simply into military target sets.”

The targets should ideally be related in some way to chemical weapons and their use. But hitting the 10 or 20 sites at which gas is stockpiled would be very risky. Deadly toxins could be released into the air. If the guards skedaddle, rebels aligned with al-Qaeda might grab the weapons for their own use.

In April this year, America set up a $70m programme in Jordan that is training the kingdom’s special forces to identify and secure chemical-weapons sites across Syria should the regime fall and the wrong rebels look like getting their hands on them. It also has specially trained troops of its own that might be sent in to secure the weapons in such conditions. The prospect of extracting the chemical weapons while the civil war continues to rage, though, is far more daunting. General Dempsey wrote to Congress that such a mission would require “a no-fly zone as well as air and missile strikes involving hundreds of aircraft, ships, submarines…thousands of special operations forces and other ground forces”. Even then he did not think America could sequester all the weapons; extremists might well still get some.

Jeffrey White of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests that targets should include the headquarters, barracks and support facilities around Damascus of the two units most heavily involved in the destruction of civilian areas and most probably responsible for the chemical attack, the 4th and Republican Guard armoured divisions. As many as possible of the systems that can deliver chemical weapons—artillery, rockets and aircraft—should also be destroyed. Higher-level military and intelligence centres around the capital might also be hit. So might the presidential palace and the main airport, through which weapons from Iran and Russia are brought in.

The fat lady does not get to sing, though, just because an appropriate set of targets has been found. As Jeremy Shapiro of the Brookings Institution, until recently a State Department planner working on Syria, puts it, “The enemy gets a vote.” Syria’s response may well simply be to treat the attack as proof of the global conspiracy against it, a propaganda ploy in which it is practised and which can pay dividends. But a senior Syrian army source told Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency on August 27th that, “If Syria is attacked, Israel will also be set on fire…not just by Damascus and its allies in retaliation, but by extremist groups.” Bluster, perhaps, but Syria could conceivably attack Israel, perhaps with Scud missiles. Or it could encourage attacks by its ally Hizbullah, Iran’s client Shia militia in south Lebanon. If Hizbullah sees the attacks as being a direct punishment for the chemical atrocity, and not an attempt to bring down the regime, though, it may not play ball. And Iran might like to see Hizbullah’s missiles saved for later use.

Worst cases

Attacks on Israel, which has excellent missile defences, might do little by way of direct damage. Nevertheless, Israeli retaliation would be certain: “We will respond and we will respond in strength,” warned Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, on August 27th. The Syrian regime might not mind. To be the target of the Zionists can cover a multitude of sins.

Scud missiles could also be aimed at Akrotiri, at Turkey or even at air bases in the Gulf, though they might not hit them: their lack of accuracy makes them better suited as terror weapons against civilians. Alternatively, Mr Assad could perpetrate new atrocities on his own citizenry. Perhaps the most troubling response, in the eyes of the attackers, would be further use of chemical weapons. That would make the allies look impotent; they might then feel the need to re-engage with greater force, and get sucked in to exactly the conflict America wants to avoid.

Ordinary Syrians have mixed views about the impending intervention. Many would like to see the regime implode under fire. Few expect it. Jalal, a mathematician in Zabadani, a rebel-held town of orchards close to Damascus, said residents were doing takbeer—calling praise to God to signal celebration—from their homes on the evening of the 28th as strikes looked ever more likely. A student from Damascus said a lack of clear purpose could cause resentment, especially if strikes cause civilian casualties. “They [America and the West] are not siding with the people rising against Assad nor with the Assad regime,” he says. Many Damascenes are leaving the country, thus adding further to the refugee crisis on Syria’s borders.

The rebels, for their part, hope military action will be a chance to advance their modest recent gains. Representatives of Syria’s opposition were present at a recent two-day meeting in Amman, Jordan’s capital, where General Dempsey and his British opposite number, General Sir Nick Houghton, discussed the scope of possible attacks with regional allies. But moderate rebels grumble that there has been no co-ordination with their Turkey-based Supreme Military Command. This means, they say, that the extremists who have been increasing their power at the expense of more moderate groups will reap the biggest benefits from the attack.

Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, both al-Qaeda affiliates, have been silent about the possible strikes. But “inside the [groups] Syrian fighters are pleased”, says an activist from eastern Syria in contact with them. A Western attack that pleases al-Qaeda; pretty good evidence of a lack of good options.

Source: The Economist