Study:Impossible to ignore Hezbollah role when you think about Shiism in Syria

  The Shiite Turn in Syria is in-depth study by the researcher Khalid Sindawi, Zaman Alwasl republishes this important paper which appeared before in Volume 8 of Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, published by Hudson Institute, according to the mounting role of political Shia in Syria we publish the forth part about the Effect of the Lebanon Conversions in Syria War of 2006 on Shiite Conversions in Syria. The first part was an overwhelming introduction to the Shiism hidden world in Syria, the second was about The Alawite Factor in Syria, the third went through the prior History of Shiism in Syria and the Role of Education

The Effect of the Lebanon Conversions in Syria War of 2006 on Shiite Conversions in Syria

In thinking about Shiism in Syria it is impossible to ignore the role of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite organization with ideological and strategic ties to Iran. While Syria was in control of Lebanon it provided the organization with political and military support, and in return Hezbollah was Syria’s main ally in Lebanon.

The thirty-three day war between Israel and Lebanon in the summer of 2006 gave rise to a wave of admiration among Syrians for Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and his organization because of their resistance against Israel. As a result, Shiism came to be seen in a more positive light, and more Syrian Sunnis converted to Shiism. Hezbollah’s perceived achievements and victories in the war also brought about an increase in Iranian activity. According to Mustafa al-Sada, a young Shiite cleric who came into contact with numerous Sunnis who showed an interest in adopting the Shiite creed, “George Bush did us a service and unified the Arabs.” Al-Sada said that he knew seventy-five Sunnis in Damascus who had converted to Shiism since the beginning of hostilities in Lebanon in July 2007, and that the war gave additional impetus to the rising trend in recent years to adopt the Shiite creed.

Wail Khalil, for example, a twenty-one-year-old student of international law at Damascus University, says that “for the first time in my life I saw a war in which the Arabs were victorious.” Subsequently Khalil, a Sunni, began to observe Shiite rites, and he plans to convert completely to Shiism.

Since the war, pictures of Hasan Nasrallah and of Khamenei have been more widely displayed than the region’s other political leaders. Anyone walking through the streets of Damascus today will see pictures of President Bashar al-Asad alongside the Hezbollah leader. These pictures are displayed on shop fronts, private cars, buses, and walls. Local Syrian intellectuals explain that these pictures express patriotism rather than sectarian religious feelings, since Nasrallah has become more a national symbol than a religious one.

Charges and Countercharges

In reaction to the increasing pace of conversion to Shiism in Syria and the Syrian government’s indifference, the prominent Saudi religious propagandist Salman al-Awda, head of the Islam Today Institute, sounded a warning on October 22, 2006. He pointed out that “Shiite expansion among Sunnis constitutes playing with fire.”In statements to the press Awda declared that “Shiism is spreading apace in Syria especially, and in a number of other countries of the Muslim world as well. A part of this trend may be ascribed to political motives, in other words to show support for the Iranian political presence. But this does not mean that others do not confuse the political and ideological aspects.”

Awda points to the various ways the Shiite creed is being disseminated in Syria: “Material inducements are used to convince people to adopt Shiism. As a result husayniyyas have proliferated, and all attempts to oppose this trend have been put down.” Awda’s declarations came after a number of Iranian organizations constructed two shrines, one over the grave of the Companion Ammar b. Yasir and the other over the grave of the tabii’i Uways al-Qarni in the northeastern province of al-Raqqa, where Iranian cultural offices were opened as well.

Shiite clerics in Syria rebut Awda’s accusations. The two most prominent Syrian Shiite religious leaders in Syria, Abdallah Nizam and Nabil Halbawi have denied that any “Shiite missionary campaign” is taking place among Sunnis and have de­manded that the accusers produce evidence for their claims.

A prominent religious leader of the Alawite community, Dhu al-Fiqar Ghazal, has also denied any efforts to convert Alawites to Shiism. In a lengthy talk on arab iyya.net he spoke about the differences between Alawites and Shiites and stressed that the Syrian regime did not rule as an Alawite regime, and that the Alawites had gained their position thanks to the love of the people. He added that Syrians coexist well with each other and that the Alawite community is more open and secular than most, and willing to maintain dialogue with those who are different.

The Shiite cleric Abdallah Nizam, supervisor of Shiite institutions and shrines in Syria and a teacher at the Sayyida Zaynab hawza sent a letter of rebuke to Awda in which he said: “We wish to put al-Awda’s mind at ease; there is no danger to the Sunni creed here, and we oppose people selling their faith.”

Like Awda, former Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who opposes the present regime, accuses the Iranian ambassador in Damascus of engaging in mis­sionary work in Syria. Khaddam claims “the Iranian ambassador in Damascus moves around Syria with greater freedom than its own Prime Minister.” In an interview with UPI, Khaddam declared that the Iranian ambassador exploited the poverty in the country by building shrines where Companions of the Prophet supposedly stayed and by giving money to the poor, with the objective of building an Iranian party within Syria by means of converting people to Shiism.

Other prominent Syrians have accused the Iranian cultural chancellery in Damascus of activities that are not consistent with its declared aims; that it promotes conversion to Shiism in Syria, and that it actually operates under Iran’s Supreme Spiritual Leader Ali Khamenei, despite its official status as a part of the Iranian embassy.

Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli, a well-known Syrian Islamic cleric and thinker, accused the chancellery of offering inducements in the form of cash, houses and cars in order to attract people to Shiism. He pointed out that “hundreds of Syrians in Deir al-Zor, al-Raqqa, Dar’a and the al-Ghuta region near Damascus have succumbed to the chancellery’s inducements and converted to Shiism” (according to a newspaper report from October 31, 2006 on the news website belonging to the Middle East Center in London).

The Shiite conversions have also roiled Sunni Islamists. The head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, told the Quds Press Agency that “the entire conversion to Shiism activity in Syria is just an attempt to create confusion so as to bring about a change in the social composition of Syrian society.”

Conversion in Deir al-Zor

The wave of conversions to Shiism in the Deir al-Zor region can be traced to the town of Hatla, where ten percent of the total population of thirty thousand has embraced Shiism. The conversions began with Umar al-Hammadi, a sergeant major in the army who served in western and southern Syria and converted to Shiism in 1979 while stationed in Dar’a. He is reported to have worked closely with the Iranians, and in the same year he also convinced his cousin and brother-in-law, Yasin al-Ma’yuf, to embrace the Shiite creed. At that time these were the only two converts.

In 1982 the Imam al-Murtada Association, founded by Jamil al-Asad, invited Syrian notables and tribal chiefs to the Association’s headquarters in al-Qardaha and asked for their cooperation with its missionary activities. Al-Mayuf was appointed head of the Association’s Hatla branch. The association was very active and spent great sums of money, until it was closed down by Hafiz al-Asad in the mid-1980s. But before it was disbanded, Yasin Mayuf was put in contact with Iran. He became one of the students sent to that country. He and others, including Ibrahim al-Sayir, continued to receive money from the Iranian Cultural Chancellery in Damascus, the Sayyida Zaynab hawza, and from a number of Shiites from the Persian Gulf.

After Mayuf came back from Iran at the beginning of the 1990s, Shiite influence began to be felt in public. Even the call to prayer in the Hatla mosque now included the phrase “and Ali is the regent of Allah.” Mayuf, who had become a very wealthy man thanks to Iranian support, used his money to induce people to convert to Shiism, either by way of direct payments, or by letting shops in a bazaar he owned for a paltry sum. Next to his home, Mayuf built a prayer hall where Ashura commemoration ceremonies were held.

Husayn al-Raja, a relative of Mayuf, as the chief Shiite missionary in the Deir al-Zor region, also has become a wealthy man. He has reportedly hosted large banquets to which he invited tribal notables and many people from the village. He has filmed the events and sent the videotape, which purportedly features people that he has converted to Shiism, to Iran. For this he has received great sums of money. He is also said to film gatherings, such as weddings and popular festivals, sending the videos to Iran on the same pretext. In fact, he allegedly sent one of his men to film cars on the highway between al-Raqqa and Deir al-Zor, which he then claimed to belong to people whom he had converted to Shiism. At present Raja gives a weekly sermon in al-Raqqa.

A number of intellectuals in the Deir al-Zor region are also active in promoting conversion to Shiism. One of these is Amir Shabib, owner of a bookstore called the Venerable Quran Bookshop on Deir al-Zor’s main square. Another is Abdallah Hamdan, whose father converted to Shiism first, followed by his son in 1990. He is a cousin of Yasin al-Mayuf. At the time of writing he sells books on the Euphrates Bridge near the al-Saraya Mosque. He gives away books on Shiism, especially to women and girls. (Among the books which are given away there: Twelver Shiismand The Prophet’s Family by Muhammad Jawad Mughniya, and The Prophet’s Family in Noah’s Ark by Munir Ali Khan.) He sells other books on installment in order to attract more customers.

In the Deir al-Zor region, in the town of Hatla and its neighboring villages, at least six husayniyyas have been built recently. Numerous husayniyyas can also be found in the surrounding villages. The land on which the husayniyyas are constructed is acquired for huge sums of money, as an inducement to the owners. Such transactions take place even in towns where there are no converts to Shiism, in order to gain a foot hold in the area. Occasionally land is bought for a million Syrian pounds per dunam, although its market price is no more than fifty-thousand. Increasing numbers of large and ornate husayniyyas are currently under planning and construction.

Muhammad al-Shamri reports that young converts to Shiism argue against the Sunni faith in front of their friends and colleagues while offering them monetary and material inducements. Marriages to willing Shiite women are quickly arranged for those whom they manage to win over; the brides are often Iranian. Shia converts also invite the villagers and tribe members to feasts and provide them with supplies such as rice, flour, sugar and the like. At first they do not call on their guests to convert, but merely attempt to win their hearts. Later, at a second or third feast, they will try to convince them to adopt the Shiite faith. Furthermore, it is reported that the aforementioned Yasin al-Mayuf and Husayn al-Raja brought bags of money from Damascus to Deir al-Zor during the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006, which was distributed among non-Shiite Lebanese refugees who came to the area, perhaps for purposes of conversion.

Money for conversions continues to arrive in the province, although sources differ about the precise origin. A man from the Persian Gulf area is said to arrive at Deir al-Zor once a month. According to some reports he, and not the Iranian Cultural Chancellery in Damascus, brings the money, although according to other reports the man and the Chancellery work in cooperation with each other. This man gives the money to Mayuf and Raja and tells them how much to distribute to each convert. The usual sum is five-thousand Syrian pounds per month.

Not all attempts to expand Shiite practice in the province have succeeded. For example, in 1996 Abd al-Hamid al-Muhajir made a journey through the provinces of Syria and visited centers of conversion, including the Ammar b. Yasir mosque. The Syrian authorities ordered the preachers in the mosques and students to attend a sermon given by Muhajir, but its content aroused the anger of a number of Sunni clerics, who succeeded, with the help of some tribal leaders close to the regime, to put a stop to his travels throughout the country.

In 1998 a group of Shiite clerics visited the mufti of Deir al-Zor during the holiday of Id al-Fitr. They attacked the Sunni creed, whereupon the mufti said to them: “I was with President Hafiz al-Asad just two days ago, and he told me that he did not want any sectarian strife here.” With these words he foiled their plan to curse the Prophet’s Companions.

Similarly, in 2003 a delegation of Shiite clerics from Damascus visited the Khalid b. al-Walid Mosque at the outskirts of Deir al-Zor. They informed the mosque’s preacher that they had an official permit to search for tombs of members of the Prophet’s family and to maintain them properly. They asked that he cooperate with them and that he let them supervise the mosque. When he refused, they attempted to harass him and to acquire the land around the mosque, where they intended to construct a large husayniyya. Their attempts did not succeed.

In 2006 some wealthy Shiite converts wanted to construct a husayniyya in the village of Ayn Ali. But a day after the foundations were laid, the villagers took them apart and removed them. At the moment of writing the attempt to construct the husayniyya has not been renewed.

Shiism in the Province of Dar’a

Some towns in Dara, such as Busra al-Sham, have had an indigenous Shiite population for a century, but their Shiites have professed to be Sunnis. This was the case until 1997 the arrival of Zaydan al-Ghazali, both the son-in-law of Rustum Ghazala, the former head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, and the cousin of Brig. Gen. Rustum al-Ghazali, head of Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon. A college graduate who joined the Muslim Brotherhood and later the al-Murtada movement, Ghazali embraced Shiism publicly and began to proselytize. He received financial support from Iran and gave inducements to young people, especially cash, furniture, books and clothing. He also promoted temporary marriages with young girls in order to satisfy men’s sexual needs without committing them to permanent marriage. Anyone who opposed him found himself in prison or was threatened by the Syrian security forces, to which Ghazali was very close through his family connections.

Currently Ghazali holds the position of preacher at the Ali b. Abi Talib Mosque in the al-Zahira neighborhood of the city of Dara, a Sunni mosque that Ghazali took over by force.

The population of the province of Dara also contains a large Iraqi Shiite population that pre-existed the fall of Baghdad in 2003 and has continued to grow. In the city of Dara one entire street is occupied only by Iraqi Shiite merchants. They have built a husayniyya, where all who convert to Shiism can make use of such facilities as a kindergarten, a computer room and a library for children.

Abu Jafar al-Iraqi has had a profound influence on conversions to Shiism in this region. Iraqi engaged in missionary work among the wealthy, as well as among physicians, to whom he offered free trips to Iran; he also gave gifts and cash to the poor and to students. He attended meetings at which he cursed the Prophet’s Companions and accuse Aisha of adultery. He disseminated hundreds of Shiite missionary books throughout the province and was the preacher at the recently constructed Great Messenger Mosque in Dara.

Iraqi left Syria for Iraq after the fall of Baghdad; his place was taken by Kazim al-Tamimi, a Shiite missionary, too, but with less of a presence than the former. For that reason Iraqi was called back, but for reasons unknown he left again two months after his return.

The building of husayniyyas has been an indicator of the increasing prominence of Shiism in the province of Dara, as well as a tool in the attempt to convert more Syrians. The first husayniyya in the city of Dara was built in 1976 near the airport, next to two Sunni mosques. Shiite clerics from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria are constantly invited to visit, in particular Abdallah Nizam, head of the Muhsiniyya School in Damascus, a powerful Shiite cleric and leader who takes part in every convocation of Shiite clerics in Syria. Other towns, ranging in population from 33,000 inhabitants to 5,000 inhabitants, also boast husayniyyas. In some cases, such as in the town of al-Maliha al-Gharbiyya, the building of the husayniyya has led to a voluntary segregation of Shiites from Sunnis, and the Shiites have even given their stores and work­shops new and typically Shiite names.

Conversion to Shiism has also taken place in many towns and villages where there are no husayniyyas. In the town of al-Sura, for example, a particular Shiite family is actively engaged in missionary work, providing inducements to young people to convert. It is reported that the father even offers his daughter in temporary marriage in order to attract young men. A third-year student at the Sayyida Zaynab Hawza, this young woman has supposedly entered into more than fifty temporary marriages within a span of a few months.

Conversion to Shiism in the Province of al-Hasaka

A number of sources point out that Shiite missionaries in the province of al-Hasaka (whose population is mostly Kurdish) have recently begun to be very active. Flyers calling on people to convert, targeting mainly young people and the unemployed, have been distributed in shops in the city of al-Hasaka; these brochures promise a monthly stipend of between 5000 and 10,000 Syrian pounds (about $200) to converts. Shiite missionaries exploit the region’s poverty, with the full knowledge of the local authorities. According to some sources this activity is sponsored by the Iranians, through their cultural attaché in Aleppo, with the cooperation of the Syrian intelligence services. The attaché is a cleric by the name of Ayatollah Abd al-Sahib al-Musawi, a sophisticated Iranian Arab, who speaks fluent Arabic.

The leaders of the missionary movement in the province have allegedly trained a great number of people, either by sending them to Iran on full scholarships, for the purpose of studying the Shiite creed, or by financing trips to visit family members in southern Lebanon. The missionaries enjoy the protection of the Syrian authorities, who allow them full use of the province’s mosques and grant them complete freedom of movement.

The leaders of the conversion movement also buy land for the construction of husayniyyas. The latest such acquisition was in the Kurdish city of Qamishli. Recently, too, a husayniyya dedicated to the Prophet’s family was constructed in al-Nashwa, financed by a Shiite businessman from Kuwait.

The Shiites in the al-Hasaka Religious College instituted the recital of prayers for the birth of a Shiite saint; some of the college’s teachers also teach that temporary marriages are sanctioned by Muslim law.

The leading Shiite missionaries in the province are Mahmud Nawaf al-Khalif, Dr. Hasan al-Ahmad al-Mashhadani and, perhaps the most prominent, the black-turbaned Abu Firas al-Jabburi (Mustafa Khamis), in addition to Abd al-Muhsin Abdallah al-Sarawi, author of a number of books, among them Eight Issues Easily Understood. At least one of the province’s missionaries owns a large bookstore, where weekly meetings are held and people are enticed to adopt Shiism.

Conversion to Shiism in Latakia

Conversions to Shiism in the city of Latakia began in the 1980s, at the instigation of the al-Murtada movement. This movement constructed some seventy-six husayniyyas in the Latakia region, the largest of which, in the Damsarkhu neighborhood, has an area of 6000 m², and the smallest, in the village of Ayn al-Tina, has just 40 m². In the past these husayniyyas were not used for missionary activity at all; rather, they served as meeting places for people opposed to the government. However, after the death of President Hafiz al-Asad, when his son Bashar enabled Teheran to gain increasing influence—especially after the fall of Baghdad—the Iranians began to manage the affairs of the Shiites in Latakia. This new phase was inaugurated by the construction of a hawza (The Great Messenger Hawza) in the al-Azhari neighborhood of Latakia, on a tract of land belonging to a Sunni endowment. The hawza’s manager is an Iraqi citizen, a representative of Khamenei, by the name of Ayman Zaytun.

In the al-Ziraa neighborhood a cultural center has been constructed that employs over three-hundred Iraqis and Lebanese whose job it is to approach people and offer them inducements to convert. Iranian officials visit the province regularly. While visiting the area, the Iranian Minister of Housing gave away three hundred newly built apartments to new converts to Shiism in Latakia. Even the head of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, Rafsanjani, visited the region and called on the inhabitants to visit Iran.

Neither the province governor nor the provincial party secretary, the two highest officials in the region, go anywhere without Ayman Zaytun, whose picture often appears in the daily newspapers. Zaytun has a say in all administrative appointments in the city, and quite openly promises jobs to converts to Shiism. At a closed meeting he went so far as to boast that “the West thinks we shall attack it from Sidon and Tyre, but we shall surprise them from Latakia and Tartus.” Shiite leaders in Latakia promise young people jobs, acceptance to university, and even wives. Those who want to participate in a holy war are sent to southern Lebanon.

Syrian universities and colleges also display the effects of Iranian influence. For example, the president of Tishrin University in Latakia provided two buildings on the campus to the Iranian ambassador in March 2007 for the purpose of establishing an Islamic college within the university.

Conversion to Shiism in Aleppo

Aleppo, too, has been experiencing the phenomenon of conversions to Shiism, with several prominent residents serving as missionaries. The main Shiite center in Aleppo is the al-Nuqta Mosque near Jabal al-Hawshan. Near the city there are two Shiite villages, Nubbal and al-Zahra, whose inhabitants are very active in Shiite affairs.

Shiites control the Aleppo Red Crescent, the Red Crescent Hospital in the city is Iranian. The Iranian Consulate in Aleppo, headed by Abd al-Sahib al-Wahid al-Musawi, is very actively engaged in missionary work among university students. The consulate is quite close to the campus and provides meals to students in the hope of inducing them to convert. Shiites in Aleppo typically hold large celebrations on the Prophet’s birthday, the birthday of the sixth Imam Jafar al-Sadiq, and during Islamic Unity Week.

An example of the latter was the celebration on May 30, 2002, which took place at the al-Nuqta (“The Drop”) shrine; the celebration was attended by some five thousand Shiite men and women, mostly from the villages of Nubbal and al-Zahra, as well as some Sunnis. The festivities were very carefully prepared by the Iranian consul in Aleppo, including a large screen for those who were not close enough to see the notables, along with loudspeakers and projectors. The walls were covered with large signs on which traditions about the Prophet were inscribed. The celebration opened with the recitation of a few Quranic verses.

Hezbollah figured prominently there. Hasan Nasrallah’s picture was placed next to those of Khomeini and Ali Khamenei. The organization was represented by Nas­rallah’s deputy, Shaykh Naim Qasim, who spoke about Hezbollah’s achievements in southern Lebanon in terms of their propaganda value to the Shiites. He was followed by a Shiite poet, Abd al-Karim Taqi, who recited a poem about conversion to Shiism. At the end of the celebration the Iranian cultural attaché al-Musawi spoke, and men­tioned a number of books that might prove useful for promoting people’s faith, such as Nahj al-balagha and al-Sahifa al-Sajjadiyya. But perhaps the most significant event at the celebration was a mass marriage ceremony, in which sixty couples were wedded at the Iranian embassy’s expense (as proclaimed by the announcer at the event). Musawi also announced that each of the grooms would receive a gift from the Iranian embassy and Khamenei’s office.

Conversion to Shiism in Idlib

Similar activities promoting conversion have taken place in the province of Idlib.

Towards the end of 2006 a religious Shiite college opened in the province. Its curriculum is Iranian and the school offers numerous inducements to potential converts. Shiite missionaries are very active in the province. Some of them hand out monetary inducements, such as a sum of 2500 Syrian pounds, to whomever names his son Hasan or Husayn.

One of the most prominent centers of Shiite activity in the province is Zarzur, a village near the Turkish border. The first conversions to Shiism in the village occurred in 1945, performed by Muhammad Naji al-Ghafri, himself a convert to Shiism. His missionary activities were supported by the Iranian embassy in Damascus, which maintained regular contact with him and financed the construction of a husayniyya.

Today a fourth of the village’s inhabitants are Shiites. Whole clans have converted, including the Tarmash, the al-Manjad, and the Asayyad. By now Shiism has also spread into some neighboring villages, although in smaller numbers.

Conversion to Shiism in Hims and the Coast

In Hims there is a large concentration of Shiites in the al-Bayyada neighborhood, one of whose streets is named Iran Street. There is also a large Shiite mosque there. The village of al-Hamidiyya, not far from Hims, is Shiite as well.

Iranian and Iraqi Shiites are active along the Syrian coast. Jamil al-Asad controlled the Syrian ports and the areas nearby with the support and encouragement of his brother Hafiz al-Asad. He also did missionary work in these areas to convert Alawites to Shiism. One of their great successes has been that the head of the Tartus religious endowments (awqaf), Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid, has publicly advocated the Shiite creed, as stated on the front page of al-Minbar, a journal devoted to converts to Shiism.

Looking Ahead

Today Shiites constitute somewhat more than one percent of the eighteen million people presently living in Syria. Many circumstances at present—geographic, political, historic, and financial, but perhaps not overwhelmingly religious or doctrinal—are conspiring to cause an increase in conversions to the Shiite creed. The percentage of Shiites in the year 1953 was not more than 0.4% of all the Syrian population.

The increasing number of conversions is, first, the consequence of geography and history. Shiites in Syria today possess a considerable number of institutions and shrines, the most important of which are the tomb of Sayyida Zaynab, the shrine of Sukayna daughter of Husayn, and the “Mosque of the Drop” in Aleppo. All these sites are visited by numerous Shiite pilgrims from the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Iran. Iraqi Shiite immigrants as well as Iranian pilgrims who come to visit Shiite shrines in Syria constitute a considerable human army imbued with the Shiite creed, and help disseminate its ideas and doctrines.

Other features of Shiism have made the creed attractive to potential converts. Shiites build houses of study next to their shrines and establish religious authorities there, which has given them a certain independence with respect to religious rulings and the leadership of the community. Shiites, moreover, celebrate many holidays, including Ashura, al-Ghadir, the birth and death dates of the Twelver Shiite imams, and others. Sunnis are invited to these celebrations and are thus exposed to Shiite ideas.

Politics has also played an important role in fostering Shiite conversions. After Bashar al-Asad came to power in 2000, Iranian influence in Syria grew considerably, supported and encouraged by the Syrian regime. As a result numerous Iranians and Iraqis became naturalized Syrian citizens, and the pace of conversion to Shiism grew, especially among Alawites, who had a desire to belong to a larger and more broadly-based community.

The Iranian embassy and its cultural attaché in Damascus have been active in the dissemination of the Shiite creed in Syria and are active in missionary work in every province of the country, which they support by way of financial inducements, scholarships to Iranian universities, free medical care, monthly stipends, and more. In addition, the Lebanon war of 2006 fanned anti-Western sentiment by the Syrian media, who oppose the existence of Israel and support the resistance movements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and in Lebanon. This aroused a wave of admiration for Hasan Nasrallah, with the result that many Syrians converted to Shiism and Shiite activities in Syria intensified.

This kind of demonstration of pro-Shiite feeling (by showing admiration of Nasrallah) may be only momentary, as it is rooted in an emotional reaction rather than on deep-seated religious conviction. However, whatever the nature of the motiva­tion, the fact of the swing towards Shiism within Syria remains.

Source: Hudson Institute by Khalid Sindawi