Syrian embassies between legitimacy and infiltration attempts by pro-Assad diplomats

Syrians often sarcastically repeat the phrase, "Has Syria become Afghanistan?" in reference to the exaggerations some make about the state of religious freedom in the country.

However, with all due respect to the Afghan people and their experience, Syria differs greatly in terms of popular and political awareness and the composition of civil society. However, the only similarity between the two cases is the potential for some embassies to become arenas of diplomatic conflict after the collapse of the Assad regime, and the attempts of remnants of the regime to infiltrate again through foreign missions.

This limited similarity does not mean that the two experiences are identical; it merely highlights the need to be wary of soft maneuvers, which could reopen the door to the old regime's tools under new guise.

Despite the fall of the Syrian regime and the formation of a new administration that enjoys the legitimacy of the revolution, real concerns remain regarding attempts by the remnants of the regime and its foreign affiliates to regain influence through diplomacy. This could be a repetition of the Afghanistan scenario, where some Kabul embassies abroad continued to fly the old flag and refused to recognize the new government.

However, in the Syrian case, the equation is different. The Syrian flag remains flying, and the new legitimacy is clear. However, suspicious signs have begun to emerge in some embassies, where figures affiliated with the former regime are attempting to impose themselves as a "third line," under vague slogans such as "political review" and "correcting the course."

In this context, it is useful to recall what happened in Afghanistan, where several embassies around the world refused to recognize the new government after the Taliban took control and continued to fly the flag of the previous government. The most prominent of these embassies are: London, Berlin, Brussels, Bonn, Switzerland, Austria, France, Italy, Greece, Poland, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and Norway.

This model reflects how embassies can become tools of political conflict and underscores the need to be wary of similar attempts that may occur in the Syrian situation, even after the official fall of the regime.

In this context, we recall what journalist Ali Hafez wrote in an article published on Al Jazeera Net on January 29, 2025, about Bashar al-Jaafari, one of the most prominent diplomatic figures who represented the regime for decades. Hafez says, "It is unlikely that any observer of Syrian affairs would have imagined that veteran diplomat Bashar al-Jaafari would turn against his "benefactor," deposed President Bashar al-Assad, so quickly and in such a manner. This shift included a complete reversal, as if he had never served the Assad regime. He defended its crimes in international forums, exploiting his culture and skill, as if he were the devil's advocate.

Hours after the fall of the regime of the younger Assad on December 8 and his escape to Russia, al-Jaafari, while serving as the Syrian ambassador to Moscow, surprised the world with an attack on the two Assads."

This transformation is not an isolated case; rather, it reflects a general pattern of opportunistic political behavior by the remnants of the regime, attempting to appear repentant or "realistic," while in essence seeking to recycle themselves and advance their project through soft diplomatic channels. Just as they turned against Assad, they will not hesitate to turn against whoever came after him if the opportunity presents itself.

Today, there are innocuous calls to restructure political representation, starting with symbolic demands such as amendments to the constitutional declaration, the state religion, and the presidency. These demands are exploiting the momentum of the "coastal events" in an attempt to undermine the revolution's achievements and present these remnants as a "moderate" alternative to the international community.

These movements require real vigilance, especially since the battle did not end with the fall of the regime. Rather, a new phase of the struggle has begun to consolidate revolutionary legitimacy and prevent any soft infiltrations that might recycle the old tools of tyranny with new facades.

By Hussein Shishakli