We want to work with a system of continuous power and permanent reforms. We do not want reform to be a temporary change like a storm.
With the victory of the revolution, the end of Assad's rule, and the entry of a large number of Salvation Government cadres into government departments and institutions, the situation in ministries and public departments can be divided into two main phases:
Phase One:
A generally similar mechanism prevailed in all government departments:
* Initially, every "shabiha" or extremely corrupt person fled Syria and did not remain in Syria, but infiltrated Lebanon and other countries.
* A staff was brought in that included:
* Employees from the Salvation Government.
* Trusted figures from the "Committee" to supervise and monitor.
* There were some beneficiaries (who believed it was a matter of dividing the "cake") who entered government institutions through their relatives.
* Key files were received in each institution, and managers and supervisors from the Salvation Government were appointed, while former managers and even ministers were retained temporarily to handle the files.
* The new managers began to try to understand the work, responsibilities, and working mechanisms of the institutions and directorates. The primary recourse was to recruit former employees—most of whom were of the same political persuasion and were appointed on flawed and unequal basis. Some tried to prove their competence, while others entered through religious affiliations.
* On another note: In each ministry, a committee was set up to evaluate employees with the aim of eliminating the redundant, the reckless, and the incompetent. This committee's work was shrouded in secrecy and extreme discretion—a very good thing.
* A state of fear pervaded all employees. Many refrained from speaking about corruption, its cases, and those responsible for it, fearing they would be included in the coming wave of change. Everyone was anticipating their fate and was uninterested in opening any file that might lead to their downfall.
* Subsequently, dismissal lists were issued for employees in most ministries and institutions, and a number of prominent figures were dismissed. However, many of the corrupt individuals who had gone along with the wave were bypassed and waited for it to end.
The second stage:
The work of the evaluation committees concluded, and actual work began in the ministries, institutions, companies, directorates, and departments. Two levels of change emerged here:
* The level of old employees and the second tier (those not affected by dismissal): This tier began to infiltrate the new managers. Their most important step was to continue withholding information and work from the lower ranks, regardless of their competence. The goal: to create a segregation between the new managers and the old employees who possessed records of corruption, favoritism, and dubious appointment methods. They exercised a monopoly over access to the new managers, a monopoly over the delivery of information, and a monopoly over work.
* The new managers: They lacked sufficient knowledge or insight into existing methods of corruption. Their primary source of information was second-tier employees (such as department heads). In fact, the corrupt went so far as to participate in decision-making indirectly, as if they were part of the revolution! All this corruption and evasion was carried out under the pretext of "experience," "understanding the required work," and other pretexts. They even attempted to reinstate dismissed corrupt officials with arguments such as "corruption is a general phenomenon resulting from previous poverty." * The weakness of new managers: Their understanding of the work is limited and they need time to understand the subtleties, on the one hand, and they are far from investigating the facts and the hidden aspects of the work, on the other.
A striking example (corruption returns using the same methods):
After a while, some corruption stories were marketed again under various pretexts. The major catastrophe began. For example, the Syrian Petroleum Company and the General Petroleum Corporation began granting overtime to employees without actual working hours—a practice that had existed in the past. Today, it is being marketed under the pretext of "low employee income." Along with this loophole, other loopholes emerged. In the past, there was manipulation of overtime hours (especially at the General Petroleum Corporation), where the human resources officer would distribute overtime hours based on sectarianism and without standards or accountability, setting all overtime hours and Saturdays for himself. Today, with the return of the overtime system, the same phenomenon has returned in a slightly different form.
Conclusion: Corruption cannot be justified under any name, title, or pretext.
Results of the current situation:
* Poor efficiency and incorrect appointments: As a result of the above, we are now seeing a lot of incorrect appointments. Were it not for the media, many corrupt figures would have been recycled. With each appointment, activists, observers, and those aware of history return to prove the corruption of those appointed through photos and videos. However, many appointments remain undetected, and many of the corrupt remain in their positions.
* The silence and frustration of marginalized employees: The remaining marginalized employees have grown increasingly frustrated by their silence due to their lack of confidence in the ability of those coming to effect change. These individuals (who possess the hidden secrets of corruption) will not answer when asked until they are confident in the change and in the existence of adequate and real protection for them.
* The required solution (a strong and secret oversight committee): This requires setting clear standards and a clear plan, and establishing a strong and effective oversight office with powers, linked to and under the supervision of management, and reporting to it confidentially. This office will then collect all the details and hidden information.
Perhaps an electronic program for reporting corruption should be implemented in every institution, with the supervising team having powers and under the supervision of senior management. * Errors in accountability mechanisms: It is important that violations related to corruption cases are not handled solely by the discretion of officials, as if we were still under the emirate system and the tribal sheikhs' method. We have witnessed cases in which corruption cases were trivialized, which harmed the whistleblower and made them a target for corruption.
Problem with new appointments:
Among those coming from the Salvation Government, approval and appointment began based on qualifications, loyalties, and "longevity in affiliation with the revolution." This led to changes in appointments and some competition.
Conclusion of the second phase:
The "storm" subsided, the committees ended, and the division of labor began. We now had a significant barrier between the institution's senior management and the employees, which brought us back to square one. Powers were divided, and work returned to the previous system without a central anti-corruption committee. Every manager became serious.
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