Will Lebanon learn form al-Sharaa’s government?

 

It’s been about 150 days since Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam took office. On one hand, Lebanon is experiencing its best chapter in two decades. On the other hand, there are concerns about the slow pace of progress – and that another war is on the verge of erupting.

Regardless of whether the fighters on both sides of the Litani River are preparing for a decisive battle – which is unlikely or not—the road is long before Lebanon can fully reclaim its sovereignty from both Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli forces still occupy Lebanese land, and Hezbollah has handed over only a fraction of its weapons – barely the tip of the iceberg.

The repeated rhetoric in both presidents’ speeches about the “Israeli enemy” carries no real weight today, nor is it necessary in modern political discourse.

The bitter truth, for some, is this: it is Israel – not the Lebanese authorities – that will determine the shape of Hezbollah’s future. Israel will define its size, the limits of its capabilities, and its influence.

Neighboring Syria is facing a similar situation, but has chosen a different approach. Bashar al-Assad’s regime has collapsed, just like Hezbollah’s grip has weakened, leaving behind a complex legacy to navigate with the region’s “superpower” neighbor. Israeli forces are also present on Syrian soil and continue to target Syrian sites frequently.

Amid this complex situation, President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government has managed to turn crisis into opportunity – and has earned global praise not only for what it has done, but for what it has deliberately chosen not to do. It quickly abandoned the ostrich-head-in-the-sand approach of previous regimes, which had failed to address internal and external politics with realism.

Al-Sharaa did not attack Israel in his speeches. He did not mobilize his forces or instruct his militias to clash or even respond to Israeli fire. Nor did he inflate government statements with false claims of confrontations and victories. In fact, he never even referred to Israel as “the enemy,” nor did he reject mediation or negotiations with the “evil” neighbor. He made it clear: his goal is to stabilize war-torn Syria – not destabilize those around it.

Lebanon’s president and prime minister come from elite circles – military and civilian alike. Salam is a graduate of the Sorbonne in France and Harvard in the US – arguably the most internationally qualified leader in Lebanese political history. In contrast, President al-Sharaa is a product of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and had seen nothing of the world before assuming power except what lay between Iraq’s Anbar and Syria’s Idlib.

You don’t need a magnifying glass to see that al-Sharaa has advanced Syria’s recovery, securing deals with both friendly and hostile powers. He has neutralized threats from Israel, Iran, Iraqi factions, and US sanctions – through dialogue – and has lured foreign investors with contracts to build and operate airports, ports, energy facilities, and industrial projects.

We recognize that the challenges in Beirut differ from those in Damascus. Nevertheless, Lebanon today has a rare opportunity – perhaps once in forty years – to end decades of foreign domination, from the Palestinians to the Syrians and now the Iranians. This moment demands flexibility and a new approach, unlike the rigid policies of the past.

Looking at the two warring sides – Hezbollah and Israel – Hezbollah has only three possible futures. First: It could return as a cross-border regional force, threatening Israel, managing Yemen’s Houthis, and operating in Syria and Iraq. But that now seems impossible given Israel’s insistence on a policy of preempting any force that poses a border threat. Note that Egypt, Jordan, and Syria – under their treaties with Israel –agreed to regulate weapons types and distances from the border, something Hezbollah used to reject. Yet under the ceasefire agreement, it accepted withdrawal from south of the Litani River, surrendering heavy weapons, military production platforms, and dismantling its infrastructure.

Second: Hezbollah could reposition itself as a purely local force. That would require acknowledging the shift in the balance of power and abandoning its role as a threat to Israel or as a bargaining chip for Iran. It may try to keep its weapons to maintain dominance in Lebanon. To counter that, Lebanese and Israeli authorities are cooperating – Israel provides Beirut with intelligence on hidden arms, and the Lebanese side carries out raids and seizures.