Since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the question of the state has become central to political and intellectual debate, particularly after the collapse of the traditional central system and the emergence of multiple forms of governance and societies outside the central authority.
With the shift in leadership to figures with a jihadi-Salafi background after 2024, the crisis of perception deepened, and the need to rethink the concept of the state itself, not just reform its tools, became apparent.
First: The Intellectual Necessity of Rethinking the Syrian State
1. The failure of the previous authoritarian model, which was based on security force and bureaucracy.
2. The contradiction in the new official discourse between political Islam and puritanical jihadism.
3. The absence of a clear constitution that reflects the popular will, and the reliance of governance on factional and ideological loyalty.
4. The failure of previous experiences in achieving moral legitimacy for the state, as Wael Hallaq pointed out in his critique of the concept of modern sovereignty.
Second: Problems of the Western Model of State in the Syrian Context
1. The modern state is based on sovereignty and central authority, while Syrian society is pluralistic and repels forced unification.
2. The predominance of coercion in governance, rather than the historical participatory and communitarian nature that characterized pre-modern legitimate regimes.
3. Importing the Western model has created formal institutions devoid of moral or local functions.
Third: The political risks of postponing state building:
1. The expansion of security chaos and the multiplicity of decision-making centers, caused by the absence of legitimate authority.
2. The rise of de facto forces and the violent imposition of Sharia law, caused by the legal vacuum.
3. The return of sectarian and vengeful tendencies due to the collapse of societal trust.
4. The recycled conflict through international proxies due to foreign intervention.
Postponement may seem intellectually justified, but it is politically destructive unless it is accompanied by the building of flexible transitional institutions.
Fourth: Can Syria formulate a new concept of the state?
Strengths:
1. A rich judicial and participatory legacy throughout Islamic history, from the system of judges and muftis to local customs.
2. The presence of critical intellectual movements that propose alternatives, such as Taha Abd al-Rahman's ideas on the moral state.
3. A growing popular awareness demanding justice and citizenship, especially after the coastal massacres and sectarian violations.
Weaknesses:
1. The centrality of military and ideological decision-making in the new regime.
2. The lack of public space for independent intellectual debate.
3. The division and fragmentation of society politically and ethnically.
Recommendations:
1. Establish independent local intellectual platforms for a collective rethinking of the state.
What should be done:
- Launch think tanks and academic centers unaffiliated with any political or religious faction.
- Encourage dialogue between thinkers from Islamic, Arab, secular, nationalist, and Kurdish backgrounds.
How it's implemented:
- Supporting community initiatives and independent digital platforms to publish research papers and discussion panels.
- Partnering with Arab and international universities to fund conferences on post-conflict state-building.
- Ensuring intellectual and security protection for participants from political harassment or rhetorical excommunication.
2. Formulating a model of a "participatory moral state" that combines historical and contemporary legitimacy.
What to do:
- Drawing inspiration from historical Islamic values that established decentralized and just judicial systems.
- Integrating these values with modern principles of citizenship and rights within a flexible and non-dogmatic framework.
How it's implemented:
- Forming a multidisciplinary think tank to propose founding principles for a moral constitution.
- Using the Tunisian or Moroccan experience as a prototype for combining modernity and religious authority.
- Involving the local community, including women and youth, in formulating this vision.
- Building flexible transitional institutions that support long-term thinking and do not completely marginalize the state.
What to do:
- Establish temporary structures for the administration of justice and services, adaptable as collective thinking advances.
- Protect public security without reverting to an "iron fist" mentality.
How to implement it:
- Adopt a "community governance" model in cities outside central control, similar to the experiences of northern Syria.
- Train local cadres to manage civil affairs without ideological or partisan affiliation.
- Draft a temporary charter that defines clear and limited powers for these transitional institutions.
Strengthen the role of non-politicized cultural and religious elites in formulating this model.
What to do:
- Rehabilitate local thinkers and reformers whose voices have been silenced by political polarization.
- Involve non-ideological religious scholars and intellectuals in formulating the state's ethics, not just its tools.
How to implement it:
- Create safe dialogue spaces for elites, both domestically and abroad, away from factional polarization.
- Drawing on intellectual figures such as Taha Hussein, Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i, and Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi as inspirational models.
- Producing intellectual and popular content that links the state to concepts such as dignity, objectives, and justice, rather than power and control.
The Syrian crisis is not just a crisis of the regime, but a crisis of the state's conception. The greatest challenge lies not in overthrowing an authoritarian model or imposing an ideological alternative, but in establishing a state that reconciles with its morals, society, and history, without borrowing imported models or hollow slogans.
Anwar Younan
Zaman Al Wasl
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