Among the remnants of Bashar al-Assad's regime, Hikmat al-Hijri stands out, not as a cleric, but as one of the most prominent leaders of the "remnants" who refused to accept the regime's fall and decided to fight in its name until the last moment—albeit under a religious and social guise.
Al-Hijri, who assumed the position of "Sheikh Aql of the Druze community" in 2012, has since formed a close affinity with Assad's authority. He publicly supported his election campaign in 2014, urged the arming of Sweida in 2015, and then urged young men to serve in the regime's army during the most difficult phases of the revolution. These positions were not merely religious choices; they represented a clear political bias toward the regime camp.
After the day of the regime's fall, al-Hijri did not adopt a consensual or nationalist stance, but instead chose to once again align himself against the new Syrian state. He refused to recognize the transitional institutions and attacked any party negotiating on behalf of Sweida. He clearly declared that there would be no agreement with "armed gangs," and that anyone who violated his position would be held accountable.
More seriously, he has embraced former regime security and military leaders, allowing them to return to Sweida under his umbrella. His office has become a public operations room to coordinate confrontations with revolutionary forces and to reject the entry of any new executive authority into the province.
The al-Hijri sheikhdom is accused of recruiting Druze youth to fight against the people of Syria and fueling sectarian conflict under the pretext of "defending Sweida." In reality, however, he has recycled the regime's own rhetoric, turning the sect into a tool in the hands of a losing project, at the expense of shared Syrian blood.
The mobilization led by al-Hijri today is not aimed at protecting Sweida, but rather at protecting an authoritarian legacy that refuses to be held accountable. Anyone who disagrees with him within the province is accused of defection, and organized media and religious campaigns are incited against him.
The question today is: Does Hikmat al-Hijri represent a sect or a hidden political project? His rhetoric, his movements, and his choice of alliances all indicate that he has transcended the position of "religious authority" to become the spearhead of a counter-revolutionary project, with clear Israeli support.
The presence of a figure like Hikmat al-Hajri in the post-Assad landscape represents an obstacle to any path to transitional justice. He neither acknowledges the fall of the regime nor apologizes for his support for it. Rather, he seeks to reassert his authority within a religious framework.
Dealing with this situation requires clarity: a new state cannot be built without holding accountable those who supported the crime, participated in it, or harbored its perpetrators. If these pockets are not addressed, the revolution will remain incomplete, and the state will remain amputated.
Hussein al-Shishakli - Zaman al-Wasl
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