Search For Keyword.

Captagon Networks Between Dismantling and Restructuring

Despite the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, which was widely linked to the Captagon trade as one of its main sources of income, combating this illicit industry remains a major challenge for the new Syrian authorities and the regional and international community.

Syria was the world's main center for Captagon production, with revenues exceeding billions of dollars, surpassing the country's legal exports.

Reports and international organizations have indicated that this trade operated under the protection of influential networks and officials close to the former regime, most notably the Fourth Division, which was commanded by Maher al-Assad.

The Role of "Pharmaceutical Laboratories" in Captagon Networks

According to reports, licensed pharmaceutical laboratories, or those operating as front factories, played a pivotal role in this criminal industry for two main reasons:

- Importing raw materials (precursor chemicals): These laboratories exploited their pharmaceutical licenses to import large quantities of the basic chemicals needed to manufacture Captagon, which were difficult to import illegally in such quantities. These materials were then transferred to clandestine laboratories, some of which were directly affiliated with security agencies (such as the Fourth Division) or trusted business partners.

- Manufacturing and Coverage: It is believed that a significant portion of production took place within these private laboratories or in nearby facilities, providing logistical and professional cover for production, storage, and packaging operations, before being concealed in shipments intended for export via ports or land borders.

New Government Measures and the Reality on the Ground

The new Syrian government, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, has affirmed its commitment to eliminating the Captagon trade, and public steps have been taken to this end:
- Seizing Factories: In June 2025, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced the seizure and dismantling of "all" known Captagon production laboratories operating under the former regime, most of which were concentrated in the Damascus countryside, the border areas with Lebanon, and the Syrian coast.

- Destruction of Confiscated Items: Millions of Captagon pills were announced to have been destroyed in various regions, in an attempt to signal a change in the government's approach.

However, despite these efforts, international and local reports warn that completely eliminating the Captagon trade is difficult for the following reasons:

- Disintegrating Networks Rather Than Eliminating Them: Experts indicate that the industry has shifted from a centralized production model to a more fragmented one, with smaller laboratories emerging in areas with limited government control, such as Sweida.

- Return of former figures: As circulating reports indicate, certain individuals (such as Ghaith al-Ansari, Abdul Razzaq al-Zaim, Ali Tawfiq Younis, and his brother) have returned to their businesses, this is evidence that the financial and administrative structures and networks that once controlled this trade have survived complete dismantling. The return of these individuals to the "front" through their licensed laboratories suggests that they may attempt to resume their operations amid the economic and security uncertainty facing the new administration, or that they are seeking to exploit the transition period to reactivate their businesses with minimal oversight.

- Economic Needs: The Syrian economy remains in deep crisis, providing a strong incentive for continued illicit activity, both for criminal gangs and parties in need of funding.

The resurgence of known Captagon dealers through their own facilities, particularly pharmaceutical laboratories, highlights that the battle to dismantle the Captagon state is still in its infancy. The real struggle lies in dismantling the deep economic and logistical networks that operated under official cover, and preventing them from repositioning and adapting to the new political and security landscape in Syria.

(3)    (4)
Total Comments (0)

Comments About This Article

Please fill the fields below.
*code confirming note