Syria today cannot be read from headlines, White House statements, or even the smiles of international envoys in group photos; rather, it is read from the "gaps." From the things that have not yet been said, from the pressures that have not been exerted, and from the American silence when the voice should be loud.
Washington lifted sanctions, the Caesar Act was repealed, channels were opened with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and its name was quietly removed from the terrorism lists, like someone changing a ship's course without making a sound. All of this happened with remarkable speed, but what hasn't happened is the most important: no real pressure on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), no serious restraint on Israel, and no declared vision for the future of the Syrian state. This is where the concern begins and never ends.
The United States is not acting out of emotion, nor out of morality, nor even out of a desire to "help people," as it likes to claim. Rather, it acts when it feels that chaos has become too costly to manage, and that continued collapse threatens larger interests: Israel's security, energy pipelines, the balance of power with Russia, and spheres of influence with China. Syria, after the fall of the Assad regime, is no longer a moral burden, but an open arena that could spiral out of control if left unchecked.
Lifting sanctions was not a reward, but a "reset." It's like untying someone's leg, not so they can run, but to redirect them. The Syrian economy was dying, and prolonged dying breeds monsters: a shadow economy, warlords, and cross-border smuggling networks. Washington realized that strangulation was no longer effective, and that control through "conditional breathing" was more efficient; I allow you to breathe, but I keep the lung in my hand.
Dealing with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham falls within this context; it wasn't a moral recognition or an ideological conviction, but a cold reading of reality: this force exists, is relatively disciplined, and possesses a local governance structure, so it can be contained, its behavior modified, and it can be tested. The alternative? A vacuum that allows for the infiltration of more extremist organizations, or chaos whose course is unpredictable. Washington doesn't favor "pure" players; it prefers those who are easily manipulated.
But why this leniency toward the SDF? And why the silence in the face of Israeli expansion? Here, the picture becomes clearer. The United States doesn't yet see Syria as a fully formed political entity, but rather as a temporary administrative space. The SDF is a bargaining chip that it doesn't want to burn too quickly, and Israel is a regional deterrent that it doesn't want to restrict now. For Washington, balance isn't about justice, but about "function"; each party is used to the extent that it serves the current moment.
This scenario is eerily reminiscent of the "soft containment" scenario in Bosnia. After the war, no radical solutions were imposed, and the deep structures of the conflict weren't dismantled. Instead, the state was left fragile, constitutionally divided, and sustained by international support. No war, but no normal political life; no explosion, but no recovery. Bosnia became a state standing on international crutches, neither falling nor walking.
The danger is that Syria will be pushed down a similar path: a state without full sovereignty, without a strong central authority, and without the ability to impose its will across its entire territory. It will be governed by agreements, not by law; its crises will be contained, not resolved. And herein lies the undesirable consequence: an entire generation living in a gray area; neither war nor peace, neither outright tyranny nor genuine freedom.
The United States is not planning to destroy Syria, nor to rebuild it as Syrians dream, but rather something simpler and more dangerous: that Syria cease to be a "problem"—nothing more. If it stabilizes sufficiently to prevent the export of chaos, and if it remains within regional red lines, that is enough from Washington's perspective. As for justice, sovereignty, and unity of decision-making, these are always postponed issues.
The real question is not: What does America want from Syria? But rather: What do Syrians want for themselves under these circumstances? Because the most dangerous aspect of soft containment is that it encourages political inertia, numbs the pain without addressing the wound, and leaves everyone in a state of waiting, while time works against fragile states.
If Syria does not quickly, clearly, and boldly develop its own national project, others will do it for it, not out of malice, but out of self-interest. History is unforgiving to nations that leave the task of defining themselves to others.
Syria today faces a critical juncture; neither a moment of victory nor defeat, but a moment of testing. It will either become a state governed from abroad by internal proxies, or a state that negotiates with the world from a position of equality, even if gradually. The difference between the two options lies not in Washington's intentions, but in the awareness of the Syrians themselves.
And here, and only here, does the question become both painful and honest: Do we want to break free from tyranny… or merely escape it?
Ahmed Mahmoud Al-Ahmed - Zaman Al-Wasl
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