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Assyrian Christians: From Taurus Mountains to Khabur Valley, Same geography same victims

The entry of ISIS into the Assyrian Khabur villages in February 2015 was not a spontaneous event, nor was its rapid advance the result of a sudden surge or a complex military operation. Rather, it followed a series of calculated steps that stripped the inhabitants of any ability to defend themselves, leaving them to face their fate alone, isolated, and forgotten.

On the morning of that same day, Assyrian civilians from the Khabur villages (Tel Tamr, Tel Nasri, Tel Shamiram, and Tel Hormiz) were gathered in the town square of Tel Tamr, not as fighters, but as terrified residents ordered to comply. They were forced to surrender any personal weapons they possessed—weapons that were not part of any military formation or insurgency, but rather had been acquired by a small group of young men to protect the villages and ensure the safe evacuation of women and children if necessary, according to the documented testimony of Elias Nasser in the investigative report by journalist Daoud Nasser in 2015.

The presence of these weapons was unacceptable because any independent local force was inherently undesirable. The residents were told that danger was approaching and that the People's Protection Units (YPG) would defend them. They were ordered to wait unarmed and motionless, while the forces that had promised protection gradually withdrew without engaging in combat or establishing defensive positions, leaving the area exposed. Not a single shot was fired at ISIS, neither in Tal Tamr nor at the village entrances, even though the Kurdish YPG was heavily armed and present in the area. Meanwhile, Syrian Army forces stationed on Mount Abdul Aziz (Syrian Army Reference – Ministry of Defense Archives, 2015) watched and observed without intervening. A few hours later, ISIS entered the villages and found the residents gathered unarmed, unprotected, and offering little resistance. They were herded like sheep, while everyone else simply watched. South of the border, in the neighboring Arab villages, there were later killings, forced displacement, the bulldozing of homes, and arson. The forces stationed on Mount Abdul Aziz remained unchanged, observing the scene from above, confirming that there was prior coordination between the parties.

This control cannot be understood without returning to its historical roots, to the Taurus, Hakkari, and Tur Abdin mountains, where the nomadic Kurdish people lived a nomadic life of herding and migration, while the Assyrian and Armenian Christian communities were settled in ancient villages and monasteries (French and Armenian consular documents, 1894–1915). This contrast between agricultural stability and armed migration was exploited by the Ottoman state through the Hamidiye Corps, established in 1891 by order of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. This paramilitary force, composed of armed Kurdish tribesmen operating in the name of the state, was officially tasked with protecting the borders and suppressing rebellions. However, in practice, it was used to target Armenians and Assyrians, carrying out the Hamidiye massacres between 1894 and 1896, killing tens of thousands, confiscating lands, and destroying villages (report of the German consul in Van, 1896). This created a culture of impunity that later became the nucleus of local violence and political mercenary activity, ultimately leading to genocide. In 1915, part of this structure transformed into the PKK in the 1970s, carrying the same geographical and ideological legacy in the Qandil, Taurus, and Hakkari mountains. Meanwhile, Christian communities remain frequent victims of this armed force, even though its name and rhetoric have changed.

Weeks after the ISIS invasion, Daoud Jindo, the commander of the Assyrian village defense forces (testimony of Elias Nasser, 2015), was assassinated because he refused to subject an independent local force to any partisan agenda. His comrade survived and, in his testimony, revealed the true identity of those who lured and shot them, removing any ambiguity about the perpetrators and proving that the assassination was not random but a premeditated crime intended to eliminate any resistance to control. Jindo's assassination was not merely the killing of a man; it was the decapitation of a nascent defense structure and a message to anyone contemplating independence: there is no place for any independent Assyrian force outside the permitted framework.

Afterward, the villages became flashpoints, their inhabitants used as political pawns, and mounting pressure made any attempt at accountability a real risk. Over time, this pattern of control expanded to 35 Assyrian villages along the Khabur River between 2016 and 2024 (see the ICAD Photo Report, 2025). These villages effectively became besieged enclaves, with residents having no say in internal affairs and no permitted armed movement. Their very existence was exploited as a readily available political tool; in negotiations, they were invoked as minorities in need of protection, but in times of escalation, they were left to face the consequences. Christian schools were forcibly closed, their administrators and students expelled, churches were converted into military headquarters and logistical hubs, and psychological and physical threats became a daily reality. While the media narrative claimed to protect minorities, the reality on the ground was that residents were being used as human shields, forced to bear arms, and subjected to the violation of their religion, education, and property.

In 2025–2026, an ICAD photo report clearly confirmed this reality: 35 Assyrian villages had been transformed into open-air prisons. Residents were forced to take up arms in a mobilization against the Syrian government, and any refusal subjected them to pressure and harassment. Claims of withdrawal to predominantly Kurdish areas did not reflect the reality on the ground. Public appeals reported by The Assyrian newspaper confirmed that Christian residents were being forcibly recruited into armed groups, that no other option was possible, and that their daily lives had become hostage to this situation. Meanwhile, leading figures from the Syriac Democratic Organization, most notably Gabriel Moushe, emphasized that Christians and Assyrian Syriacs support the sovereignty of the Syrian state and reject the exploitation of their areas for partisan or military purposes, affirming the right of residents to security and to remain peacefully in their villages.

From a historical perspective, this control is neither new nor sudden, but rather an extension of a long process that began with the Ottomans, when armed tribes in the Taurus and Hakkari regions were used against settled Christian communities. The methods of plunder, coercion, and local terror culminated in the massacres of 1915 and the subsequent displacement of Assyrians to the Syrian Jazira and the Khabur Valley. There, villages were officially established within the framework of Syrian sovereignty, official land ownership was granted, and the dominant communities faced a powerful armed force.The state framework was reshaped, while local autonomy and genuine sovereignty were not always permitted, until the events of 2015–2026, when slogans of protection became a facade, and psychological, physical, and economic pressure became a means of stripping the population of its will. This confirms that the land, which has been Syrian from the beginning, has not changed, but those who control it and make decisions in its name have changed over the centuries; from the Ottoman Hamidiye regiments (French and German consular documents, 1891–1896) to the PKK, and finally to the SDF today. This has left the Assyrian Christians as continuous victims on this land for over a century, trapped between the legacy of historical violence and the current reality of foreign control over their sovereignty and their right to remain in their villages.

Reem Al-Nasser - Zaman Al-Wasl

Zaman Al Wasl
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