Homs Victory Boulevard: Who is behind the project?

The "Victory Boulevard" project presents itself as one of the biggest reconstruction bets in Homs: thousands of units, a huge public park, underground parking, hotels, offices, shops, and ultra-modern architectural design. But behind the model images and the high demand for subscriptions lie more difficult questions: Who is the legally registered developer? What is its actual track record in executing projects of this scale? Who is the main contractor? How will the labor, equipment, and infrastructure be secured? And was the project designed primarily to solve the housing crisis or to maximize investment and resale value?

1. A Massive Project by All Measures

According to the latest official information at the time of the project's launch on August 21, 2026, Victory Boulevard includes approximately 2,500 residential, commercial, administrative, and hotel units, about 500,000 square meters of above-ground buildings, in addition to nearly 250,000 square meters of underground parking with a capacity of approximately 5,000 cars, and a public park of approximately 350,000 square meters. The project is divided into three phases with announced timeframes of 3, 5, and 7 years.

However, this description differs from the initial proposal in August 2025, when the Homs Governorate spoke of a project providing approximately 4,500 housing units and aiming to improve services and living conditions and meet the needs of the population. The shift from "4,500 housing units" to "2,500 residential, commercial, administrative, and hotel units" does not necessarily imply a contradiction; it may be the result of redesign and a different definition of the units. Nevertheless, it reveals that the project has evolved from a broad housing initiative into a mixed-use urban investment product.

2. The first investigative question: Who exactly is "Al-Omran"?

Herein lies the real ambiguity. The official Homs Governorate announcement of August 7, 2025, referred to the company as "Al-Omran Real Estate Development and Investment Company." The company's website published the memorandum of understanding under the same name, while the same website used the name "Al-Omran Holding Company" in the foundation stone announcement. At the project's official launch in August 2026, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) presented Rifai Hamada as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Al-Omran Holding Company, the project's developer.

The difference in trade name is not in itself evidence of a violation, as Al-Omran Holding Company could be the parent company and Al-Omran for Real Estate Development and Investment a subsidiary or operating name. However, in a project involving the collection of substantial sums from the public, it is essential that the contracting entity be clearly identified.

The official and public materials reviewed for this investigation did not clearly reveal the following: the developer's commercial registration number, country of registration, declared capital, shareholder structure, or a complete published copy of the final development contract. Furthermore, open-source research into publicly announced investment companies in Syria in 2025 found no clear and extensive public record of Al-Omran for Real Estate Development and Investment under its current name prior to the project.

3. Confusion with "Al-Omran Kuwaiti": A Question Mark, Not a Minor Detail

Some media coverage described "Al-Omran" as a Kuwaiti company established in 2006 and owned by Rifai Hamada. However, research in open sources reveals the existence of several Arab companies bearing the name "Al-Omran" or similar names, making the attribution of any previous record to the current Syrian company a matter requiring legal documentation, not merely a similarity in name.

Therefore, it is insufficient to simply state that the company is "Kuwaiti" or has a long history; what is required in a project of this scale is the publication of the full legal name, registration number, registration authority, names of shareholders, and paid-up capital. The absence of this information from the project's public profile is one of the most significant points of ambiguity that must be resolved.

4. Rifai Hamada is not unknown... but that doesn't solve the developer's record problem

Conversely, there is no similar problem in proving the existence of Rifai Hamada and his engineering companies. The official Spanish commercial register confirms the establishment of HESCO European Group SL in 2021 with a capital of €40,000, listing Rifai Hammada Abbara as the sole owner and director. Other Spanish records show engineering and real estate companies associated with it, and HESCO's own records confirm international engineering and consulting activity.

This is a clear strength: behind the project is someone with a documented commercial and engineering presence, not just untraceable names. However, experience in design, consulting, and planning management does not automatically equate to the experience of a "main developer" who manages financing, off-plan sales, dozens of contractors, procurement, infrastructure, serving thousands of clients, and then final handover.

5. Who is the main contractor? A question with no clear public answer.

As of the date of this investigation, the official materials reviewed do not mention the name of a main contractor responsible for executing the towers and infrastructure of the project. The role of "Al Omran" as developer/implementer and HESCO's role in urban planning and design are clearly stated, but the name of the entity that will manage thousands of workers, equipment, concrete pouring, facades, and electromechanical systems is not clearly mentioned in the public announcements.

Contracts may be under signing or not yet announced, which is possible at the beginning of a project. However, for the subscriber, the contractor's name is not a minor detail; it is one of the most important indicators of the project's ability to move from the sales and design phase to actual implementation.

6. Escrow Account: A Reassuring Concept Requiring Documentation

Details of the subscription indicate that buyers' payments are deposited into an escrow bank account and are only transferred to the company according to progress milestones. If this system is documented by a clear escrow contract with a specific bank, it is one of the strongest elements of buyer protection and one of the best indicators of sound financing practices.

However, true protection does not rely solely on the term "escrow account." The name of the bank, the legal owner of the account, the conditions for releasing funds, who verifies the percentage of completion, what happens if the project stops, and whether the subscriber has the right to recover their funds and in what order, must all be known. Until these details are published, the escrow account remains more of a potential advantage than a legally valid guarantee.

7. The first challenge: Where is the skilled labor?

Construction of four 12-story towersIn the initial phase, and later in dozens of blocks, hundreds of workers and technicians are needed simultaneously: ironworkers, formwork carpenters, concrete workers, electricians, mechanics, air conditioning technicians, elevator installers, facade installers, insulation specialists, safety personnel, laboratory technicians, quality control specialists, and project management specialists. In a Syrian market that has lost a significant portion of its skilled workforce to emigration, while the remaining labor force is already occupied by private reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, labor shortages could become the first real bottleneck.

The problem could be solved by offering higher salaries, bringing in workers from other governorates, repatriating Syrian expertise from abroad, or contracting with regional companies and contractors. However, each solution increases costs and adds complexity. Most importantly, money can attract existing skilled workers, but it cannot create thousands of technicians in a matter of months.

8. The second challenge: Modern equipment not available locally. A project of this scale requires tower cranes, high-capacity concrete pumps, formwork and modern casting systems, excavation equipment, underground parking facilities, surveying equipment, and laboratories. The Syrian market currently lacks a specialized rental network comparable to those in the Gulf or Türkiye.

This challenge can be solved through importation, which is less risky than a lack of expertise. However, importation involves purchasing, shipping, customs clearance, installation, certification, operation, maintenance, and spare parts—meaning the project requires a well-regulated international supply chain. A delay in a crane, formwork system, or spare parts could impact the entire tower's program.

9. The Third Challenge: Who Will Finance the Infrastructure?

The most difficult dilemma may lie outside the towers themselves. Thousands of units, a hotel, offices, shops, and five thousand parking spaces require water, sewage, electricity, telecommunications, roads, stormwater drainage, and fire suppression systems. The initial project memorandum assigned the company the responsibility for implementing the infrastructure and building projects, while the governorate would provide logistical support, data, and administrative oversight. However, the details regarding external connection points and cost-sharing still need greater clarity.

If the surrounding city's networks lack the capacity, modernizing the networks within the project is insufficient. The central question is: Who will pay for the substations, sewage expansion, roads, and main connection points, and when will these works be completed for the towers?

10. The Fourth Challenge: Management Before Concrete

Initial indicators of the IPO – according to testimonies circulating among attendees – included overcrowding, chaos, and a lack of answers to some questions. The company's website remains very basic compared to the scale of the project. These observations do not necessarily indicate future failure, but they are significant because the problem is not simply "customer service."

A company managing a project of this size needs a CRM system, a unit allocation system, contract and installment management, international procurement, timeline planning, cost monitoring, claims management, contractor management, progress reports, quality and safety measures, and the ability to serve thousands of buyers for years. The chaos in the first public test does not condemn the company, but it underscores the importance of building a professional management system that is just as crucial as constructing towers.

11. Why Wasn't the Project More Like Al Rehab in Cairo?

Al Rehab City in New Cairo offers a different model. Developed by Talaat Moustafa Group, the project was built in phases, with the majority of its built-up area dedicated to residential use. It features mid-rise residential complexes with schools, markets, medical centers, a clubhouse, green spaces, and daily services. Al-Rahab wasn't cheap social housing, but it demonstrated how an integrated project could expand gradually without making every square meter overly complex and expensive.

For a city like Homs, a simpler model might have been envisioned: 5-8 story buildings, standardized layouts, less complex parking, ample green spaces, schools, markets, services, and a greater number of family apartments. This model might not look as impressive on model, but it could be faster, cheaper, easier to maintain, and a more direct way to address the housing shortage.

12. So why was the luxury model chosen?

The most obvious answer lies in the project's economics. The smallest units currently available start—according to the circulated subscription details—at around $72,000, with an initial reservation and the remaining 30% due within three months. This means that the buyers themselves constitute a significant source of construction financing.

To convince an expatriate or investor to pay tens of thousands of dollars upfront, a developer needs a product unlike a typical apartment in Homs: a modern design, parking and storage, a huge garden, services, facades, offices, hotels, and retail. These components serve more than just aesthetics; Rather, it increases the selling price and creates an "investment story" that allows for a higher price and stronger marketing.

13. Did the company prioritize its own interests? What can actually be proven? The company's internal intentions cannot be proven from the outside, and there is no document stating that management decided "profit before the citizen." Therefore, this cannot be presented as a definitive accusation. However, the project's choices can be compared with its stated social objective.

If the primary goal is to provide the largest possible number of good housing units at the lowest cost, the expected economical design would be mid-rise buildings, repetitive designs, less expensive parking, a higher occupancy rate, and directing the largest share of investment into the units themselves. In contrast, Al Nasr Boulevard allocates approximately 250,000 square meters for underground parking, combines residential units with hotels, offices, retail, and services, and adopts a high-cost architectural and service-oriented approach.

These are very rational decisions for a private developer seeking to increase the project's value, attract capital, and achieve strong pre-sales. However, they also provide practical evidence that the project's design and financial priority is the "success of the investment product" rather than "producing the largest number of housing units at the lowest price." This is the limit that is allowed. Evidence: Not proof of personal intent, but rather proof of a clear economic direction in the project design.

14. Questions the company and the governorate must answer before paying 30%:

• What is the full legal name of the company that will sign the sales contracts with the subscribers? What is its commercial registration number, country of registration, and capital?

• Who are the actual shareholders in the developer company? What is their legal relationship?What is the precise relationship between Al-Omran Holding, Al-Omran Real Estate Development and Investment, and HESCO?

• Who is the main contractor for the first four towers? What are their previous projects and their human and material capabilities within Syria?

• What is the name of the bank managing the escrow account? What are the conditions for releasing subscribers' funds?

• Who approves the completion percentages that allow the transfer of funds from the escrow account to the developer?

• Who is responsible for financing and implementing the water, sewage, electricity, and road networks outside the project boundaries?

• What is the detailed timeline for the first phase? How many workers, cranes, and pieces of equipment will be operating simultaneously?

• What is the compensation mechanism in case of significant delays or work stoppages? Are there any performance guarantees or warranties from the contractors?

15. What will eliminate the ambiguity?

The project doesn't need an additional public relations campaign as much as it needs a simple and clear transparency package: publishing the developer's legal record, ownership structure, name of the main contractor, the escrow account agreement or its legal summary, the timeline, infrastructure responsibilities, and independent periodic progress reports.

If this data is published and the actual cranes, equipment, and workforce begin to appear within a clear program, the current uncertainty will quickly transform into confidence. However, if the essential information remains fragmented while sales and collections increase, marketing success will outpace the growth of institutional trust, which is not a healthy equation for a multi-year project.

In conclusion: A promising project, but the real test has yet to begin. Al Nasr Boulevard is not a project that can be dismissed simply because it is luxurious, and there is no evidence to dismiss it as a mere illusion. It is backed by Rifai Hamada, a proven engineering track record, and HESCO has a clear engineering presence. The project has received official support and strong market demand. These are significant factors in its favor.

However, the aspect that remains unproven is the ability of the "real estate developer," as an administrative and financial entity, to transform the design into a functioning city: a clear legal name and ownership structure, a main contractor, labor, equipment, infrastructure, management of thousands of contracts, and a commitment to a long-term timeline. Therefore, the biggest current problem is not a lack of buyers, but rather a lack of information that allows buyers to assess the risks of implementation themselves.

From a public interest perspective, the design and financial data indicate that the current version was primarily designed as a high-value investment product, financeable through sales, rather than an affordable housing project aimed at producing the largest possible number of inexpensive units. This is an understandable choice for a private company, but it places a greater responsibility on the state: to ensure that reconstruction not only consists of attractive and profitable projects, but also includes housing needed by citizens who cannot afford apartments costing tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Zaman al-Wasl