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				<title>SYRIA NEWS | ZAMAN ALWSL</title>
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				<description>Syria leading news site delivering fast, in-depth coverage of the events shaping the war-torn country. https://www.zamanalwsl.net/  https://en.zamanalwsl.net 
Founded in Homs, 2005 </description>
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						<title><![CDATA[Exclusive: North Korea runs underground military base near Assad's hometown]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/33363</link>
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						<pubDate>Tue, 06 Mar 2018 18:55:00 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman Al Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl) Exclusive- North Korea runs an underground military base south of Qardaha, Bashar al-Assad’s hometown in costal Latakia province, well-informed source told Zaman al-Wasl.Long tunnels have been built during the last seven years in a deep valley in Qardaha under the supervision of No]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl) Exclusive- North Korea runs an underground military base south of Qardaha, Bashar al-Assad’s hometown in costal Latakia province, well-informed source told Zaman al-Wasl.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Long tunnels have been built during the last seven years in a deep valley in Qardaha under the supervision of North Korean experts.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font>According to Zaman Al Wasl’s satellite images and a military source the underground facility has been under construction for seven years, started by the beginning if the Syrian revolution in March 2011.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A part of the base is being constructed inside a large tunnel in the mountainous area that lies on the Mediterranean Sea. Just a small part is located outside.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The high level of secrecy and tight guard in the North Korean base raise speculations whether it’s a nuclear facility or overseas depot for North Korean weapons.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp; The military collaboration&nbsp;between the Assad regime came to surface in the last two weeks.</font></div><div><br></div><div><font>&nbsp;CNN <a>reported</a> that North Korea has been sending supplies to the Syrian regime that could be used to produce &nbsp;chemical weapons, according to a United Nations Security Council diplomat.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Speaking on condition of anonymity, the diplomat said that North Korea had sent acid-resistant tiles, valves and thermometers to Syria. The diplomat was citing a report on North Korea authored by a UN panel of experts.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The same report also claims North Korean missile experts visited Syria in 2016 and 2017, after the chemical weapons supplies had been sent to the Middle Eastern state.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><img></div><div><br></div><div>(The construction works began in 2011)</div><div><img></div><div><br></div><div><div>(The construction site in 2018)</div></div><div><br></div><div><img>(The image shows guard posts in the facility)&nbsp;</div></font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Iran stricken by new marine crash]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/32226</link>
						<comments>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/32226</comments>
						<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jan 2018 03:08:01 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[&nbsp;(Zaman Al Wasl)- Iran was stricken by another marine crash as Iranian warship crashed into concrete wave breakers at a port in the Caspian sea following the crash of Iranian tanker Sanchi in Eastern China Sea, according to reports translated by Zaman al-Wasl.The warship Damavand crashed into c]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>&nbsp;(Zaman Al Wasl)- Iran was stricken by another marine crash as Iranian warship crashed into concrete wave breakers at a port in the Caspian sea following the crash of Iranian tanker Sanchi in Eastern China Sea, according to reports translated by Zaman al-Wasl.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The warship Damavand crashed into concrete waves breakers at the harbor town of Bandar Inzali, causing damage to its body. The Iranian Navy rushed to say the damage was light and superficial.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Some thought that Iran talk of minor damage to the Iranian destroyer was premature, and that its crew had been thrown into the sea (four of them rescued while two were missing). It seems that the crash was graver than what the Iranian Navy described.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Regardless of the gravity of the damage to Damavand, the mere crash of Damavand and its impact on the naval pier is a powerful blow to the prestige of the Islamic Republic, which is trying to build its image by marketing its military power, particularly land and sea, and a painful blow to the Iranian military industry. If we know that Damavand is the pride of this military industry, the modern generation of Gamaran, referring to locally manufactured warships. More than 700 Iranian industrial and research centers, collaborated on the design and manufacture of Damavand until the project was completed 2013.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The destroyer Damavand was not operational until two years ago (Spring of 2015), which means it is almost entirely new, and is not supposed to be exposed to such an accident, which a maritime site report said was not caused by weather disturbance in the Caspian Sea, but rather due to concrete errors of the crew during the command of the warship.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In order to shed light on the magnitude and importance of Damavand, it is sufficient to know that the length of this destroyer is about 100 meters and weighs about 1,500 tons. It is capable of carrying helicopters and equipped with anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns and modern machine guns which makes it - in theory - destructive ideal for use in all fields and against different targets.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In addition to the variety of its armament, the destroyer Damavand has significant technical advantages. It was supplied with 25 electrical and communications systems, including naval radars, communication systems, detection and intercepts, which Iran said were domestically manufactured.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Iranian military boasts that when they talk about Damavand, it is destructive, capable of tracking and dealing with air, surface and sub-surface targets at once. Perhaps all of the above illustrates the fact that the Iranian military fleet was exposed to a setback morally speakıng at the very least and that the crash reaffirmed the extent to which Tehran is exaggerating when it talks about the "development" of its military industries and perhaps even its "superiority" over the industries of other countries, which have a firm foot in this field.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The destruction of the warship Damavand three days after the crash of a huge Iranian oil tanker Sanshi (275 meters) while crossing the East China Sea, carrying136 thousand tons of flammable crude oil ( about one million barrels), and the value of the load alone is about 60 million dollars.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Not only did the disaster destroy the tanker and the fire broke out (experts estimated it would be burning for about a month). There were 31 mariners on board, whose fate was still unknown, possibly dead, especially after they had not been found.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Role of Hezbollah, Iran in Ghouta Chemical Attack: Yellow Box]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/31098</link>
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						<pubDate>Wed, 15 Nov 2017 11:17:52 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl)-&nbsp;The third part of Yellow Box documentay about the Syrian Chemcial weapons has fouced on the deadly checmical attack on Eastsern Ghouta on August 21, 2013 that left more than 1466 people killed and how the Lebanese Hezbollah militia took part in the massacre.&nbsp;The data-rich ]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)-&nbsp;The third part of Yellow Box documentay about the Syrian Chemcial weapons has fouced on the deadly checmical attack on Eastsern Ghouta on August 21, 2013 that left more than 1466 people killed and how the Lebanese Hezbollah militia took part in the massacre.&nbsp;</font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The data-rich documentary highlights the Chemical programme since its birth by the Soviet Union and how the Israelis were following up the developing process through its spies.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It is based on studies prepared by group of researchers in the Syrian Center for Scientific Study and Research which explain the establishment of the chemical weapons programme and its development.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><font>Related:</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><a>Syrian Chemical Programme: Production and Storage Locations- Special Report</a></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><a>Yellow Box: Story of The Syrian Chemical Programme From Establishment to Handover</a></span></font></div><div><br></div><div><font><a>Assad still hiding chemical stockpiles in secret depots: document, witness</a></font></div><div><h3><span><br></span></h3><h3><a><span>Assad never stop producing chemical weapons in underground </span><span>Zouba facility: report</span></a></h3></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The documentary also charts the history of the program since has been established, the weapons used during the Syrian revolution to reach the handover agreement and the supposed dismantling of the deadly arsenal.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font></font></div><font><div><br></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div></div><div><span><font>Yellow Box III</font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Israelis were concerned with the fate of Syria’s chemical weapons since the early days of the Syrian revolution due to rapid advances of opposition groups.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A plan was laid by three neighboring countries Jordan, Turkey and Israel in coordination with the American and Russian forces.&nbsp;</font></div><div><br></div><div><font>The plan dictated a direct limited intervention through a commandos operation, to secure those locations in the event the regime collapsed completely.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>But the Israelis and the Americans were thinking further ahead than that. So when the suggestion was made, after the chemical attack on the Ghouta, for the chemical weapons to be handed over in return for maintaining the head of the regime, the suggestion was accepted immediately since it was originally an Israeli idea.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><font><div><span>-Using and Handing Over the Chemical Weapons-&nbsp;</span></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On December 6, 2012, the regime apparatuses by directed by the Air Force Intelligence broadcasted a fabricated video claiming that the armed opposition obtained the technique for manufacturing and using chemical weapons from a Turkish company. In the video, a person appears in a room filled with different bottles full of chemical materials which have the company’s label on them. The person did a live test on some rabbits which died seconds after inhaling the gas. It appears that the video was filmed in the al-Rowad (Pioneers) for scientific projects and it is the sole agent for the Turkish Takkem company with its headquarters in al-Qabun, Borj Hamshou.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The Air Force Intelligence broadcasted a copy of a weak video, in terms of filming, producing and performance, of supposed dissents from the Center for Studies and Scientific Research. In the video, the speaker, whose name is Obay Marouf says he is the official spokesperson for Colonel Ali Tarin… (unclear) Tamer Qaylouh. He appeared with a slogan written behind him reading “We sold you, like you sold us” in a reference to the Syrian regime’s sect. This is supposedly due to the regime smuggling chemical materials to a side he did not name. The video clearly shows one of the regime laboratories. As part of the weakness of the performance, the speaker sends his regards to his fellow Syrians in the regime areas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>On the date of May 14, 2013, less than one month after filming the first vide, a second video was released as Obay Marouf promised. In the video, another person also appeared in the video, who identified himself as Yussef Issa from the Center for Study and Scientific Research.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>He directed a message to his family, and then the video showed chemical materials which he claimed were smuggled out of the Center.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The regime forces used chemical weapons several times in attacks of limited effect which were documented by human rights and media institutions which may have been part of a plan to reach the famous chemical weapons deal. A report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, issued in July 2013, mentioned that the Syrian regime launched 26 attacks targeting 5 provinces using chemical weapons and poisonous gases. The attacks killed 380 people and injured 790 others. Of the places targeted: al-Bayada neighborhood and Deir Balba in Homs; Khan al-Asal al-Sheikh Maksoud in Aleppo; al-Atayba Adra in Damascus Suburbs; and Saraqib in Idlib.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Ghout&nbsp;Attack-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;In August 2013, the regime bombed the Eastern Ghouta with nerve gas when it launched 16 missiles. These missiles targeted the areas of the Eastern Ghouta. One hour after, missiles were launched on the eastern part of Zamalka city in Damascus. At exactly 2:40 AM, the bombing targeting the village of Ayn Tarma with missiles that hit the area of al-Zeyniya. After two minutes, 18 missiles were launched on the Eastern Ghouta areas in Damascus. One missile fell between Zamalka and Arbin.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Missiles continued to be launched until 5:21 AM. Two missiles targeted the city of al-Moadamiya in a crime categorized as the crime of the century.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>After the arrival of the international observers from the United Nations (UN) three days later, the number of victims had risen to 1466 people.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The UN inspectors tasked with overseeing the dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons, started their work on Thursday, October 03, 2013. They ensured the safety of the locations they were to work in implementing the international Security Council decision number 2118 concerning gathering the Syrian chemical weapons ahead of getting rid of it.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div></div></div><div><font>Perhaps the presentation of the previous dates shows that the media whirlwind about the chemical weapons and its limited usage were nothing more than preliminary acts to reach the main crime that would be the regime’s salvation and his means to remain in power. The speed in which the Syrian file on the location of chemical weapons was prepared, is additional evidence of a prior planning for the regime to reach the deal and remain in power. This agreement removed Israel’s fears of the destructive weapons falling into the wrong hands based on Israel’s strategic perspective. Perhaps that plan received the blessing of the regime’s enemies before its friends.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-OPCW Report-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to the report of the UN-organisation for Prohibition of&nbsp;Chemical Weapons,&nbsp;the Assad regime had used Sarin nerve gas in Ghouta attack. The report says that only two types of ammunition was used. The first is BM-14 missiles.&nbsp;The second a locally manufactured missile of caliber 330.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>These two types of weapons are not available to the Syrian armed forces currently. It was coordinated for the weapons to go out of active service in the 1980s. The regime denied that the BM-14 missile weapon was an agent in the armed Syrian forces. However, what the regime and the Russians hid was the fate of the old weapons, where they were placed after going out of service, and what happened to the tons of diverse ammunition used with this weapon.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font>On Septemebr 27, the Security Council unanimously adoptied resolution 2118 (2013) in a fast-breaking evening meeting, the Council determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and security, and called for the full implementation of the 27 September decision of the OPCW which contains special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.</font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The regime handed over most of this, former Soviet imported, weaponry and ammunition to the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. The weapons and ammunition were stored in Warehouse 550, the warehouse for storing coordinated and reserve weapons, in Masyaf. The weapons were not included in the warehouse inventory based on a memorandum signed off on the decision of the Deputy Commanding General and the Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Mustafa Tlass. After Hezbollah received missile launchers, they attached some of them to trucks and hid the reminder in secret underground fortified bunkers. The side most ware of this is Israel.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Studies indicate that Iran possesses the second type of weapon and ammunition that was used in the chemical attack. While it is an active participant in the conflict on the ground alongside the regime, no questions were directed to it.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It is beneficial to look at the attack using prohibited weapons on Khan Sheikhoun. On the morning of April 04, 2017, Khan Sheikhoun was bombed using chemical weapons. Four undirected missiles were launched by a Su-22 warplane which took off from al-Shayrat military airbase. The aircraft’s symbol is Quds-1, and it was flown by Brigadier General Mohammad Yusef al-Hasouri. Three of the missiles were explosive and one was loaded with Sarin gas. &nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Studies indicate the presence of the Syrian version of Sarin which differs in its composition from Sarin produced in any other country due to the Syrian regime using some cheap materials in producing one of the primary roots needed to manufacture the gas. After taking some samples from the Ghouta and from Khan Shaykhun, French experts concluded that the primary scientific composition for the materials used in both cases have the mark of the Syrian Sarin. The issue embarrassed many organizations and countries that claim they are trying to reach the truth.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl obtained voice recordings for an officer in al-Shayrat airbase. Listen… Recordings captured for al-Assad’s officer about the Tomahawk and the targets hit during the American hit on al-Shayrat airbase</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The study that we obtained suggests that the regime hid some of its chemical weapons and did not hand them over. We depend on several pieces of evidence, as the study on this issue indicates that the regime smuggled the chemical materials before submitting its report the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, so before September&nbsp;19, 2013. The material that was smuggled is the material the regime obtained after 2010, so after the execution of the Israeli spy, because the Israelis had detailed knowledge about the regime’s stores from before 2010.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The study raises big questions about Hezbollah’s involvement in the chemical attack as well the attempts of the U.S., Russia and Israel to protect the war criminal who has killed about 1 million people and has destroyed two thirds of Syria, the cradle of civilization.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><div><font></font></div><font><div><br></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span>Yellow box II</span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The second part of ‘Yellow Box’&nbsp;documentary, Zaman Al Wasl reveals the production and storage locations, and the types of chemical gases produced which is under the supervision of the Air Force intelligence and the Republican Palace.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><span><font><span>Production and Storage of Chemical Weapons</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to a report delivered by the Syrian regime to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on September 13, 2013, the regime possesses 12 stable units to produce and store chemical weapons distributed throughout Syria, two mobile filling units and three institutions of a civilian nature.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Institute 6000- Branch 450&nbsp;</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Institute 6000 owns the most advanced laboratories and technical equipment that enable it to produce most of the primary materials that enter into the production of chemical precursors and activators. Strangely, the United Nations Committee did not engage in any operation to destroy or dismantle the Institute’s laboratories or equipment based on the excuse that their uses are circular. &nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Unit 416&nbsp;</span></font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Unit 416 is located south of the town of al-Safira, and it is considered one of the most important sites for Branch 450 and one of the most important factories for the production and development of chemical weapons in Syria. The Unit develops Mustard and Sarin Gas, and it is administratively subordinate to Brigadier General Samir Daaboul, responsible for the central and northern area. After emptying it and the warehouses subordinate to it of the material and handing these over to the United Nations Committee and destroying the other part of the material, the UN Committee detonated the main production site in the Unit to ensure that it will not return to operation.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font>&nbsp;Unit 417</font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>2:24 Unit 417 is located in the Abu Ash Shamat area ( 43 miles east of Damascus). It is overseen by Brigadier General Ali Wannoos. Inside the Unit, there are hundreds of tons of chemical activators and precursors that enter into preparing Sarin, Tabun and Mustard Gas. A secret warehouse subordinate to the Unit takes the form of a massive underground tunnel located in the Jarwa Well area.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Unit 418&nbsp;</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Unit 418 is located 3 miles east of the town of al-Farjlus. It resembles Unit 417 in its architectural, administrative and technical planning as the two were established at the same time under the supervision of Russian experts. Unit 418 is also considered one of the most important warehouses for the storage of materials used to produce Sarin, Tabun and Mustard Gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Brigadier General Samir Daaboul oversees the Unit and his office is located close to the Revolutionary Air Force Intelligence roundabout in Homs.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Ali Center&nbsp;</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Ali Center is located northeastern the desert town of Dumayr, 30 miles east of Damascus, the site is a fortified and camouflaged area. A dirt barricade was constructed south of the Center to hide it from view on the Damascus-Palmyra road.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Al-Nasiriya Khan Jenjil Center&nbsp;</span></font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The al-Nasiriya Center is one of the production locations established in the southern region. It is located on the al-Nasiriya - al-Qaryatayn road north of the General Road on the lower part of the northern slope of the al-Maksar Mountain. The UN envoy destroyed the main production site in the Center to ensure it would not return to operation again.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Zouboaa and al-Mansoureh Center in Nabk</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Zoubaa location is considered one of the oldest chemical production sites in Syria and one of the largest. The site was established with the foundation of the program and its settlement. The Center was built in the form of large tunnels dug into the al-Nasiriya Mountains and work continued on the site for several years. However, the Syrian regime did not account for the injuries that started to appear on the crews working on the site due to the site’s location inside the mountains.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Some of the injuries took the form of chronic respiratory problems which necessitated the site overseers to change the crews working on the site every six months. This issue also forced the project overseers to halt operations in the site on several occasions.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The al-Masoureh site is located close to the former Zoubaa site and administratively subordinate to it. The site is distinguished by its proximity to the strategic hiding place of Scud missiles in the al-Nasiriya Mountains which makes it possible to prepare and equip the chemical warheads for these missiles in ready, equipped and fortified tunnels.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>-Khan Unaybah Production Center-&nbsp;</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Khan Unaybah site is considered the most important and dangerous chemical site in Syria due to its strategic geographical location as it is surrounded by three high, and almost deserted, mountain ranges extending between the al-Narsiriya and al-Qaryatayn Mountains. The site is surrounded by mountain ranges on its four sides. The site is far from any civilian activity where its only connection is to the Syrian Badiya. It is the site for the development and storage of the activators used to produce dangerous nerve gases including the BX gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><span>Jousiyah Unit (known as the Central)</span></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Central Unit is located west of the village Hasya in a mountainous region close to the town of Jousiyah. The Unit is secured by a branch of the Air Force Intelligence in Homs.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Maliki Center is located south of the town of Adra. The Husun al-Bahar location in Tartus. The Latakia location close to the industrial city which is responsible for producing some of the aiding precursors related to Sarin gas. The Baniyas Refinery produces some of the roots that aid the production of chemical activators. The Homs Refinery also produces some of the roots that aid the production of chemical activators. The Phosphate Factory in Homs produces some of the essential roots used in the production of nerve related gases.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Chemical activators need carriers or ammunition to reach enemy locations. These are launched on specific locations for them to explode and disperse the toxic substance achieving the required effect. There are many kinds of chemical warheads that carry these chemicals around the world. The warheads available to the Syrian regime can be limited to the following: 65 Scud missiles of the type Scud-B which can be loaded with Sarine gas. BM-21 Grad missiles which can be loaded with Sarine and Tabun gas and have been used to fire Mustard gas. These missiles leave patches of black residue in the launchers they were fired from, and these warheads are locally manufactured at present. BM-14 missiles which are some of the oldest ammunition found in Syria. These missiles were imported from the Soviet Union. The 130-millimeter artillery shells and 120-millimeter mortar rockets can be loaded with Mustard, Sarin, Chlorine or Tabun gas.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>107-millimeter artillery shells were Korean produced originally but are presently produced in Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Airplane rockets which are rockets that work by free fall. These can be transformed with any of the chemical agents including the VX agent into chemical warheads. Airplane rockets filled with Chlorine were imported from China and they were produced by the famous Chinese Conico company.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Suicide drone planes of the kind RAMI-2, have a small storage space which can be loaded with chemical substances. The drones were equipped with pouches, called beneficial pouches, which were previously manufactured by the Center for Studies and Research in Aleppo. Recently, the regime has engaged in producing short-range missiles such as the Fil missile which can be filled with Sarine, Mustard and Chlorine gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The most important warehouses to store different ammunition of the most important warehouses to store ammunition is Warehouse 572 subordinate to the Missile Administration and located north of the town of al-Dumayr.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The warehouse contains a specialized loading unit for Scud missiles in addition to several missiles that can be adapted to carry non-traditional warheads. The importance of the warehouse comes from its location close to the Ali Center, Unit 417 and Zoubaa Site.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Sawanet Warehouse is a specialized site for launching Scud missiles with a warhead storage warehouse and a chemical storage unit close by. This is considered one of the locations fortified against airstrikes and large missile attacks because of its high fortification and its rocky nature.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The armament Warehouse in al-Rahbet 639 in the town of al-Khatab is big enough to house 350 tons of diverse kinds of ammunition.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Thanaya Armament Warehouse is located close to the Homs-Damascus motorway before the town of al-Qatayfa. The locals know the site as al-Thanaya. Artillery shells and artillery missiles of the type 122-millimeter are stored here.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Armament warehouse 553 in Latakia close to the town of al-Shamiya, and it is one of the largest warehouses in the Syrian coastal region. The larger part of the warehouse stores normal ammunition. In addition to having loading equipment.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Om Twaiqiya warehouses subordinate to the air force in Hama. Palmyra warehouse which is located north of the city of Palmyra. Al-Mazzeh Military Airport, is the site for a squadron of drone planes Rami-2, formed of 14 planes. The planes are called suicide planes and they are capable of carrying chemical weapons. These planes are identical to the Iranian RAED-1. The planes are overseen by the Colonel Mohammad Bilal, the brother of Brigadier Ghassan Bilal the office manager for Major General Maher al-Assad.&nbsp;</font></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><br></span></font></div><div><font><span>Yellow Box I</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span>-Secret Depots-</span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>An official document obtained by Zaman al-Wasl reveals that the Syrian regime had transferred most of chemical weapons stockpiles in 2013 to secret depots held by Maher al-Assad, de-facto military commander of Syria&nbsp;after the deadly Sarin gas attack on Eastern Ghouta suburbs.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Moving most of the chemical arsenal from the Institute 1000 in Jamraya to 105th Brigade near the Presidential Palace in Damascus was on&nbsp;September 19, 2013 at&nbsp;the same day the regime handed the UN Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) a list of chemical sites in the war-torn country,&nbsp;following the Eastern Ghouta Chemical attack on August 21, 2013 when more than 1460 died in the nerve gas attack, two weeks before the arrival of the United Nations inspectors on October 3.&nbsp;&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>At the time, the horrific images from the immediate aftermath of the attack drew global outrage.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div></font></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Assad never stop producing chemical weapons in underground Zouba' facility: report]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/31081</link>
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						<pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2017 11:22:22 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/31081</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl)- A special source revealed to Zaman al-Wasl exclusive and highly sensitive information about the secret Zouba Center which regime has chosen for decades to prepare and produce chemicals that were later used to suppress and exterminate the Syrian people.The source, who spoke on&nbsp;c]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- A special source revealed to Zaman al-Wasl exclusive and highly sensitive information about the secret Zouba Center which regime has chosen for decades to prepare and produce chemicals that were later used to suppress and exterminate the Syrian people.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source, who spoke on&nbsp;condition of&nbsp;anonymity, &nbsp;had worked as a civil servant at the Zouba Center until 2012. He clarified how he witnessed the places and equipment of the chemical preparation, and how he smelled the emitting smells throughout his service there.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>At the beginning, the source pointed out that he had applied for an employment at the 3000 Institute affiliated with the Center for Scientific Research in Barza, north of Damascus. His application got accepted while he was serving in the army. The 3000 Institute summoned him several times to start his job and he told them he had to finish his military service.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>As soon as he completed his military service, the source went to the institute to start his work. He was surprised that they had decided to appoint him in a place he had never heard of before. “the post is sensitive and we are working in it to serve homeland and confront Israel,” an institute official told the source. The burly official had grey hair and was wearing civil clothes and speaking the Alwaite dialect. The source was informed that he is the security officer in the research center.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Next to Scud Division-&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source tries to remember the first time he went to Zouba. He said he arrived in a gloomy place. Later, he realized the place was not only gloomy but also one of the brutal regime strongholds. He says, "I left the institute with two people in Toyota High Luxs heading to Homs road. An hour before we reached al-Nabek city and at a road sign for Yabroud city on the left, there is a well-known road intersection known as Nazlat Hajula, a severe and winding downhill that the car needs 20 mins to pass. In the middle of the downhill, there is military checkpoint to monitor and inspect those who pass along the road.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font>Related:</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><a>Syrian Chemical Programme: Production and Storage Locations- Special Report</a></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><a>Yellow Box: Story of The Syrian Chemical Programme From Establishment to Handover</a></span></font></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><font><span><a>Yellow Box: Ghouta Chemical Attack: Role of Hezbollah, Iran</a></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><br></div><div><font><a>Assad still hiding chemical stockpiles in secret depots: document, witness</a></font></div></div><div><br></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source clarifies that when they passed Hajula, they moved 2 km towards al-Nasirya where they encountered a military division on the right. Later it was known this military division is the 155th Brigade (Scud missiles). On the side of the brigade, the car continued road upward in the mountain to reach Zouba which is located in a place overlooking large areas of its surroundings, which is higher than the location of 155th Brigade. The only place higher than Zouba Center is a military division where tanks are deployed.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><div><img></div><br></div><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source describes Zouba Center from entrance to the last place in it. He explained that the center’s entrance is not any different from regular military divisions’ entrance. There is a room next to the entrance where guards are deployed in shifts who inspect the IDs and register those who enter the center.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>After the entrance, there is a two-kilometer-wide road to the heart of the center used to prepare various types of highly toxic and dangerous chemicals. This heart of the center is tunnels, which constitute the larger and more important section of Zouba Center that extends on an area of 2.5 kilometers long and about one kilometer wide.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Like any regime military division, the source saw a few normal buildings close to each other, including the electricity workshop overlooking the north side, and the mechanics workshop, which is about 100 square meters.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Not far from the mechanic workshop, there is a two-story laboratory. The dimensions of floor in the laboratory are about 6 meters by 4 meters. Parallel to it, there is a lathe and next there is the office of the project manager. The grey-haired project manager is a brigadier-general whose last name is Ramadan and originally from Tartos.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Next to these buildings, there are two warehouses; one for electricity and the other for mechanics. They are carved in the mountain, 30 meters long and 8 meters wide, each with a large, wide door of concrete opened by electricity.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>- Orange and cappuccino-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Until now, our source felt nothing that he was really in front of a secret and sensitive center, but when a worker at the center volunteered to take him to the tunnels, the scene turned upside down.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The first thing that our source spotted was a large, high concrete door that allows for the passage of huge trucks. Behind the door is a vault of 5 meters or more and a length of about 50 meters. At the end of this vault, there are the so-called two halls which are two big centers for the preparation and production of chemicals.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>To the right of the interior to the vault, there is Hall 70 and to the left is Hall 50, both equipped with an independent control room, each with a separate entrance and exit, each of which has a total area of 800 square meters (100 in length and 8 in width).</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>And in the basement leading to the halls, there is an emergency exit in the event of targeting tunnels or if something extraordinary took place. The exit includes iron ladder whose end leads a hole that puts you near the top of the mountain on which Zouba Center was built and its gloomy tunnels were carved.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Our source asserts that access to the tunnels (manufacturing rooms) requires the wearing of a protective mask (original made in Russia), wearing special shoes and outfit to prevent the person from inhaling any gases or bodily injury with any chemical effects.</font></div><div><font>The source describes his astonishment at the first time he saw the tunnels and their contents. He could not believe he would see such a scene, indicating that he had reached the end of the halls where the taps and barrels were filled with the final product. He asked the worker about the barrels’ contents. He answered sarcastically, “this is orange and this is a cappuccino. Do not ask this question again if you want your head on.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Shifts-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source pointed out that the design of halls 70 and 50 are similar in terms of the presence of control panels and timers, huge glass flasks. The size of the flask is the size of a barrel. There is also a storage space for raw materials. However, each hall is allocated for production of specific types which he could not recognize since those working on the chemical production are volunteer military personnel. On the other hand, the work of the civil employees is outside these halls. They work in power, mechanics and supervising the warehouses.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to the source, he used to work in Zouba every other day meaning 3 days a week. The shuttle used to pick him up from his house to the center at 9:30 in the morning and he goes back at 8:00 p.m. with other employees.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>But the most surprising thing is that the source confirmed work was never interrupted in the halls, which were operating on 24 to 24 shifts system in order to build for the regime an arsenal of chemicals and toxins. The source estimated the production to be between 100 and 120 barrels per week.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to our source, the number of workers in the halls of chemical productions is 20 workers per shift. The workers ranks’ range between officers and row officers. The total number of workers at Zouba Center is 120 workers; approximately half of them are civil servants.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Concerning the method of transporting the production, the source points out that he has no reliable information about the matter because the transport of production took place after the end of work (after 8:00). Civil servants did not also know. At the same time, he clarified that the center used to receive 2 trucks to 3 large trucks every two weeks. The trucks would unload the raw materials and others in the allocated space. The load allocated for the halls was emptied by volunteer military personnel and what was the share of the warehouses were emptied there.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>• The security official advised me on being discreet because we work in the service of the homeland and to confront Israel.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Regarding the names of the active officers at the Zouba Center, the source mentioned Colonel Ali Hatoum, in charge of shifts in the halls. He is a tall bald and slim man from the coast region. The source also mentioned Colonel Mohsen Yousef, in charge of the mechanic workshop and and the security officer of the center Haider al-Ali.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Closure-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In February 2012, while the staff at Zouba were working, the source was surprised by the visit of the security officer at the Scientific Research Center and his request to meet with the staff to announce the decision of the closure of the center and transfer of staff to the 3000 Institute under the pretext of fear for their safety and to prevent any targeting by armed men.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Here Zaman al-Wasl interrupted the source to ask him if this is indeed the real reason for the closure of the center or the real reason is the proximity of the center to the 155th Brigade allocated for launch of ballistic missiles. In doing so, the regime activity in launching the missiles would go unnoticed. The the source replied in a firm language that the decision to close Zouba was indeed for this purpose- the proximity to the 155 Brigade and for other purposes.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source cited two things. The first is that the closure order was intended to give a formal justification for the "deportation" of civilian personnel in the center only, whereas the military personnel remained in service. The second is that one of the civilian staff had to get important things from Zouba for work at 3000Institute. After he picked up his things, he told the source that he saw with his own eyes 3 Scud missiles starting from the 155th Brigade to the north, and the regime was keen to hide this from.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>But there is something bigger that the regime was trying to keep secret and in a narrow circle which is adding a new and dangerous mission to Zoubo. The mission was creating a line for the manufacture of explosive barrels, part of which was hinted to our source by the same civil servant who was a colleague of our source. The civil servant who had to pick up somethings from the center.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Our source reconfirmed that nobody would think Zouba Center has tunnels or workshops for chemical productions. He added that, “I do not think anyone no matter how insightful could expect a chemical manufacturing site in Zouba. I saw the site less than normal, although they told me it was secret and sensitive, and I kept seeing it even after I entered and wandered, until I reached the "hidden" tunnels, and then I knew the truth hidden behind this center located in a remote spot. Nothing would show the center as being dangerous. It is not protected by strict procedures no screens, no high walls, and everything that shows is a few humble buildings located on a land surrounded by barbed wire.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Since 1984-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source ruled out that the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had been able to reach the center after the chemical deal sponsored by Russia and the United States. The deal which ordered regime hand over of chemical arsenal. He noted that he does not know exactly neither how old the center is nor the launch year. However, he looked through special records in the center which date back to the year 1984.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source asserts he did not notice any visits by non-Syrian officials to the center during the time he worked there. Even senior regime officials rarely visited Zouba. He was told that Bashar al-Assad personally visited the center under the rule of his father Hafiz, and then Bashar visited it again when he assumed power. again. Also, regime former minister of defense Mustafa Tlas visited the center and toured the tunnels alone and did not allow any of his guards to tour with him.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to the source, he never expected that the chemicals he saw being manufactured was being used to kill the Syrian people. The words of the official who advised him to remain discreet still ring in his ears because he will work in a site that " Serves the homeland and confronts Israel. "</font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Assad transferred chemical stockpiles to 105th Brigade a week before OPCW arrival: Document, Eye-witness]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/31074</link>
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						<pubDate>Mon, 13 Nov 2017 23:01:29 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/31074</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl)- &nbsp;Zaman al-Wasl obtained an official document condemning the Syrian regime by revealing regime manipulation of handing over its entire chemical weapons stockpile a few days before the arrival of UN experts to begin the chemical disarmament in implementation of a Russian-American]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><br></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- &nbsp;Zaman al-Wasl obtained an official document condemning the Syrian regime by revealing regime manipulation of handing over its entire chemical weapons stockpile a few days before the arrival of UN experts to begin the chemical disarmament in implementation of a Russian-American deal between the parties through UN binding resolution number 2118.</font></div><div><br></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The document contains small content, but a serious one. It is a book issued by the 1000 Institute in Jamraya (Damascus countryside), signed by its director, Dr. Mohammed Khaled Nasri, and addressed to the Director General of the Center for Scientific Studies and Research.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Related:</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><a>Syrian Chemical Programme: Production and Storage Locations- Special Report</a></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><span><a>Yellow Box: Story of The Syrian Chemical Programme From Establishment to Handover</a></span></font></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><font><span><a>Yellow Box: Ghouta Chemical Attack: Role of Hezbollah, Iran</a></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><br></div><div><font><a>Assad still hiding chemical stockpiles in secret depots: document, witness</a></font></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Confidentiality-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The document comes in response to a previous book, in which the Director-General of the Center for Scientific Studies and Research ordered the designation of the head of the supervisory committee to transfer the stockpile of chemical materials deposited at the 1000 Institute to the warehouses of the 105th Brigade, the most famous and most important Republican Guard brigade, whose mission is to protect Bashar al-Assad and his palaces.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><img></div><br></font></div><div><span><br></span></div><div><span>In his document, Nasri proposes to appoint engineer Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Firas Ahmad who is security office director of the 1000 Institute as head of supervisory committee to transfer the chemical stock. Ahmad will choose the team to carry out the transport mission in the most suitable and confidential manner.</span></div><div><span><br></span></div><div><span><br></span></div><div><font><div><img></div><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><br></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><table><tbody><tr><td><label><br>''The document embodies how the Syrian regime has manipulated the international community and its organizations, as well it assures Assad's violation of the Security Council resolutions.'' 

"<br></label></td></tr></tbody></table></div></font></div><div><span>This is regarding the content of the very confidential document. Regarding the date of the document and the order date to appoint the committee to transfer the chemicals, it contains sufficient information to deepen the condemnation of the Bashar al-Assad regime of fraud and manipulation, and to ignore all the countries, organizations and personalities involved in the process of chemical elimination of the regime, first and foremost the Organization for the Prohibition of Weapons Chemical (OPCW).</span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The first date that draws attention to the document issued by the Director of the 1000 Institute is the date of the order to name the head of the supervisory committee on the transfer of the chemical stockpile. The date is 19 September 2013, a shocking paradox of the date on which the regime formally handed over a list of chemical production and storage sites to OPCW.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The date of the document itself is September 22, 2013. The date reveals that the regime was racing for time to move its chemical stockpiles from one place to another in a misleading move for all. Chemical dismantling experts had arrived in Damascus eight days after the date of the document to carry out the implementation of the transfer.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Also, the date of the document came days before OPCW resolution concerning the chemical file of the regime. The OPCW resolution warns of concealment or transfer of regime chemical weapons and it was issued on September 27 2013, the same day Security Council issued resolution 2118 to destroy regime chemical stock. The Security Council resolution states clearly in one of its paragraph that, "no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, possess, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons." The resolution also warned of the violation of all or any of the provisions of the resolution - including "unauthorized transfers of chemical arms " considering it necessitates imposing measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations which authorizes use of military force.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span>-Stuffed along the chemical flasks-</span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Nasri document which reveals the manipulation of the regime in the chemical file, is supported by an exclusive certificate given to Zaman al-Wasl by one of the persons involved in the transfer of the chemical stock from the 1000 Institute's warehouses to the 105th Brigade.</font></div><div><br></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source confirms in his testimony that the actual preparation of the chemical transfer operation began on September 24and that the operation lasted one week. Fifty members of the regime forces were chosen to carry out the mission based on their sectarian allegiance. The operation was under the supervision of Brigadier General Yusuf Ajeeb who is the security officer of Center for Scientific Studies and Research with the participation of Lt. Col. Firas Ahmad, the security officer of 1000 Institute, which was mentioned in the document.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source explains how regime elements were assigned to 5 groups; 10 elements for each group. They were transferred from the area of Barza (north of Damascus) to the area of Jamraya. They started work the next night (25 September). They uploaded the chemical stock in flasks and placed them in 5 closed refrigerated trucks. As the trucks got full, they were moved towards the 105th Brigade to be unloaded there. And so work continued in stages until the completion of the transfer of the entire stock.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source points out in his testimony that the transport elements were put along the chemical flasks inside the same refrigerator, and that the new storage space was underground tunnels inside the 105th Brigade.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to the source, he is aware of the parallel operation of the transfer of another stockpile from the 2000 Institute in the Barzeh area to the 105th Brigade.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-House of Power-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The 1000 Institute is located in Jamraya behind Mount Qasioun Mountain northwest of Damascus. It is subordinate to 410 Branch 410, and was established in cooperation with the Soviets in the 1980s.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The 105th Brigade is the first "house of power and military influence" in Syria. A few of the names of its leaders are Basil al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad, Munaf Tlass, Talal Makhlouf- who is current leader of the Republican Guards in Syria).</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The 105th Brigade and the 1000 Institute are approximately located in one area, only a few kilometers apart. Both are close to the People's Palace.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It seems that the choice of the 105th Brigade to hide the chemical stockpile was not pointless. The military site is similar in its immunity to Bashar's palaces. No international party can dare to request to visit the brigade as well as tour and search it. If such a request was made, it would have justified for the regime to thwart the whole chemical inspection, under the pretext of violation of sovereignty and exit from the framework of the chemical mission.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On the other hand, the evacuation of Jamraya from the chemical stockpile gave the regime a very large margin of maneuver, accompanied by listing of the center as one of the "chemical production and storage sites", which the regime handed over to OPCW. The regime knew it could not evade the inclusion of this site on the list since the site has been exposed to various international parties. The regime decided to approve inspection of the site in conjunction with his evacuation, to present himself as "honest" and "cooperative" in the mission, as if to tell the International Community: "I have allowed you to search my most important sites. Stop doubting me.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It seems the regime have reaped the fruits of its maneuver quickly, as back then reflected by statement of OPCW senior official that indicates that there is "no reason to doubt the information provided by the Syrian authorities" in a hint to the chemical production and storage sites provided by the regime on September 19 2013, the same day that the regime decided to circumvent and transfer the chemical stock from Jamaraya to 105 Brigade.</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Intersection-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl exclusive document and testimony used for this report intersect remarkably with a testimony given by a senior leader of an Alawite republican guard in early 2015. He revealed secret places in which the regime hid part of its chemical stockpiles to avoid its destruction including 105 Brigade. The republican guard noted that the entry to chemical warehouses is limited to a small number of officials and senior officers, and it is likely that the warehouses of 105 Brigade is the largest store of chemical weapons in Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Also, Zaman al-Wasl previous study confirmed that the regime concealed some of its chemical arsenal and did not deliver them, and that what was hidden and transported includes imported materials that are difficult for the regime to produce domestically. The regime obtained these materials after 2010 and they are manufactured or semi-manufactured materials with long-term storage capacity.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Under consideration-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Nasri document puts the International Community especially Russia and the United States (the godfathers of the chemical deal) in front of a long-standing reality that has been ignored. The document condemns Bashar al-Assad in the crime of manipulating and circumventing one of the most dangerous and complex issues in the Syrian file.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>While the regime was making statements about its full readiness to cooperate in the destruction of all its chemical stockpiles, it gave instructions to its concerned agencies (intelligence, military, research) to practice the utmost deception and hide what they could from their chemical agents from destruction.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The document also places the UN Security Council in charge of fulfilling its mandate in resolution 2118 of September 27 2013. The resolution which places the Syrian chemicals file "under consideration by the Council" i.e. that the file remains open and permanently monitored.</font></div><div><br></div><div></div><div><br></div><div><font>The resolution stated in one of its paragraphs to ban Syria from "use, develop, produce, possess, stockpile or retain chemical weapons or to transfer chemical weapons in a direct or indirect form", followed by another paragraph stating that " no party in Syria can use, develop, produce, possess, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons. "</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Paragraph 21 sets out to warn against the consequences of breach and manipulation: "In the event of failure to comply with this resolution, including the unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, measures will be imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations."</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Nasri document proves in conclusive evidence that the regime of Bashar al-Assad violated - and proactively - all these paragraphs in part or in full; which requires the Security Council to move in response to the pledge to keep the chemical file "under consideration". This is these violations do not necessitate using UN Chapter VII.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Although the Nasri document was issued several days before Security Council resolution several days, it provides compelling proof of the bold behavior of a regime that was deceiving the International Community and its governments and organizations - at the very time when the regime was under their microscope after the great chemical massacre in East Ghouta of Damascus. It is a given that this regime is more maneuverable and lethal and “bolder” in misleading, after reassuring the International Community that it has handed over all of its chemical stockpiles.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><br></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Yellow Box: Ghouta Chemical Attack: Role of Hezbollah, Iran]]></title>
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						<pubDate>Sun, 05 Nov 2017 20:30:17 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl)-&nbsp;The third part of Yellow Box documentay about the Syrian Chemcial weapons has fouced on the deadly checmical attack on Eastsern Ghouta on August 21, 2013 that left more than 1466 people killed and how the Lebanese Hezbollah militia took part in the massacre.&nbsp;The data-rich ]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)-&nbsp;The third part of Yellow Box documentay about the Syrian Chemcial weapons has fouced on the deadly checmical attack on Eastsern Ghouta on August 21, 2013 that left more than 1466 people killed and how the Lebanese Hezbollah militia took part in the massacre.&nbsp;</font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The data-rich documentary highlights the Chemical programme since its birth by the Soviet Union and how the Israelis were following up the developing process through its spies.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It is based on studies prepared by group of researchers in the Syrian Center for Scientific Study and Research which explain the establishment of the chemical weapons programme and its development.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The documentary also charts the history of the program since has been established, the weapons used during the Syrian revolution to reach the handover agreement and the supposed dismantling of the deadly arsenal.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div></div><div><b><font>Yellow Box III</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Israelis were concerned with the fate of Syria’s chemical weapons since the early days of the Syrian revolution due to rapid advances of opposition groups.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A plan was laid by three neighboring countries Jordan, Turkey and Israel in coordination with the American and Russian forces.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Related:</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><a><font>Assad still hiding chemical stockpiles in secret depots: document, witness</font></a></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The plan dictated a direct limited intervention through a commandos operation, to secure those locations in the event the regime collapsed completely.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>But the Israelis and the Americans were thinking further ahead than that. So when the suggestion was made, after the chemical attack on the Ghouta, for the chemical weapons to be handed over in return for maintaining the head of the regime, the suggestion was accepted immediately since it was originally an Israeli idea.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><font>-Using and Handing Over the Chemical Weapons-&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On December 6, 2012, the regime apparatuses by directed by the Air Force Intelligence broadcasted a fabricated video claiming that the armed opposition obtained the technique for manufacturing and using chemical weapons from a Turkish company. In the video, a person appears in a room filled with different bottles full of chemical materials which have the company’s label on them. The person did a live test on some rabbits which died seconds after inhaling the gas. It appears that the video was filmed in the al-Rowad (Pioneers) for scientific projects and it is the sole agent for the Turkish Takkem company with its headquarters in al-Qabun, Borj Hamshou.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The Air Force Intelligence broadcasted a copy of a weak video, in terms of filming, producing and performance, of supposed dissents from the Center for Studies and Scientific Research. In the video, the speaker, whose name is Obay Marouf says he is the official spokesperson for Colonel Ali Tarin… (unclear) Tamer Qaylouh. He appeared with a slogan written behind him reading “We sold you, like you sold us” in a reference to the Syrian regime’s sect. This is supposedly due to the regime smuggling chemical materials to a side he did not name. The video clearly shows one of the regime laboratories. As part of the weakness of the performance, the speaker sends his regards to his fellow Syrians in the regime areas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>On the date of May 14, 2013, less than one month after filming the first vide, a second video was released as Obay Marouf promised. In the video, another person also appeared in the video, who identified himself as Yussef Issa from the Center for Study and Scientific Research.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>He directed a message to his family, and then the video showed chemical materials which he claimed were smuggled out of the Center.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The regime forces used chemical weapons several times in attacks of limited effect which were documented by human rights and media institutions which may have been part of a plan to reach the famous chemical weapons deal. A report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, issued in July 2013, mentioned that the Syrian regime launched 26 attacks targeting 5 provinces using chemical weapons and poisonous gases. The attacks killed 380 people and injured 790 others. Of the places targeted: al-Bayada neighborhood and Deir Balba in Homs; Khan al-Asal al-Sheikh Maksoud in Aleppo; al-Atayba Adra in Damascus Suburbs; and Saraqib in Idlib.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Ghout&nbsp;Attack-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;In August 2013, the regime bombed the Eastern Ghouta with nerve gas when it launched 16 missiles. These missiles targeted the areas of the Eastern Ghouta. One hour after, missiles were launched on the eastern part of Zamalka city in Damascus. At exactly 2:40 AM, the bombing targeting the village of Ayn Tarma with missiles that hit the area of al-Zeyniya. After two minutes, 18 missiles were launched on the Eastern Ghouta areas in Damascus. One missile fell between Zamalka and Arbin.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Missiles continued to be launched until 5:21 AM. Two missiles targeted the city of al-Moadamiya in a crime categorized as the crime of the century.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>After the arrival of the international observers from the United Nations (UN) three days later, the number of victims had risen to 1466 people.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The UN inspectors tasked with overseeing the dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons, started their work on Thursday, October 03, 2013. They ensured the safety of the locations they were to work in implementing the international Security Council decision number 2118 concerning gathering the Syrian chemical weapons ahead of getting rid of it.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div></div></div><div><font>Perhaps the presentation of the previous dates shows that the media whirlwind about the chemical weapons and its limited usage were nothing more than preliminary acts to reach the main crime that would be the regime’s salvation and his means to remain in power. The speed in which the Syrian file on the location of chemical weapons was prepared, is additional evidence of a prior planning for the regime to reach the deal and remain in power. This agreement removed Israel’s fears of the destructive weapons falling into the wrong hands based on Israel’s strategic perspective. Perhaps that plan received the blessing of the regime’s enemies before its friends.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-OPCW Report-</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to the report of the UN-organisation for Prohibition of&nbsp;Chemical Weapons,&nbsp;the Assad regime had used Sarin nerve gas in Ghouta attack. The report says that only two types of ammunition was used. The first is BM-14 missiles.&nbsp;The second a locally manufactured missile of caliber 330.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>These two types of weapons are not available to the Syrian armed forces currently. It was coordinated for the weapons to go out of active service in the 1980s. The regime denied that the BM-14 missile weapon was an agent in the armed Syrian forces. However, what the regime and the Russians hid was the fate of the old weapons, where they were placed after going out of service, and what happened to the tons of diverse ammunition used with this weapon.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font>On Septemebr 27, the Security Council unanimously adoptied resolution 2118 (2013) in a fast-breaking evening meeting, the Council determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and security, and called for the full implementation of the 27 September decision of the OPCW which contains special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.</font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The regime handed over most of this, former Soviet imported, weaponry and ammunition to the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. The weapons and ammunition were stored in Warehouse 550, the warehouse for storing coordinated and reserve weapons, in Masyaf. The weapons were not included in the warehouse inventory based on a memorandum signed off on the decision of the Deputy Commanding General and the Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Mustafa Tlass. After Hezbollah received missile launchers, they attached some of them to trucks and hid the reminder in secret underground fortified bunkers. The side most ware of this is Israel.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Studies indicate that Iran possesses the second type of weapon and ammunition that was used in the chemical attack. While it is an active participant in the conflict on the ground alongside the regime, no questions were directed to it.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It is beneficial to look at the attack using prohibited weapons on Khan Sheikhoun. On the morning of April 04, 2017, Khan Sheikhoun was bombed using chemical weapons. Four undirected missiles were launched by a Su-22 warplane which took off from al-Shayrat military airbase. The aircraft’s symbol is Quds-1, and it was flown by Brigadier General Mohammad Yusef al-Hasouri. Three of the missiles were explosive and one was loaded with Sarin gas. &nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Studies indicate the presence of the Syrian version of Sarin which differs in its composition from Sarin produced in any other country due to the Syrian regime using some cheap materials in producing one of the primary roots needed to manufacture the gas. After taking some samples from the Ghouta and from Khan Shaykhun, French experts concluded that the primary scientific composition for the materials used in both cases have the mark of the Syrian Sarin. The issue embarrassed many organizations and countries that claim they are trying to reach the truth.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl obtained voice recordings for an officer in al-Shayrat airbase. Listen… Recordings captured for al-Assad’s officer about the Tomahawk and the targets hit during the American hit on al-Shayrat airbase</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The study that we obtained suggests that the regime hid some of its chemical weapons and did not hand them over. We depend on several pieces of evidence, as the study on this issue indicates that the regime smuggled the chemical materials before submitting its report the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, so before September&nbsp;19, 2013. The material that was smuggled is the material the regime obtained after 2010, so after the execution of the Israeli spy, because the Israelis had detailed knowledge about the regime’s stores from before 2010.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The study raises big questions about Hezbollah’s involvement in the chemical attack as well the attempts of the U.S., Russia and Israel to protect the war criminal who has killed about 1 million people and has destroyed two thirds of Syria, the cradle of civilization.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><div><font></font></div><font><div><br></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b>Yellow box II</b></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The second part of ‘Yellow Box’&nbsp;documentary, Zaman Al Wasl reveals the production and storage locations, and the types of chemical gases produced which is under the supervision of the Air Force intelligence and the Republican Palace.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><span><font><b>Production and Storage of Chemical Weapons</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to a report delivered by the Syrian regime to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on September 13, 2013, the regime possesses 12 stable units to produce and store chemical weapons distributed throughout Syria, two mobile filling units and three institutions of a civilian nature.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Institute 6000- Branch 450&nbsp;</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Institute 6000 owns the most advanced laboratories and technical equipment that enable it to produce most of the primary materials that enter into the production of chemical precursors and activators. Strangely, the United Nations Committee did not engage in any operation to destroy or dismantle the Institute’s laboratories or equipment based on the excuse that their uses are circular. &nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Unit 416&nbsp;</b></font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Unit 416 is located south of the town of al-Safira, and it is considered one of the most important sites for Branch 450 and one of the most important factories for the production and development of chemical weapons in Syria. The Unit develops Mustard and Sarin Gas, and it is administratively subordinate to Brigadier General Samir Daaboul, responsible for the central and northern area. After emptying it and the warehouses subordinate to it of the material and handing these over to the United Nations Committee and destroying the other part of the material, the UN Committee detonated the main production site in the Unit to ensure that it will not return to operation.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font>&nbsp;Unit 417</font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>2:24 Unit 417 is located in the Abu Ash Shamat area ( 43 miles east of Damascus). It is overseen by Brigadier General Ali Wannoos. Inside the Unit, there are hundreds of tons of chemical activators and precursors that enter into preparing Sarin, Tabun and Mustard Gas. A secret warehouse subordinate to the Unit takes the form of a massive underground tunnel located in the Jarwa Well area.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Unit 418&nbsp;</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Unit 418 is located 3 miles east of the town of al-Farjlus. It resembles Unit 417 in its architectural, administrative and technical planning as the two were established at the same time under the supervision of Russian experts. Unit 418 is also considered one of the most important warehouses for the storage of materials used to produce Sarin, Tabun and Mustard Gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Brigadier General Samir Daaboul oversees the Unit and his office is located close to the Revolutionary Air Force Intelligence roundabout in Homs.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Ali Center&nbsp;</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Ali Center is located northeastern the desert town of Dumayr, 30 miles east of Damascus, the site is a fortified and camouflaged area. A dirt barricade was constructed south of the Center to hide it from view on the Damascus-Palmyra road.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Al-Nasiriya Khan Jenjil Center&nbsp;</b></font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The al-Nasiriya Center is one of the production locations established in the southern region. It is located on the al-Nasiriya - al-Qaryatayn road north of the General Road on the lower part of the northern slope of the al-Maksar Mountain. The UN envoy destroyed the main production site in the Center to ensure it would not return to operation again.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Zouboaa and al-Mansoureh Center in Nabk</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Zoubaa location is considered one of the oldest chemical production sites in Syria and one of the largest. The site was established with the foundation of the program and its settlement. The Center was built in the form of large tunnels dug into the al-Nasiriya Mountains and work continued on the site for several years. However, the Syrian regime did not account for the injuries that started to appear on the crews working on the site due to the site’s location inside the mountains.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Some of the injuries took the form of chronic respiratory problems which necessitated the site overseers to change the crews working on the site every six months. This issue also forced the project overseers to halt operations in the site on several occasions.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The al-Masoureh site is located close to the former Zoubaa site and administratively subordinate to it. The site is distinguished by its proximity to the strategic hiding place of Scud missiles in the al-Nasiriya Mountains which makes it possible to prepare and equip the chemical warheads for these missiles in ready, equipped and fortified tunnels.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>-Khan Unaybah Production Center-&nbsp;</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Khan Unaybah site is considered the most important and dangerous chemical site in Syria due to its strategic geographical location as it is surrounded by three high, and almost deserted, mountain ranges extending between the al-Narsiriya and al-Qaryatayn Mountains. The site is surrounded by mountain ranges on its four sides. The site is far from any civilian activity where its only connection is to the Syrian Badiya. It is the site for the development and storage of the activators used to produce dangerous nerve gases including the BX gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font><b>Jousiyah Unit (known as the Central)</b></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Central Unit is located west of the village Hasya in a mountainous region close to the town of Jousiyah. The Unit is secured by a branch of the Air Force Intelligence in Homs.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Maliki Center is located south of the town of Adra. The Husun al-Bahar location in Tartus. The Latakia location close to the industrial city which is responsible for producing some of the aiding precursors related to Sarin gas. The Baniyas Refinery produces some of the roots that aid the production of chemical activators. The Homs Refinery also produces some of the roots that aid the production of chemical activators. The Phosphate Factory in Homs produces some of the essential roots used in the production of nerve related gases.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Chemical activators need carriers or ammunition to reach enemy locations. These are launched on specific locations for them to explode and disperse the toxic substance achieving the required effect. There are many kinds of chemical warheads that carry these chemicals around the world. The warheads available to the Syrian regime can be limited to the following: 65 Scud missiles of the type Scud-B which can be loaded with Sarine gas. BM-21 Grad missiles which can be loaded with Sarine and Tabun gas and have been used to fire Mustard gas. These missiles leave patches of black residue in the launchers they were fired from, and these warheads are locally manufactured at present. BM-14 missiles which are some of the oldest ammunition found in Syria. These missiles were imported from the Soviet Union. The 130-millimeter artillery shells and 120-millimeter mortar rockets can be loaded with Mustard, Sarin, Chlorine or Tabun gas.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>107-millimeter artillery shells were Korean produced originally but are presently produced in Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Airplane rockets which are rockets that work by free fall. These can be transformed with any of the chemical agents including the VX agent into chemical warheads. Airplane rockets filled with Chlorine were imported from China and they were produced by the famous Chinese Conico company.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Suicide drone planes of the kind RAMI-2, have a small storage space which can be loaded with chemical substances. The drones were equipped with pouches, called beneficial pouches, which were previously manufactured by the Center for Studies and Research in Aleppo. Recently, the regime has engaged in producing short-range missiles such as the Fil missile which can be filled with Sarine, Mustard and Chlorine gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The most important warehouses to store different ammunition of the most important warehouses to store ammunition is Warehouse 572 subordinate to the Missile Administration and located north of the town of al-Dumayr.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The warehouse contains a specialized loading unit for Scud missiles in addition to several missiles that can be adapted to carry non-traditional warheads. The importance of the warehouse comes from its location close to the Ali Center, Unit 417 and Zoubaa Site.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Sawanet Warehouse is a specialized site for launching Scud missiles with a warhead storage warehouse and a chemical storage unit close by. This is considered one of the locations fortified against airstrikes and large missile attacks because of its high fortification and its rocky nature.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The armament Warehouse in al-Rahbet 639 in the town of al-Khatab is big enough to house 350 tons of diverse kinds of ammunition.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Thanaya Armament Warehouse is located close to the Homs-Damascus motorway before the town of al-Qatayfa. The locals know the site as al-Thanaya. Artillery shells and artillery missiles of the type 122-millimeter are stored here.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Armament warehouse 553 in Latakia close to the town of al-Shamiya, and it is one of the largest warehouses in the Syrian coastal region. The larger part of the warehouse stores normal ammunition. In addition to having loading equipment.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Om Twaiqiya warehouses subordinate to the air force in Hama. Palmyra warehouse which is located north of the city of Palmyra. Al-Mazzeh Military Airport, is the site for a squadron of drone planes Rami-2, formed of 14 planes. The planes are called suicide planes and they are capable of carrying chemical weapons. These planes are identical to the Iranian RAED-1. The planes are overseen by the Colonel Mohammad Bilal, the brother of Brigadier Ghassan Bilal the office manager for Major General Maher al-Assad.&nbsp;</font></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b><br></b></font></div><div><font><span><b>Yellow Box I</b></span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b>-Secret Depots-</b></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>An official document obtained by Zaman al-Wasl reveals that the Syrian regime had transferred most of chemical weapons stockpiles in 2013 to secret depots held by Maher al-Assad, de-facto military commander of Syria&nbsp;after the deadly Sarin gas attack on Eastern Ghouta suburbs.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Moving most of the chemical arsenal from the Institute 1000 in Jamraya to 105th Brigade near the Presidential Palace in Damascus was on&nbsp;September 19, 2013 at&nbsp;the same day the regime handed the UN Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) a list of chemical sites in the war-torn country,&nbsp;following the Eastern Ghouta Chemical attack on August 21, 2013 when more than 1460 died in the nerve gas attack, two weeks before the arrival of the United Nations inspectors on October 3.&nbsp;&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>At the time, the horrific images from the immediate aftermath of the attack drew global outrage.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><br></div></div></font></div><div><div><font><span>&nbsp;</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span></font></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Syrian Chemical Programme: Production and Storage Locations- Special Report]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/30595</link>
						<comments>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/30595</comments>
						<pubDate>Mon, 23 Oct 2017 00:42:32 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/30595</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl-Special)- The second part of ‘Yellow Box’&nbsp;documentary, Zaman Al Wasl reveals the production and storage locations, and the types of chemical gases produced which is under the supervision of the Air Force intelligence and the Republican Palace.The documentary also reveals the ]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl-Special)- The second part of ‘Yellow Box’&nbsp;documentary, Zaman Al Wasl reveals the production and storage locations, and the types of chemical gases produced which is under the supervision of the Air Force intelligence and the Republican Palace.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The documentary also reveals the ammunition carriers and the specialized tunnels used to store the ammunition, and the bases from which the weapons were launched to target, not an occupying or attacking force, but innocent civilians.&nbsp;</font></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><span><font>Zaman al-Wasl obtained set of studies prepared by group of researchers in the Syrian Center for Scientific Study and Research which explain the establishment of the chemical weapons programme and its development.</font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><span><font><p><span>The documentary charts the history of the program since has been established, the weapons used during the Syrian revolution to reach the handover agreement and the supposed dismantling of the deadly arsenal.</span></p><div><span><br></span></div></font></span></div><div><font>A data-rich report highlights the Chemical programme since its birth by the Soviet Union and how the Israelis were following up the developing process through its spies.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Yellow Box documentary shows how the U.S. underestimated the Syrian chemical arsenal that later claimed lives of almost 2000 people in Eastern Ghouta in August 2013.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Is the Lebanese Hezbollah militia involved in the Eastern Ghouta Massacre? another question Zaman al-Wasl tries to answer in the three-part documentary.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><b><font><br></font></b></div><div><b><font>&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><b><font>Production and Storage of Chemical Weapons</font></b></div><div><b><font><br></font></b></div><div><b><font><br></font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to a report delivered by the Syrian regime to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on September 13, 2013, the regime possesses 12 stable units to produce and store chemical weapons distributed throughout Syria, two mobile filling units and three institutions of a civilian nature.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Institute 6000 (Barzeh Neighborhood north of Damascus) Branch 450&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Institute 6000 owns the most advanced laboratories and technical equipment that enable it to produce most of the primary materials that enter into the production of chemical precursors and activators. Strangely, the United Nations Committee did not engage in any operation to destroy or dismantle the Institute’s laboratories or equipment based on the excuse that their uses are circular. &nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Unit 416&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><b><font><br></font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Unit 416 is located south of the town of al-Safira, and it is considered one of the most important sites for Branch 450 and one of the most important factories for the production and development of chemical weapons in Syria. The Unit develops Mustard and Sarin Gas, and it is administratively subordinate to Brigadier General Samir Daaboul, responsible for the central and northern area. After emptying it and the warehouses subordinate to it of the material and handing these over to the United Nations Committee and destroying the other part of the material, the UN Committee detonated the main production site in the Unit to ensure that it will not return to operation.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>&nbsp;Unit 417</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>2:24 Unit 417 is located in the Abu Ash Shamat area ( 43 miles east of Damascus). It is overseen by Brigadier General Ali Wannoos. Inside the Unit, there are hundreds of tons of chemical activators and precursors that enter into preparing Sarin, Tabun and Mustard Gas. A secret warehouse subordinate to the Unit takes the form of a massive underground tunnel located in the Jarwa Well area.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Unit 418&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Unit 418 is located 3 miles east of the town of al-Farjlus. It resembles Unit 417 in its architectural, administrative and technical planning as the two were established at the same time under the supervision of Russian experts. Unit 418 is also considered one of the most important warehouses for the storage of materials used to produce Sarin, Tabun and Mustard Gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Brigadier General Samir Daaboul oversees the Unit and his office is located close to the Revolutionary Air Force Intelligence roundabout in Homs.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Ali Center&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Ali Center is located northeastern the desert town of Dumayr, 30 miles east of Damascus, the site is a fortified and camouflaged area. A dirt barricade was constructed south of the Center to hide it from view on the Damascus-Palmyra road.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Al-Nasiriya Khan Jenjil Center&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><b><font><br></font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The al-Nasiriya Center is one of the production locations established in the southern region. It is located on the al-Nasiriya - al-Qaryatayn road north of the General Road on the lower part of the northern slope of the al-Maksar Mountain. The UN envoy destroyed the main production site in the Center to ensure it would not return to operation again.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>The Known Zouboaa and al-Mansoureh Center in al-Nabk</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Zoubaa location is considered one of the oldest chemical production sites in Syria and one of the largest. The site was established with the foundation of the program and its settlement. The Center was built in the form of large tunnels dug into the al-Nasiriya Mountains and work continued on the site for several years. However, the Syrian regime did not account for the injuries that started to appear on the crews working on the site due to the site’s location inside the mountains.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Some of the injuries took the form of chronic respiratory problems which necessitated the site overseers to change the crews working on the site every six months. This issue also forced the project overseers to halt operations in the site on several occasions.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The al-Masoureh site is located close to the former Zoubaa site and administratively subordinate to it. The site is distinguished by its proximity to the strategic hiding place of Scud missiles in the al-Nasiriya Mountains which makes it possible to prepare and equip the chemical warheads for these missiles in ready, equipped and fortified tunnels.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Khan Unaybah Production Center&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Khan Unaybah site is considered the most important and dangerous chemical site in Syria due to its strategic geographical location as it is surrounded by three high, and almost deserted, mountain ranges extending between the al-Narsiriya and al-Qaryatayn Mountains. The site is surrounded by mountain ranges on its four sides. The site is far from any civilian activity where its only connection is to the Syrian Badiya. It is the site for the development and storage of the activators used to produce dangerous nerve gases including the BX gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Jousiyah Unit (known as the Central)</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Central Unit is located west of the village Hasya in a mountainous region close to the town of Jousiyah. The Unit is secured by a branch of the Air Force Intelligence in Homs.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Maliki Center is located south of the town of Adra. The Husun al-Bahar location in Tartus. The Latakia location close to the industrial city which is responsible for producing some of the aiding precursors related to Sarin gas. The Baniyas Refinery produces some of the roots that aid the production of chemical activators. The Homs Refinery also produces some of the roots that aid the production of chemical activators. The Phosphate Factory in Homs produces some of the essential roots used in the production of nerve related gases.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>7:40 Chemical activators need carriers or ammunition to reach enemy locations. These are launched on specific locations for them to explode and disperse the toxic substance achieving the required effect. There are many kinds of chemical warheads that carry these chemicals around the world. The warheads available to the Syrian regime can be limited to the following: 65 Scud missiles of the type Scud-B which can be loaded with Sarine gas. BM-21 Grad missiles which can be loaded with Sarine and Tabun gas and have been used to fire Mustard gas. These missiles leave patches of black residue in the launchers they were fired from, and these warheads are locally manufactured at present. BM-14 missiles which are some of the oldest ammunition found in Syria. These missiles were imported from the Soviet Union. The 130-millimeter artillery shells and 120-millimeter mortar rockets can be loaded with Mustard, Sarin, Chlorine or Tabun gas.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>107-millimeter artillery shells were Korean produced originally but are presently produced in Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Airplane rockets which are rockets that work by free fall. These can be transformed with any of the chemical agents including the VX agent into chemical warheads. Airplane rockets filled with Chlorine were imported from China and they were produced by the famous Chinese Conico company.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Suicide drone planes of the kind RAMI-2, have a small storage space which can be loaded with chemical substances. The drones were equipped with pouches, called beneficial pouches, which were previously manufactured by the Center for Studies and Research in Aleppo. Recently, the regime has engaged in producing short-range missiles such as the Fil missile which can be filled with Sarine, Mustard and Chlorine gas.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The most important warehouses to store different ammunition of the most important warehouses to store ammunition is Warehouse 572 subordinate to the Missile Administration and located north of the town of al-Dumayr.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;The warehouse contains a specialized loading unit for Scud missiles in addition to several missiles that can be adapted to carry non-traditional warheads. The importance of the warehouse comes from its location close to the Ali Center, Unit 417 and Zoubaa Site.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Sawanet Warehouse is a specialized site for launching Scud missiles with a warhead storage warehouse and a chemical storage unit close by. This is considered one of the locations fortified against airstrikes and large missile attacks because of its high fortification and its rocky nature.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The armament Warehouse in al-Rahbet 639 in the town of al-Khatab is big enough to house 350 tons of diverse kinds of ammunition.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Thanaya Armament Warehouse is located close to the Homs-Damascus motorway before the town of al-Qatayfa. The locals know the site as al-Thanaya. Artillery shells and artillery missiles of the type 122-millimeter are stored here.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Armament warehouse 553 in Latakia close to the town of al-Shamiya, and it is one of the largest warehouses in the Syrian coastal region. The larger part of the warehouse stores normal ammunition. In addition to having loading equipment.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Om Twaiqiya warehouses subordinate to the air force in Hama. Palmyra warehouse which is located north of the city of Palmyra. Al-Mazzeh Military Airport, is the site for a squadron of drone planes Rami-2, formed of 14 planes. The planes are called suicide planes and they are capable of carrying chemical weapons. These planes are identical to the Iranian RAED-1. The planes are overseen by the Colonel Mohammad Bilal, the brother of Brigadier Ghassan Bilal the office manager for Major General Maher al-Assad.&nbsp;</font></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b>Watch&nbsp;Part I</b></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><span>It’s been four years since the Syrian chemical attack on the embattled Eastern Ghouta suburbs near the capital that claimed lives of 1,400 people, mostly women and children.</span></font></div><span><font><div><br></div><font><p><span>They joined the convoy of martyrs which has continued to grow since Bashar Assad announced its war against the people who wanted to live in a country respects their rights in freedom of speech, equality and dignity. </span></p><div><br></div><p><span>Since August 21, 2013, the term CHEMICAL has entered everyday Syrian life, searches, questions and death as that was not the last attack of its kind, the same as it was not the first. </span></p><div><br></div><p><span>The studies indicate that the Soviet chemical technology was transferred to Syrians through coordination between the KBG and the Air Force Intelligence. The studies explain in detail the formation of units from centers, laboratories, experimental fields as well as identifying the types of chemical weapons manufactured and imported among other technical details. These details bring clarity to a complicated issue. Zaman al-Wasl TV has produced a documentary of three parts about this issue with the first presenting the Soviet relationship to the Syrian chemical weapons program as well as the story behind the liquidation of a large number of the scientists and officers involved in the programme. &nbsp;</span></p></font></font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Yellow Box: Story of The Syrian Chemical Programme From Establishment to Handover]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/30250</link>
						<comments>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/30250</comments>
						<pubDate>Sun, 08 Oct 2017 15:53:18 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman A Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/30250</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[Zaman Al Wasl reveals in a new documentary the inner circle of the Syrian regime's chemical facilities.A data-rich report highlights the Chemical programme since its birth by the Soviet Union and how the Israelis were following up the developing process through its spies.The Yellow Box documentary s]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>Zaman Al Wasl reveals in a new documentary the inner circle of the Syrian regime's chemical facilities.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A data-rich report highlights the Chemical programme since its birth by the Soviet Union and how the Israelis were following up the developing process through its spies.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Yellow Box documentary shows how the U.S. underestimated the Syrian chemical arsenal that later claimed lives of almost 2000 people in Eastern Ghouta in August 2013.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Is the Lebanese Hezbollah militia involved in the Eastern Ghouta Massacre? another question Zaman al-Wasl tries to answer in the three-part documentary.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;<span>It’s been four years since the Syrian chemical attack on the embattled Eastern Ghouta suburbs near the capital that claimed lives of 1,400 people, mostly women and children.</span></font></div><span><font><br><p><span>They joined the convoy of martyrs which has continued to grow since Bashar Assad announced its war against the people who wanted to live in a country respects their rights in freedom of speech, equality and dignity. </span></p><br><p><span>Since August 21, 2013, the term CHEMICAL has entered everyday Syrian life, searches, questions and death as that was not the last attack of its kind, the same as it was not the first. </span></p><br><p><span>Zaman al-Wasl obtained set of studies prepared by group of researchers in the Syrian Center for Scientific Study and Research which explain the establishment of the chemical weapons programme and its development.</span></p><br><p><span>The studies indicate that the Soviet chemical technology was transferred to Syrians through coordination between the KBG and the Air Force Intelligence. The studies explain in detail the formation of units from centers, laboratories, experimental fields as well as identifying the types of chemical weapons manufactured and imported among other technical details. These details bring clarity to a complicated issue. Zaman al-Wasl TV has produced a documentary of three parts about this issue with the first presenting the Soviet relationship to the Syrian chemical weapons program as well as the story behind the liquidation of a large number of the scientists and officers involved in the programme. &nbsp;</span></p><div><span><br></span></div></font></span><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Even Assad Thugs 'Shabiha' Find Refuge In Germany- Report]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29979</link>
						<comments>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29979</comments>
						<pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2017 02:12:25 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman Al Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29979</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl)-&nbsp;“We kill you and displace you there [in Syria] we watch you and steal your chances here [In Europe] this is what pro-Assad Shabiha who mingled with Syrian refugees is doing right now in many European countries which gave asylum to hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees.As t]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)-&nbsp;<span>“We kill you and displace you there [in Syria] we watch you and steal your chances here [In Europe] this is what pro-Assad Shabiha who mingled with Syrian refugees is doing right now in many European countries which gave asylum to hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees.</span></font></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><span><font>As the Syrian diaspora surged Assad loyalists who always threatened to burn the country if Assad leaves power, made use of the open- borders European policy and sneaked into many EU countries claiming that they were victims of war who needed protection.&nbsp;</font></span><div><font><span>&nbsp;</span><br><span>In Germany, the country that opened its doors wide to welcome Syrian refugees fleeing Assad regime atrocities and torture chambers, many of torture victims or their family members face the growing threat of Assad Shabiha and thugs who also managed to sneak out of the country and get asylum as refugees that deserve protection.&nbsp;</span></font><div><font><span><br></span><span>Being unaware of the country’s legal system or unwilling to cause any problems, many victims resort to silence or avoid any contact with their torturers despite feeling bitter and angry. However, some complaints were made and submitted to the German authorities which in turn didn’t move a nerve or brought any of the suspects to justice.</span></font><div><font><span><br></span><span>Worst of all is the fact that these Shabiha are making regular trips to Syria where they stay for some time then come back to their host countries.</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>These shuttle trips between Syria and Germany should legally make those Shabiha ineligible to enjoy their current status as refugees any more since they can go there without being questioned besides there is no longer any threat to their lives in their original country; however, they go to regime-dominated areas, come back to Germany under the sight of the German Police which surprisingly didn’t take any action.&nbsp;</span></font><div><font><span><br></span><span>In some cases pro-Assad Shabiha visiting Syria take indirect ways by which they intentionally misguide German authorities which in turn demand complainants to submit their proofs on their claims about those indirect visits.&nbsp;</span></font><div><font><span><br></span><span>Zaman Al-Wasl team managed to investigate one of these cases in which a pro-Assad senior member of one of the regime gangs in Aleppo, Muhammad Abdul Kareem Hazori sent his elder son Abdul Kareem in 2015 to Germany to seek asylum.&nbsp;</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>Going into details of this case Abdul Kareem left Syria to Turkey on 17 of September 2015 then two days later, he boarded a dinghy with other refugees and arrived to Greece where he spent few days before setting off to Germany which he arrived to in October 2015.</span></font><div><font><span><br></span><span>Abdul Kareem succeeded in convincing the German authorities that he was a victim that deserved protection and was granted a 3-year residence permit which surprisingly wasn’t granted to real torture victims of Assad’s thugs.</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>In June of this year Abdul Kareem travelled indirectly to Syria through Iran. He stayed two months in regime- dominated areas where he openly showed his support to Assad regime.</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span><font>In August 22 Abdul Kareem, and via a private Facebook group, asked about the possible ways to leave Syria to Germany through Lebanon and Greece expressing his personal fears that German authorities may realize his trick and deception.</font></span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span><font>On September 7, Abdul Kareem arrived to Lebanon, Zaman Al-Wasl has a video recording in which he tells one of his friends that he has arrived to Beirut which he left in the next day to&nbsp;complete his&nbsp;journey&nbsp;before&nbsp;arriving Germany on September 23.</font></span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>Going back to Abdul Kareem and his family’s involvement in supporting Assad regime, we find that Hazoris’ were among the most loyal groups that propped up Assad and carried out many dirty operations against peaceful protestors in Aleppo back in 2011 and afterwards.&nbsp;</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>Abdul Kareem’s father Muhamad was among the first echelon of Assad regime controlling the city Aleppo. Muhamad was a senior member in Aleppo Municipality besides his work in Aleppo Endowment Directorate and Sports Union. A photo taken last spring shows Muhamad Hazori being honored by Ammar al-Assad.&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></font></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>Hazoris who come originally from Abu Taltal, a small village in Aleppo Eastern countryside known to be one of Assad strongholds in area joined Shabiha groups and used arms and guns and had their own detention centers where they tortured protestors. Some others were senior members in Assad government and People’s Assembly.</span><br><br></font><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><img></div><br></font></div><div><span><font>Muhamad Hazori was appointed as a member in Assad’s so called People’s Assembly in April 2016 then was upgraded to be the governor of Hama city who represent Assad authority in the city.</font></span></div><div><font><span><br></span><span>Abdul Kareem joined his father and other family members and had a pistol when he was even 15-year-old and wore fatigues and other military uniforms as many photos that Zaman Al-Wasl has in its possession. Abdul Kareem might be indirectly involved in torture inflicted on protestors early in 2012 and 2013.&nbsp;</span><br><span><br></span></font></div><div><font><span>&nbsp;Building on these facts Zaman Al-Wasl team members working on this case express their willingness to submit all these information and other related documents to the German authorities to take necessary action and to prevent Abdul Kareem and others like him from posing a real threat to Assad opponents who live on the German soil as refugees who have really fled their country because of Assad and his supporters and can’t even think of visiting their country like Abdul Kareem Hazori did.&nbsp;</span>(Writing by Ethar Abdulhaq; Translation&nbsp;by Jamal Mamo)</font></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Daily Mail deludes readers in 'Syrian bucket bomb' report]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29872</link>
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						<pubDate>Thu, 21 Sep 2017 01:28:32 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zaman Al Wasl]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29872</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[By Ethar Abdulhaq(Zaman Al Wasl)- How can a “westernized” 21 old Syrian refugee who “enjoys weed, vodka and drugs” be a “lone wolf”?Zaman Al-Wasl investigates the claims made by the Daily Mail against the 21 year old Syrian refugee Yahya Faroukh who escaped his war-torn country to Europe]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>By Ethar Abdulhaq</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- How can a “westernized” 21 old Syrian refugee who “enjoys weed, vodka and drugs” be a “lone wolf”?</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman Al-Wasl investigates the claims made by the <a>Daily Mail</a> against the 21 year old Syrian refugee Yahya Faroukh who escaped his war-torn country to Europe 4 years ago.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>With a headline writing “For better life you need to have weed, vodka and drugs” the 125 year-old English newspaper launches a witch hunting campaign against the young refugee who was arrested by Home Office undercover cops over Parsons Green Bombing on Saturday night outside Aladdin's Fried Chicken in Hounslow where he worked.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Daily Mail article which was widely shared on social media made up its allegations depending on few posts and photos posted by Yahya on his Facebook page and Instagram account that portrayed him as a “westernized” young man who is “addict to drugs and wears a T-shirt and jeans”!</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><img></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>However, the fact is that those photos and posts were widely de-contextualized and greatly misrepresented according to a thorough investigation made by Zaman Al-Wasl.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The investigation shows that Yahya has always been a serious and sensitive young man who is still faithful to his conservative upbringing in his town in Daraa. On the other side Yahiya’s posts reflect his moderate relation with religion and his strong bonds with the struggle of his own people in Syria besides his sympathy with the Palestinian cause.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The majority of Yahya’s photos present him as longing to his family and homeland which contradicts with the Daily mail story about spending most of the time drinking vodka and smoking weed.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Following Yahya’s comments on his friends’ posts also reveal the good nature of his character and how the Daily Mail widely deformed and misrepresented his words by being so selective and culturally out of touch when it decided that common jokes among Syrians about “Hashish” or weed and its addicts as signs that show Yahya as a weed addict!</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On the other side of the story the Daily Mail headline which speaks about Yahya’s post about “better life with weed and vodka” was taken from Yahya’s post on his Facebook account but it turned a blind eye to the Arabic translation of it which wrote “For a better life you should be truthful, generous and have good morals.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It looks clear through Zaman Al-Wasl investigative report that Yahya who fled his war-torn country on a boat that arrived to Europe 4 years ago didn’t have a cultural shock after reaching Britain. He didn’t put a ring on his ears, nor draw any tattoos on his body or even had a weird haircut.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>However, being a serious, sensitive, hardworking young man and at the same time unwilling to be westernized in a silly way don’t mean that this young refugee who was eager to learn English to earn his living and continue his studies would turn into a “lone wolf” or a terrorist just because he is from Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Yahya’s story adds to the suffering of people from the Middle East, Arabs and Muslims in general who are stereotyped by western media as main suspects when terrorist attacks happen. The strange thing about this continuous witch hunting campaign is that news outlets and media which have long history can easily change the facts and give roles or decide without any feeling of responsibility who is guilty and who is innocent.</font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Israel's strike on Hezbollah missile facility 'was devastating, painful': military source]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29674</link>
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						<pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2017 14:36:25 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29674</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[&nbsp;(Zaman Al Wasl)- Israel's strike on the research center of Sheikh Ghadban near northwestern Masyaf town was devastating and a successful blow by Tel Aviv to the Assad regime and allies since the strikes had destroyed the production lines of Hezbollah short-range missiles, well-informed militar]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;(Zaman Al Wasl)- Israel's strike on the research center of Sheikh Ghadban near northwestern Masyaf town was devastating and a successful blow by Tel Aviv to the Assad regime and allies since the strikes had destroyed the production lines of Hezbollah short-range missiles, well-informed military source told Zaman al-Wasl on Monday.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The rebuilding process will take at least 6 months to install and produce the missiles, that highly used by the Lebanese militia, said the source who spoke on condition of anonymity.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Syrian army admitted on Thursday that Israel had targeted one of its positions in Hama province, an area turned into a military compound for manufacturing missile and chemical weapons run by Russia and Iran.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><a>Iran's missile factory in Tartus to increase tension with US: report</a></div><div><br></div><div><a>Iran building long-range rocket factory in Syria: Israeli TV</a></div><div><br></div><div><div><a>Iran runs secret missile facilities in Tartus: source</a></div><div><br></div><div><a>Photos for Iranian missile developing site in Tartus</a></div><div><br></div></div><div><br></div></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Scientific Studies and Research Centre facility is not producing chemical weapons but short-range ground-to-ground rockets which guarded and protected by oops from of Iran and its allied Lebanese Hezbollah.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The bombed factory was limited to manufacturing 220mm and 302mm rockets, which Hezbollah has a good proportion of it, according o the source..</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Israeli officials have in the past admitted that Israel has attacked weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah without specifying which ones.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Israeli raids came after the announcement of Russian elements to establish a radar system and air defense to protect the Syrian airspace by merging radar and air defense systems of the system with the radar network and the Russian air defense in Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Another well-informed source within the regime's army confirmed that the Israeli raids targeted the actual production lines, denying rumors that the target was to run Sector 4 at the Tala'i camp.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b>Syria hasn't retaliated</b></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The army statement said,&nbsp;according o&nbsp;Reuters, &nbsp;the airstrike killed two people and caused material damage and warned against the “dangerous repercussions of this aggressive action to the security and stability of the region”.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The airstrike’s timing was sensitive because it came after the partial cease-fire achieved in Syria, under Russian auspices, in July. The aerial attack also came after Russia and the United States didn’t heed Israel’s protests about the cease-fire deal, which didn’t keep the Iranian forces out of Syria, Analyst Amos Harel from Haaretz said.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The strike was different from earlier ones attributed to Israel, which targeted weapons convoys intended for Hezbollah or the makeshift arsenals in which those weapons were kept. This time the bombed site was a large, permanent facility clearly identified with the Assad regime,&nbsp;</font><span>Harel</span><font>&nbsp;said.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A military retaliation against Israel could create difficulties for the parties bolstering Hezbollah. The response could come at a later stage and indirectly, like the tightening of Russian-Iranian cooperation.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;&nbsp;</font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Russia set up S-400 systems near Iran's missile facilities in Syria: sources]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29262</link>
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						<pubDate>Fri, 25 Aug 2017 10:45:39 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/29262</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[(Zaman Al Wasl)- Russia has built a base for its S-400 long-range air defense missile systems in Hama province, well-informed&nbsp;sources said, 15 km (10 miles) far from the newly-discovered Iranian missile facilities in the most loyal area to Bashar al-Assad in Syria.The key ally of Damascus has f]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font><br></font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- Russia has built a base for its S-400 long-range air defense missile systems in Hama province, well-informed&nbsp;sources said, 15 km (10 miles) far from the newly-discovered Iranian missile facilities in the most loyal area to Bashar al-Assad in Syria.</font></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The key ally of Damascus has first deployed batteries of this advanced missile platform at the Hmeimym airbase. The new deployment in 'Dhahaer rama Ahmed' hilltop near Masyaf city northwestern Syria comes as an outcome to Russia's fevered efforts to fortify the Alawite-dominated territories as to secure Iran's long-range missile facilities, military sources said.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font>Related:</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><a><font>Iran's missile factory in Tartus to increase tension with US: report</font></a></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><a><font>Iran building long-range rocket factory in Syria: Israeli TV</font></a></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><a><font>Iran runs secret missile facilities in Tartus: source</font></a></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><a><font>Photos for Iranian missile developing site in Tartus</font></a></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><br></div></div></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The S-400 system is designed to destroy aircraft, drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles up to 400 kilometers away; it is also equipped with a radar able to detect targets at a range of 600km. Since its installation in Syrian territory, the action of Western and Turkish warplanes in support of rebel forces has been limited, according to <a>Asia Times</a>.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><table><tbody><tr><td><label>"<br>Russia installed batteries for Yakhont (supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles) in the air defence base.<br><br>"</label></td></tr></tbody></table></div><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The presence of S-400 platforms in the Syrian theater possibly influenced the US strategy of attack against the Assad regime, analyst Emanuele Scimia said. The USS Porter and USS Ross, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean, bombarded the Shayrat airbase in central Syria, which the Syrian Air Force used to launch suspected chemical attacks that left dozens of civilians dead in rebel-held Khan Shaykhun.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Satellite images and military experts assured to Zaman al-Wasl that Russia has also installed batteries for the P-800 Oniks, also known as Yakhont (supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles) in the air&nbsp;defence base.</font></div><div><br></div></div><div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><span><font><div><img></div><br></font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><span><font><br></font></span></div><div><span><font><b>Iran controls Syria's missile facilities</b></font></span></div></div><div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><span><font>The Israeli and Western media, in the last week, shed the light on Iran-run missile facilities in Syria, almost two months since Zaman al-Wasl news site had revealed an exclusive data and satellite images for Iran’s main long-range-rocket factories in coastal Tartus province.</font></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The first research center for developing long-range missiles built by Iran in Wadi Jehanam, also known as the Hell Valley, the abysmal valley that separates between Hama and Tartus provinces.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Military experts from Iran, Russia and N.Korea are working to develop FATIH 110, The Iran-made ballistic missiles, Zaman al-Wasl’s source said.</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>In June, Bashar Assad has made a secret &nbsp;visit to o a research center after visiting Hama city where he delivered Eid al-Fiter prayers, showing more confident after six years of daily bombing that claimed lives of half million Syrians.</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>The center is working on developing long-range missiles and it will be inaugurated by the end of the year, according to sources who provided Zaman al-Wasl by photos for the site.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div><table><tbody><tr><td><img></td><td>هذه الصورة تم تصغيرها.لعرض الصورة كاملة انقر على هذا الشريط,. المقاس الأصلي للصورة هو 1147x748px.</td></tr></tbody></table><div><img></div></div><div><br></div></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>The second Iranian facility was set up in al-Sheikh al-Ghadhban area, 25 km (17 miles) southeast Hell Valley.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A well-informed source confirmed that at the end of 2013, the regime began building new facilities to the north-east of Masyaf city in an area called al-Sheikh al-Ghadhban. The area includes the site of Project 111 which the source described as a failure.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>The source added that by the end of 2016 the regime began installing Institute 4000’s production lines, for the manufacture of medium range missiles (220 mm, 302 mm) at the site in al-Sheikh al-Ghadhban. These are the same lines the regime previously moved from lines the New Aleppo site to this site.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Read also:</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><a><font>The Lost Truth of Syria's Nuclear Reactor</font></a></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>Iran guaranteed to provide the necessary machines for the project regardless of whether the machines were damaged or the regime unable to transfer them from Aleppo for the project to begin production in early 2017, according to the source.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl’s source confirmed that the production of M600 long-range rockets known as Maysalun and Tishreen will be carried out at the Wadi Jehanam site, which is still being prepared for production. According to the source, the site is expected to be ready for production by the end of 2017.</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>The Assad regime has transferred the management of the Fourth Sector (which supervises the al-Sheikh al-Ghadhban and Wadi Jehanam sites) to a camp near the two sites. The move increased the sensitivity of the area and the security measures implemented in the area. The al-Sheikh al-Ghadban site is barely 25 kilometers south-east of the Wadi Jehanam site based on aerial photographs the source provided with his testimony.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div><div><br></div></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>Dr. Aziz Esber manages this sensitive sector (the Fourth Sector), which lies within the strongholds of sectarian pro-regime areas.</font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>According to the source, the transfer of the missile production lines to the pro-regime strongholds coincides with the demobilization of the remaining Sunni experts. The source indicated that Iran is training pro-regime personnel to compensate for the lack of experts who have either been demobilized or dissented.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><div></div><div><br></div></font></div><div><font>&nbsp;</font></div></div><div><font><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br></font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Iran's missile factory in Tartus to increase tension with US: report]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/28197</link>
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						<pubDate>Wed, 19 Jul 2017 22:53:47 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[By Ethar Abdulhaq(Zaman Al Wasl)- Many international media outlets have circulated news of Zaman al-Wasl’s exclusive reports about the top-secret Wadi Jehanam (Valley of Hell) and the Iranian and Russian activities in the area. Moscow was incited by the reports and responded by accusing Zaman al-W]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>By Ethar Abdulhaq</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- Many international media outlets have circulated news of Zaman al-Wasl’s exclusive reports about the top-secret Wadi Jehanam (Valley of Hell) and the Iranian and Russian activities in the area. Moscow was incited by the reports and responded by accusing Zaman al-Wasl of being “subordinate to the extreme opposition”.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Although the two reports are available in <a>Arabic</a> and <a>English</a>, and many international news sites cited the original reports, Sputnik specifically reported the news from the Washington Free Beacon website. The move may have aimed at increasing the insinuation that an “imperialist conspiracy” is ongoing against those protecting the al-Assad regime.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Sputnik began its <a>report</a> with a dramatic introduction, “According to Zaman al-Wasl, one of the websites subordinate to the extremist Syrian opposition, the Washington-based Free Beacon website said that Iran was manufacturing long-range missiles on Syrian territory.”&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Sputnik refrained from articulating the nature of Zaman al-Wasl’s extremism raising the question is Zaman al-Wasl’s extremism apparent in its coverage of the regime’s crimes and violations? Its direct focus and monitoring of the crimes of extremists against the Syrian revolution? Is the extremism apparent in its insistence on revealing the massacres committed by Iran, Russia and America in Syria? Is the extremism clear in its continued monitoring of the Syrian opposition’s, in its military and political branches and various institutions, violations? Or all the above?!&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In its report, Sputnik took a schizophrenic approach as it amplified the US site handling Zaman of Al-Wasl’s exclusive reports, included comments from Russian and Iranian “experts” while at the same time working to discredit the reports.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to Boris Dolgov, the Russian expert, “the opposition’s accusations are based only on the testimonies of people whose names are invented.” The accusations come despite Sputnik itself being an icon of slander and lies.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Sputnik is notorious for basing much of its news reports on rumors and fabricated news, as well as the testimonies of unknown persons- not even a group of people- to refute a dangerous issue on the scale of the recent chemical attack on the Eastern al-Ghouta. The recent chemical attack on al-Ghouta is but one instance, and we will present several of Sputnik’s most important instances showing its lack of professionalism and credibility below.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It is worth noting that in the Sputnik report, the Russian expert claimed that Zaman al-Wasl’s reports were aimed at “creating a confrontation between Russia and the United States of America and accusing North Korea and Russia of helping Iran to manufacture missiles on Syrian territory.”&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In the event, Zaman al-Wasl manages to achieve a fraction of what the Russian expert claimed then we are very proud of our institution. We are especially proud if our efforts would stop the bloodletting of Syrians, end the oppressive regime which has ruled Syrians for 40 years with its sectarian intelligence apparatus and expel al-Assad who has no intention of leaving his position until the country is reduced dust and a playfield for every occupier and mercenary.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Based on the Russian expert’s comments, the staff at Zaman al-Wasl recommend that all Russian and American officials stay home since Zaman al-Wasl is drawing up their policies, dictating their plans and controlling their reactions.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>Dolgov said that Zaman al-Wasl's report depicts “the three countries (Russia, Iran and North Korea) as a satanic alliance seeking to manufacture missiles capable of striking the United States and the West in general. The report portrays these countries and Syria as a group of hostile countries that deserve punishment at all costs.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On the other hand, Imad Abshinaz, the Iranian analyst, considered Zaman al-Wasl’s report to be nothing but “false allegations aimed at pressuring Russia and Iran.” Abshinaz made no effort to offer a logical or even an unreasonable denial for what Zaman al-Wasl reported. He only said, “the American and Israeli media never stopped talking about Iran running a chemical weapons and ballistic missile factory on Syrian territory.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font>At the end of the report, Sputnik claimed that the Iranian analyst “revealed that the name of the place where this virtual factory is located, Wadi Jehanam is between the cities of Hama and Tartous.” The comment comes although Zaman al-Wasl published the exact location and images of the location!</font></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><img></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><img></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>That's what we said</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On June 28, Zaman al-Wasl published a special report revealing Bashar al-Assad’s secret visit to Wadi Jehanam, one of the regime and Iran’s most sensitive military research sites.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Sources confirmed that they started building the center almost a year ago in a fortified area east of the town of Baniyas. The complex was built in a valley with difficult terrain known as Wadi Jehanem in Tartous’ countryside. The area is neighbors several towns including, Al-Anazah, Nahal, al-Aaliqat, al-Ghnisalet which are administratively subordinate to the Baniyas region.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl’s sources said the center, which is a facility for the production and development of long-range missiles, is likely to be officially opened at the end of this year.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Wadi Jehanam Center is affiliated with the fourth sector based on the regime’s division of its research centers. The fourth sector includes the activities of centers in Aleppo, Hama, and Masyaf and will include this new center as well.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Wadi Jehanam is not just a new secret military center for developing and manufacturing arms, but also a link in a wider chain as the regime establishes vital and strategic institutions in pro-regime areas.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On July 10, Zaman al-Wasl followed its first report about the research center with a report showing exclusive photographs of Wadi Jehanam. The report noted that Brigadier Ghassan Abbas is running the secret center under the direct authorization of Salam Tohma, Deputy Director of the Center for Studies and Scientific Research.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The report drew on the testimony of a source at the Higher Institute of Scientific Research who attempted to shed some light on the mystery surrounding this secret base. The source noted that he saw the strict security measures in Wadi Jehanam while he was on a military mission in the area.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to the source, the base includes Russian, North Korean and Iranian officers and personnel, and he received strict orders to not engage with, speak to, or question any of the experts about anything no matter how small or trivial.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The source revealed that he and others saw, “large trucks enter the place loaded with equipment and machines covered with wood.” The Russian and Koreans then moved the equipment to other trucks and covered them with tarpaulin under heightened security from the Air Force Intelligence.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>-Examples of Sputnik’s Propaganda-&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Although Sputnik has not completed its fourth year yet (it was launched in November 2014), its short life has been filled with an extensive record of contempt for professional values, transgressing journalistic norms, falsifying facts, spreading lies, fabricating stories, slandering people, institutions, and even states.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Margarita Simonian is the editor-in-chief of both Russia Today and Sputnik which explains why the two channels have the same propaganda approach.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Sputnik tries to argue that it is independent and committed to professionalism, but the fact it is owned by Russia Segodnya government news agency raises questions about its independence. The issue is reinforced by the agency’s propaganda style in all its news and reports. These facts suggest that Sputnik is not only an arm of the Russian government but may even be an intelligence platform in the style of the old Soviet-style which Putin is trying to re-establish.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It is enough to point out Sputnik's inefficiencies or criticism of its demagoguery to provoke an entire army of defenders and critics who fiercely criticize anything said against it. This army includes not only ordinary people or third or fourth grade officials but also elite officials such as Putin, his Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>These people do not hesitate to defend Sputnik or Russia Today as they consider that anyone criticizing these media outlets are attacking Russia and targeting it at its core. Any reader may turn to major Russian officials’ statements to understand the degree of exceptional attention afford Sputnik.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>For Syrians, Sputnik was nicknamed the “chemical agency” for the large number of reports it published claiming that the different chemical attacks in Syria were fabricated news, as well as its other coverage of news relating to the regime and Bashar al-Assad.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Included below are some explains of issues raised by Sputnik showing bias and the horrifying hiccups that have accompanied its short career. We present the examples in chronological order starting with the most recent.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>July 2017: Sputnik categorically denies that a chemical attack was launched on Damascus city (the attack killed nearly 40 people). Sputnik based its denial on a piece of news from Russian Today which quoted a Syrian writer by the name of Abdo Haddad who said he lives on the borders of al-Ghouta. This source said that he was “absolutely confident that the data on a chemical attack is completely unrealistic.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>July 2017: Sputnik published the report the “Map of Terrorist Organizations in North Africa,” sparking the anger of some social groups in Tunisian who consider the report to contain misinformation aimed at hitting the country's tourism sector. Tunisians were further angered as Sputnik registered itself as a supporter of the Carthage Festival, which Tunisia relies on, since the festival’s launch decades ago, to revitalize its tourism industry.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>June 2017: Sputnik returns to its favorite file (the chemical file) and publishes allegations that terrorist groups in Daraa are preparing a chemical attack.</font></div><div><font>May 2017: Sputnik claims that al-Jazeera is filming fabricated scenes of a chemical attack on civilians and broadcasting them as an attack by the al-Assad regime with the aim of inciting the international community against al-Assad.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Al-Jazeera responded by stating that the Russian agency is a cheap propaganda tool and warning the Russian agency of the legal ramifications it will face if it persists in circulating this false news. If not for the seriousness of the issue, Sputnik would not have withdrawn its claims and apologized for what it published. The news may have been an introduction to justify new chemical attacks on civilians in Syria.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>May 2017: French president Macron receives Putin and holds a press conference in which he says that Russia Today and Sputnik spread lies and that it is suspected that the employees are not journalists. Putin refused to comment on Macron’s speech during the press conference.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>April 2017: Sputnik says that the production of sarin gas which killed dozens of people in the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack can be manufactured easily as the manufacturing instructions are available on Wikipedia and accessible to all terrorist organizations.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>April 2017: Sputnik publishes exclusive claims that the victims of the Khan al-Shaykhun attack did not die due to the chemical attack but because the White Helmets (Civil Defense) injected them with adrenaline. Sputnik attributed the lie to the Swedish Doctors for Human Rights organization which promptly responded denying the news agency’s claims.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>February and April 2017: Sputnik publishes dangerous political accusations about Emmanuel Macron at the height of his presidential campaign which forced Macron’s ‘Republic on the Move’ party to respond and accuse the Russian agency of lying. The party then prevented Sputnik and Russia today from accompanying Macron’s presidential campaign.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>February 2017: Sputnik attributed the news that the “head of the Saudi intelligence threatened Jordan and Egypt” to a major Arab newspaper although no news of this nature was published by that newspaper which is considered an arm of the Saudi government.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>January 2017: Sputnik recognizes that an “unintended modification” happened to an interview it held with the media advisor to the President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq Massoud Barzani. Sputnik commented that this modification was the inclusion of a statement attributed to the adviser saying that Barzani intends to give up power “to end the political dispute” ongoing in the province.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>April 2016: Sputnik openly plays a dirty intelligence role during the crisis of relations between Moscow and Ankara which led to Turkey permanently blocking its site in Turkey.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>November 2016: The European Parliament adopts a special memorandum regarding its dealings with Russian media outlets, according to which Sputnik was classified as a hostile propaganda tool that poses a threat to the Union. Sputnik quickly denounced the memorandum. The Russian Foreign Ministry followed shortly denouncing the memorandum although he is not obliged to make such a statement. Putin himself handled the issue criticizing the memorandum, considering it a “fallout”, and congratulating Sputnik and Russia Today for their “successful performance.”</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A Note&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl explains that its objective in publishing these reports is not to respond to Sputnik, given it is a puppet and controlled. Zaman al-Wasl does not demand an apology from Sputnik because apologies are very cheap to this media agency as proven by its previous behavior. Zaman al-Wasl’s is concerned with communicating its message to all Russian figures and sectors, official and unofficial, which own, support, encourage and defend Sputnik and the other agencies used as war heads to instigate against free journalism, those conveying the truth and confronting oppressive regimes and formations.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl reminds all these parties that injecting some air into ideologies and practices that ruled once upon a time is not only absurd and disruptive but also dangerous. Taking such a route reveals who is the true supporter of extremism given Russia classifies everyone who opposes the al-Assad regime and Russia’s mandate over Syria as an extremist.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Russia’s approach of accusing everyone from Syrian resistance factions- who have suffered from extremist groups in Syria- Syrian politicians through to media institutions serves one purpose of rendering these actors as traitors and targeting them morally and financially.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In the face of Sputnik’s owners’ fabrications, Zaman al-Wasl confirms that we do not defend ourselves in our capacity as a media outlet but in our capacity as a legal channel conveying Syrians’ suffering. We respond as a media outlet conveying the truth and reality about all violations perpetrated by all side in Syria regardless of their justification loud and clear. Based on this role, Zaman al-Wasl has the power to address the Russian government and call on it to stop using its money and energies to broadcast its dark propaganda. Zaman al-Wasl’s call comes not as a threat but as a recommendation drawing on the first school of those who turned on and revolted against Russia due to the extreme horrors they experienced.</font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Truth behind rift rumors between Syrian refugees and Turkish people]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/27861</link>
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						<pubDate>Sun, 09 Jul 2017 02:45:35 +0300</pubDate>
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						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/27861</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[By Ethar Abdulhaq(Zaman Al Wasl)- Difficult days ahead, sedition, causing unrest and strike, and circulating rumors are the main terms, among others, which Syrians are using to describe their situation and that of their 3 million co-nationals inside Turkey in recent days. The terms reflect Syriansâ]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font><br></font></div><div><font>By Ethar Abdulhaq</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- Difficult days ahead, sedition, causing unrest and strike, and circulating rumors are the main terms, among others, which Syrians are using to describe their situation and that of their 3 million co-nationals inside Turkey in recent days. The terms reflect Syrians’ fears of serious repercussions for their situation in the country that was and still is hosting the largest number of Syrians since the start of al-Assad’s campaign against the Syrian people.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The talk and anxiety come a few days before the first anniversary of the attempted coup that took place on July 15, 2016. On that terrible night hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of Syrians held their breaths and waiting for dawn, news of that the coup failed and the government led by the Justice and Development Party secured the state institutions. Most Syrians, if not all of them, are aware that their situation would not be the same if a different government took power.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The majority of Syrians recognize the gratitude they owe the Turkish government and people, and the majority of Turks understand the meaning of hospitality and “supporting the vulnerable.” In the midst of these two majorities are a small minority who are trying to make their voices the loudest. They take advantage of any negative incident to turn Syrians and Turks on each other and to show them as hateful and vengeful against each other.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Among a minority of Syrians you find those who insult Turks and their government, and among a minority of Turks, you have racists calling and demanding Syrians be expelled from Turkey. Between these two minorities is a majority that is trying hard to put out any sparks of strife and mobilization, rejecting the language of generalization and emphasizing the deep connections between Syrians to Turks.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl spoke to some Syrians to gain their perspectives on the situation in Turkey. Many of them commented that this attempt to cause strife and discord is driven by hidden hands on both sides. They insisted that on the Syrian side, there are people, with dubious moral and criminal records who are suspected of being connected to the Syrian regime intelligence apparatus, trying to create problems. On the Turkish side, there are public figures and parties whose orientation is announced and publicized in statements and programs, and who in summary oppose the Turkish government welcoming Syrians and demand that Syrians be deported to Syria.</font></div><div><font>The new in the efforts of these groups, is that this time, these groups are taking advantage of individual attacks committed by some Syrians, highlighting these incidents and magnify them on social media sites for the news to appear amplified tenfold. In the process, these groups fulfil role their in inciting problems and differences.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In this context, the lawyer Maher Abbas warns of the magnitude and danger of what Syrians are currently facing in Turkey. He wished all Syrians to deal seriously with the situation with much seriousness, and avoid as much as possible contact with Turks, especially those trying to provoke them.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Zaman al-Wasl obtained a copy of recordings in which Abbas confirmed that a minority, perhaps a little over exceed one million Turks out of the population of 80 million, will seek to launch a campaign to distort the image of the Turkish government as a generous host of Syrians and to tarnish the image of Syrians as guests.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Abbas, who is interested in the case and is monitoring its developments, based his words on statements he received from his law professor (a member of the Turkish parliament). The law professor informed Abbas of the discussion during a meeting he added attended along with other parliamentarians, government officials and members of the Justice and Development Party.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b><br></b></font></div><div><font><b><br></b></font></div><div><font><b>The Spearhead&nbsp;</b></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Abbas said that his parliamentary teacher and the remainder of the meeting attendees delegated him to him the task of conveying their message to every Syrian living in Turkey. The message is that Turkey is today exposed to a major sedition at the level of the state and the ruling party. According to Abbas, a new coup is being prepared, and Syrians are being used as a card in this coming coup and are perhaps at the helm of the issue. Those preparing for the coup intend to provoke problems with them in conjunction with mobilizing the opposition in Turkey for these issues to become part of the same context and restore the atmosphere of the 2016 coup.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Abbas revealed that in June alone, the Turkish authorities caught over 10 cells subordinate to the al-Assad regime intelligence operating in Turkey.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Abbas presented several recommendations made by the Turkish officials, including that Syrians do not gather for any reason, ensure that they provoke no problems or friction with Turks. He added that Syrians should try to resolve these issues peacefully especially as there are Turks affiliated with opposition parties and even terrorist movements (PKK) whose mission will be to provoke Syrians and harass them.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to Maher Abbas the incidents several Syrians have experienced in several cities in Turkey are most likely planned. He warned that pages on social media are witnessing incitement against Syrians and that these pages involve different media outlets. He cited one newspaper which published news claiming that Syrians have killed around 120 Turks, to provoke the greatest amount of hatred.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In his message, Abbas hoped that all Syrians would help the Turkish government face these campaigns of hatred and incitement, by committing to restraining themselves and fight the provocations especially as the Turkish government has enough concerns and problems and does not need new concerns about Syrians.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>He mentioned that the Turkish police Ankara city is on high alert 24/7 in most of the city’s neighborhoods and that Syrian must appreciate this and stand with the Turkish state and its institutions.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><b>Protest&nbsp;</b></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A prominent activist, familiar with the conditions of the Syrians in Turkey, confirmed that there were manifestations of protest on Tuesday in Gaziantep city which hosts the largest number of Syrians. Speaking to Zaman al-Wasl, the activist explained that the protests came a day after clashes with Syrians and assaults on their property and breaking some of their properties in the capital Ankara. The activist pointed out that the Turkish police came out to contain the situation and calm protestors.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The activist who preferred to refer to his name with the letter ‘M’, revealed to Zaman al-Wasl that since the emergence of this latest campaign, he has been entering Syrian groups and pages on social media to publish calming and prudent comments. He explained that due to his actions, he has personally clashed with suspicious Syrians whose comments on different pages and groups held the same level of incitement against Turks. He said that it appeared as if these people were- indeed - employed exclusively for this task.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The activist pointed out his deep suspicions about these people and commented that he entered a page to follow the comments about the protest against the presence of Syrians in Gaziantep to found a person calling for attacks and violence against Turks. ‘M’ responded to the comments to highlight the danger of these comments, and the situation escalated with the person insulting the revolution and the activist. The person followed this by threatening ‘M’ that his account will be blocked.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>According to ‘M’, about one hour later, his account was blocked due to reports about him. He highlighted the person’s ability to mobilize so many people in such a short time to block M’s account is evidence that the person inciting violence is not an ordinary person but a member of a cell. ‘M’ highlight that the most dangerous thing is that the account the person got Facebook to block is a fictional account which does not reveal M’s real identity, and despite this, the person took no chances. ‘M’ wondered how the situation would have been if the person knew his real identity and his influential position in the Syrian opposition.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>No one doubts that the Syrian regime and its intelligence apparatus has from the first moment that a Syrian refugee landed on Turkish soil, tried to distort and demonize Turkey and its government, and denigrate every refugee. To that end, the Syrian regime used every tool at its disposal, overstepping all red lines, and even reach the point of targeting the honor of Syrian women in camps as further evidence of the regime’s degeneration.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Every time Turkey experienced an internal or external problem, the regime hastened to exaggerate and benefit from the issue, portraying it as the end of the ruling Justice and Development Party and Erdogan personally. According to its familiar tune, the regime media takes any incident in Turkey as an attempt to convince Syrians living in Turkey that the fire of the regime is a heaven in comparison to what they have suffered in Turkey from exploitation and injustice.</font></div><div><font>The regime and its agents have benefited greatly from the climate of public freedoms in Turkey to market their stories. A regime television reporter even works freely in Turkey photographing and broadcasting pictures and interviews from Turkey to Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In the spring of this year, millions of Syrians revolted against a person named Adib Abdel Fattah who was employed by the regime television as its correspondent in Turkey. He broadcasted a report from inside Turkey, where he hosted figures who oppose Erdogan. These figures claimed that Erdogan was behind the chemical massacre in Khan Shaykhoun where dozens of innocent civilians were killed, and it is well documented that the regime perpetrated the attack.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>It appears the regime tried to replace Adib after his cover was blown, and so they hired his relative Saleh Abdel Fattah to take over the task assigned to Adib in the demonizing Turkey and showing it as a hell for its citizens and Syrians alike. The regime persists in trying to push the idea that there is nothing better than the homeland even if that means accepting al-Assad and his intelligence.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>For this purpose, Abdel Fattah broadcasted a report in which he collected footage of misery and poverty, and mixed these images with talk about the bitterness of Eid in Turkey in comparison to the sweetness of it in Syria.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Abdel Fattah, who conducted brief interviews for the report mostly with Syrian children, took advantage of those he interviewed by using a microphone with the banner of a famous television station on it. The microphone belonged to a relative of Abdel Fattah who used to work for that television station. This other relative is a well-known journalist who poses as an expert on Turkish affairs but is considered a regime support and one of its aids.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Abdel Fattah’s fraudulent activities appear in footage of the report as he not only avoided using the regime television microphone but also the footage from the report does not show the lower half of the microphone when Abdel Fattah was interviewing people. The absence comes in contrast to the final shot of the report when Abdel Fattah appears holding the regime television microphone.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><b><font>Not Fiction&nbsp;</font></b></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>While we were in the midst of finishing this report, we carefully weighed every word to avoid being counted among the ranks of the ignorant of recent events concerning the Syrians in Turkey. During this time, the Turkish Ministry of Interior issued a transparent and clear statement to address the issues. The issue proved to us that what is threatening the three million Syrians living in Turkey is not a joke or fiction, but a serious issue that resulted in the Ministry of Interior alerting to it in a formal written statement.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>In the statement issued on Wednesday, the Ministry of Interior considered that the actions of some Syrian guests against Syrians from their own country or against Turkish citizens are not incidents that can be overlooked since they are being distorted, exaggerated and they are being circulated in this way to provoke tension in the society.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Interior Ministry pointed out that the manner in which some of the incidents are occurring is not compatible with the spirit of hospitality and the principles of the Ansars ( a reference to the supporters of the Prophet PBUH) which was raised by the government and adopted by Turkish society. The Ministry warned against exploiting these incidents to spread strife and discord for political purposes.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The statement added that some of the reports about the escalation in the number of crimes committed by Syrians in Turkey, do not align with the governmental statistics. The Ministry said that the numbers circulated distort reality as the number of Syrians committing crimes is minimal, barely 1.3% according to the figures covering the years 2014-2017.&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The Interior Ministry pointed out that most of the crimes committed by Syrians in Turkey were perpetrated against Syrians themselves and not Turkish citizens in contrast to what is being promoted. The Ministry explained in its statement that these the number of crimes committed by Syrians in Turkey decreased by 5% in the first half of 2017.</font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Assad made secret visit to Iran-run missiles developing site in Tartus: sources]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/27512</link>
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						<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jun 2017 01:08:33 +0300</pubDate>
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						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[&nbsp;(Zaman Al Wasl)- Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has made secret visit to a research center run by Tehran for developing long-range missiles and chemical weapons in coastal Tartus province during Eid al-Fiter holiday, well-informed sources said.The move comes as White House accused the Assad ]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>&nbsp;</font></div><div><font>(Zaman Al Wasl)- Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has made secret visit to a research center run by Tehran for developing long-range missiles and chemical weapons in coastal Tartus province during Eid al-Fiter holiday, well-informed sources said.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The move comes as White House accused the Assad regime on Tuesday of preparing a new chemical attack on eastern and southern Syria&nbsp;</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The one-year-old center has been built by Iran in Wadi Jehanam, also known as the Hell Valley, the abysmal valley that separets between Hama and Tartus provinces.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The secret visit of Assad has followed a rare visit to Hama city where the Russian backed tyrant delivered Eid al-Fiter prayers, showing more confident after six years of daily bombing that claimed lives of half million Syrians.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The center is working on developing long-range missiles and it will be inaugurated by the end of the year, accordign to sources who provinced Zaman al-Wasl by photos for the site.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>On Tuesday, the minister for national reconciliation denied White House allegations that it may be preparing a new chemical attack, insisting again that it has never used such arms.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Ali Haidar told The Associated Press that the White House statement foreshadowed a "diplomatic battle" that would be waged against Syria in the halls of the U.N.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>The White House issued a stern warning to Syrian President Bashar Assad on Monday night, saying it had "potential" evidence that Syria was preparing for another chemical weapons attack.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>A non-governmental source with close ties to the White House said the administration had received intelligence that the Syrians were mixing precursor chemicals for a possible sarin gas attack in either the east of south of the country, where government troops and their proxies have faced recent setbacks.</font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font>Assad had denied responsibility for the April 4 attack in the rebel-held Idlib province that killed dozens of people, and Russia, Assad's key backer, sided with him. Days later, President Donald Trump launched a retaliatory cruise missile strike on a Syrian government-controlled air base.</font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Euphrates Dam: Story of Survival from Explosions and Russian Oil]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/27026</link>
						<comments>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/27026</comments>
						<pubDate>Mon, 12 Jun 2017 11:56:46 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[
















By Abdullah Ghadawi 

&nbsp;

(Zaman Al
Wasl)- The voices which cried out against the murder of the Ahmad al-Hussein,
engineer and director of the Euphrates Dam, soon dissipated as other voices
cried out about the looming danger of the Dam collapsing, and the]]></description>
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<!--StartFragment-->

<p><font>By Abdullah Ghadawi <o></o:p></font></p>

<p><font>&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><span><font>(Zaman Al
Wasl)- The voices which cried out against the murder of the Ahmad al-Hussein,
engineer and director of the Euphrates Dam, soon dissipated as other voices
cried out about the looming danger of the Dam collapsing, and the impacts of
such an event on the Syrian Jazeera region. At that time, everyone spoke about
the Dam regardless of their expertise, and all the analysis and quotes fell
apart, and the Dam did not fall.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
In an exclusive investigation, Zaman al-Wasl reveals what happened to the
Euphrates Dam and its current condition. Zaman al-Wasl was given access to
every corner of the Dam even the subterranean levels which are now flooded with
water. <o></o:p></font></span></p>

<p><span><font>&nbsp;</font></span></p>

<p><span><font>Our
investigative team examines the extent of the damage and destruction that
befell the Dam after the Islamic State forces left the Dam’s current
mechanisms, and the sole means of preserving the Dam and restoring it.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br>
<!--[endif]--><o></o:p></font></span></p>

<p><span><font>&nbsp;</font></span></p>

<p><b><span><font>Blowing up the Dam<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></b></p>

<p><span><font><br>
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br>
<!--[endif]--><o></o:p></font></span></p>

<p><span><font>Operators
in the Euphrates Dam, many of whom worked at the Dam since the time the regime
was in control and throughout the period of Islamic State control, revealed
that the Islamic State tried to blow up the entire Euphrates Dam.<o></o:p></font></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
Speaking to Zaman al-Wasl at the Dam site, employees said the Islamic State
wanted to blow up the entire Dam quietly and without announcing their
intention. “They ordered us to go and take our salaries from al-Tabaqa, and
when we went there, they detained us for an entire day. They [the Islamic
State] sent for mine and explosive experts from Raqqah city,” they explained.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
The employees added that the Islamic State forces brought in their explosives
experts who started blowing up parts of the Dam while Abu Hisham, the oldest
employee at the Dam, who is now managing the everyday functioning of the Dam in
the absence of experts, tried to prevent them from blowing it up. He confronted
them, but they ignored him and blew up some parts of the Dam. During this time,
the other workers were released from detention in al-Tabaqa and fighting
escalated in al-Tabaqa, so the Islamic State’s plan to blow up the Dam failed.
To compensate for the failure of their plan, they vandalised the equipment and
the machines.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>
<!--[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]--><br>
<!--[endif]--><o></o:p></font></span></p>

<p><span><font>&nbsp;</font></span></p>

<p><b><span><font>Damaging Equipment<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></b></p>

<p><span><b><span><font>&nbsp;</font></span></b></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
While touring the subterranean levels of the Euphrates Dam, Zaman al-Wasl’s
team saw the destruction perpetrated by the Islamic State forces in the Dam
facilities. Abu Hisham said that the Islamic State’s aim was to deprive any
incoming forces, which take control of the city from benefiting from the Dam
and what it provides. He stressed that he always debated with Islamic State
forces the importance of the Dam for civilians, but they always responded, “if
we as Jihadists do not benefit from it then others gaining any kind of benefit
from it is a loss.”<span>&nbsp;</span><br>
Zaman al-Wasl documented the destruction of over 200 electrical cups (as they
are referred to), which work on gas. The cups are an advanced electrical energy
generating technology, which Iran provided to the regime one year before
al-Raqqah fell to Islamic State control. The electrical cups were not used
until the Islamic State took control of the city and when they left, they
destroyed them entirely.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
According to employees, the electrical cups cost millions of Dollars, and this
technology was destroyed with several rounds of bullets. The Islamic State did
not care how important this technology is for the region’s people as the cups
provided electricity to the people of al-Raqqah and al-Tabaqa who until now are
without electricity.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
During Zaman al-Wasl’s tour of the facilities, we photographed the destruction
the Islamic State forces exacted on the Dam equipment and machines. It appears
that the Islamic State forces were entirely unaware of what was inside the
Euphrates Dam and the technologies available. Employees explained that due to
their lack of awareness, the Islamic State forces did not harm any of them, as
they wanted to benefit from their knowledge capabilities.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p>

<p><span><font><br>
On the first floor of the Dam building, Zaman al-Wasl was greeted by a sand
wall and showed the Islamic State’s sniper position. Abu Hisham explained that
the Islamic State forces were preparing for all the possible war scenarios,
especially at the Euphrates Dam. He said that they were preparing for a
chemical war after they failed to blow up the Dam, and they worked to poison
the Euphrates water, but something indescribable prevented that. Abu Hisham
said, “I truly do not know…The river’s water was saved by divine will.”<span>&nbsp;</span><br></font></span></p></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><img></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><p><b><span><font>Russian Oil: The Only Solution<o></o:p></font></span></b></p><p><font><span><span>&nbsp;</span></span><span><br><br></span></font></p><p><font><span><br></span></font></p><p><font><span>The Euphrates Dam’s technicians and experts who spoke to Zaman al-Wasl, said the only solution to repair the Dam is for Russian experts to come to the Dam and repair it. They explained that the Dam was established and built using Russian technologies and expertise and only they could repair it. The technicians added that the Americans tried to repair the damages, but they failed because they do not know the Dam’s build and work mechanisms. The Dam’s highly experienced employees managed to get the Dam’s water levels under control. Abu Hisham stressed that despite this, the only experts capable of repairing the damage to the Dam are the Russians.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></span></font></p><p><span><font><br>He explained that the Dam map, its equipment, and even the oil used to activate the facility are manufactured in Russia. All machines are disabled due to the absence of Russian oil. The engines and machines could only be operated under Russian supervision. According to the employees’ estimations, even with the intervention of Russian experts, it will take between 2-3 years for the Dam to return to its previous function.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p><p><span><font><br>Abu Hisham said the issue is not exclusive to the Euphrates Dam as Tishreen Dam suffers the same problem. The Chinese team who build Tishreen Dam programmed the Dam according to Chinese technologies, so that Dam can only be repaired by a team of Chinese experts.<span>&nbsp;<o></o:p></span></font></span></p></div><div><span><span><font><br></font></span></span></div><div><font><br></font></div><font><br></font><div><div><br></div><div><font><img></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><p><span><font><b>The Dam’s Major Problem</b><span><b>&nbsp;&nbsp;</b><o></o:p></span></font></span></p><p><span><font><br>As you walk around in the depth of the Dam with all the damaged equipment around you, water hits you from every side. The subterranean levels have become a sea of water, and employees have treated the problem using primitive methods such as expelling the water using ordinary pumps. Abu Hisham said that the main problem is, “if the water reaches to here, everything ends and the Dam is gone.” He was referring to the level of water, so if the water level rises to 254 or above- the level of Euphrates Dam turbines- the Dam will go out of service completely.<o></o:p></font></span></p><p><span><font><br></font></span></p><p><span><font>Abu Hisham, the Dam’s technical historian, asserted, “The Dam employees exerted extensive efforts for the water level to reach 248, which is the acceptable level in the Dam.” He pointed out that below the level we stood at there are other floors which have been flooded with water due to some of the facilities going out of service.<span>&nbsp;</span><br>Although the so-called “underground electrical floor” is submerged, the Dam is still operating without a complete breakdown. The employees attributed this to the strength of the Russian construction of the Dam to enable it to resist natural disasters and shocks.<br><br></font></span></p><p><font><br></font></p></div></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><div><font><img></font></div><font><br></font></div><div><p><span><font><b>Zaman al-Wasl in the Operation Rooms</b><o></o:p></font></span></p><p><span><font><br></font></span></p><p><span><font>Our tour led us through the Dam’s corridors to the main operation rooms where the work was regulated and monitored. Shockingly, we found the room full of iron remnants after it was burnt and all the equipment destroyed. By examining the destruction, we identified that the fire was an intentional act of arson. The fire extended beyond the operation rooms to the Director General’s office as well.<span>&nbsp;</span></font></span></p><p><span><font><br>Abu Hisham revealed that the major strike was the Islamic State force targeting the main control room. He continued that the largest damages the Dam suffered were caused by the Islamic State forces more than the International Coalition’s bombardment. The Islamic State forces were not content just to burn and vandalise equipment, but also left mines in the Dam facility. He explained that a group of American experts removed more than 70% of mines placed in the Dam, but said that there are still more hidden in different corners of the Dam.<span>&nbsp;</span></font></span></p><p><span><font><br>According to technicians and experts, the amount of damage and destruction amounts to hundreds of millions of US Dollars. Abu Hisham pointed out that the technical capabilities are now limited to managing the destruction of the dam only, but this will not last more than a year as the dam needs complete maintenance.<o></o:p></font></span></p><p><span><font><br></font></span></p><p><span><font>Zaman al-Wasl’s investigation revealed that the Islamic State forces wanted to stop the Dam from working entirely. Finding all the destruction they leveled within the facility not enough, they took to firing bullets at the Dam’s eight turbines leaving behind scars. (Translation by Rana Abdul)</font></span></p><p><span><font><br></font></span></p><p><span><font><br></font></span></p></div><div><div><font></font></div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Hassan Abu Hamza, the secret agent with religious robe]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25899</link>
						<comments>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25899</comments>
						<pubDate>Thu, 04 May 2017 15:49:22 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25899</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[&nbsp;By Ethar Abdulhaq(Zaman Al Wasl)- From the al-Nusra Front to Christianity, so did the case of a young Syrian identified himself as Hassan Abu Hamza became globalized through various media outlets circulating his news especially as the young man directed the story of his conversion to Christian]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>&nbsp;By Ethar Abdulhaq<br><br>(Zaman Al Wasl)- From the al-Nusra Front to Christianity, so did the case of a young Syrian identified himself as Hassan Abu Hamza became globalized through various media outlets circulating his news especially as the young man directed the story of his conversion to Christianity in the form of a long narrative about his involvement in Jihad in Iraq and his detention for years in the terrible prison of Sednaya, and joining al-Nusra Front after his release from Sednaya. He assumed a leadership position in al-Nusra Front and he accused and insulted those who rebelled against the Syrian regime.<br><br>Zaman al-Wasl followed the story and research the roots of the young man and his history to provide readers with testimonies contrary to what has been promoted, especially about the jihad of this young man, and his relationship with to the Syrian revolution and jihadist movements relying on a selection of sources very close to Hassan’s family, friends and even his activism.<br><br>The surprise is that in the midst of working on Hassan's file was not only to reveal his agency to regime, but also to reveal that he was a very "ideal" model for the intelligence agents recruited by the regime. He is exactly the person who embodies the image of Assad's intelligence with all the deception and evil character and he might be even the extreme image of that where there is no recognition of taboos of any kind, and no commitment to the laws, even if they are the" laws "that are required by the gangs themselves.<br><br><br>ASSOCIATED WITH SHIITE&nbsp; GROUPS<br><br><br>At first, close sources to Hassan confirmed that the young man is called Hassan Nayef al-Hilal, denying that he went to Iraq at any stage of his life, and that the young man has several brothers, one of whom was executed by ISIS about a year and a half ago. The other brother has been missing since few years ago. The latter is accused to be an agent of regime intelligence to try to divert the course of the demonstration broke out in his city, al-Tabaqa when the city rebelled against Assad regime whereas his brother Hassan was calling for a caliphate.<br><br>Our sources pointed out that the regime detained Hassan in the famous prison of Sednaya, where the regime insinuated among the "Islamists" detainees who discovered him and tried to retaliate from him, but the regime proceeded to transfer him to another detention.<br><br></font></div><div><font><img></font></div><div><font><br><br>Hassan known for its fluctuation and black history in working for the intelligence of the regime, according to our sources, Hassan was married with a Shiite woman residing in Homs. It is said that her origin goes back to Iraq which puts more signs of wonder about the tendencies of the young man who attacked the Islamic religion and its symbols and sanctities with the most insulting phrases when he appeared on one of the TV Christian missionary channels in addition to a series of stories through which he tried to demonize the Syrian revolution.<br><br>But Hassan's "wonders" do not seem to end, according to the media professional Muhab Nasser, one of Hassan's neighbors, and those who personally interacted with him as they used to live in the same neighborhood in al-Tabaqa city in Raqqa Province.<br><br>Nasser in his talk with Zaman al-Wasl reported that Hassan lied about going to Iraq to join the "Mujahideen", and then joining the al-Nusra as a Sharia person and even al-Nusra has sentenced him to death on the charge of being a regime agent.<br><br><br>FITTING BODY<br><br><br>Nasser reveals serious information about Hassan's imprisonment in Sednaya that did not have to do with his involvement in Jihad in Iraq or elsewhere. On the contrary, he was imprisoned for attempting to recruit himself for the benefit of the Hebrew intelligence (Mossad). He was arrested on that basis and incarcerated in Sednaya, but - ironically - to be a spy on the "Islamists", where he is said to have mingled with some of those who later became leaders of "jihadist" organizations after Bashar al-Assad released them in the summer of 2011.<br><br>During the invasion of Iraq, according to the testimony of Nasser, the regime recruited and cultivated Hassan among the young jihad enthusiasts, especially the Salafists. Hassan tricked some of them and contributed to their handing over to Bashar al-Assad's intelligence, just as Abu al-Qaqaa (Mahmoud Gul Agassi) was doing. Abu al-Qaqaa who al-Nayef can be considered one of his students, according to Muhab Nasser.<br><br>Nasser went further revealing what he called the fake name Hassan used when he was working for the intelligence of the regime. The fake name wasunder the name of Qasim Mekdad.<br><br>He continued indicating that the regime released Hassan in 2015 and sent himto Idlib to be a spy on rebel factions, taking advantage of the fact that his history is unknown in that province, unlike his region (al-Tabaqa).<br><br>Nasser said that Hassan remained in Idlib for about three months during which he worked to initiate dispute between the factions and then he left for Turkey and eventually to Germany. In Germany, he appeared to announce his conversion to Christianity to elaborate further in the narration of his novels.<br><br><div></div><br><br>Nasser described Hassan as a fraudulent and a man with multiple faces. Nasser said that Hassan’s body is fitting that he can wear many different outfits pointing out to his many different identities. He is a secularist when he promotes the secular market and a Salafist when it fits his interest and a Christian when he thinks his deal is a winner.<br><br>He confirmed that he met Hassan in one of the Turkish cities following his escape from Syria. The latter wanted to form a "political party" (he tried to meet there with a high profile people from othe opposition but failed), and showed no interest in religion.<br><br>In the context of the intensification of testimonies about him, our newspaper tried to communicate with one of Hassan's uncles in order to find out about other circumstances in the case of his nephew, especially that the uncle included in his personal page a publication about the transformation of Hassan "from al-Nusra front to Christianity," commenting: there is no sin after infidelity not after the infidel sin, but the uncle apologized with great respect.<br><br>The narrative of the previous close sources was confirmed and supported by the testimony of Abdul Karim Aliawi the close friend of Hassan since the years before the revolution. Aliawi told Zaman al-Wasl that Hassan was committed to one of the Sufi methods whose Sheikh was a military intelligence agent which paved the way for Hassan to be like his Sheikh an agent but working for air intelligence.<br><br>After a duration of time and upon orders by intelligence, Hassan left the ranks of his Sufi group and focused his attention on the group of "calling and reporting" (to regime) in his al-Tabaqa, but he was not of use in his city so he became a follower of Salafist Jihadist movements.<br><br>In order to complete his role fully, Hassan contributed to the formation of an <br>organization called "Lions of Tawhid Jihad in the Levant" in 2008 in the al-Tabaqa. It is an organization that included among its members Aliawi himself, and aimed at fighting the Shiite tide in Raqqa province especially in the city of al-Tabaqa. He began his propaganda activity through the distribution of leaflets, and then moved to armed action.<br><br>The first target of the organization was one of the symbolic figures of Shiisim in al-Tabaqa. The organization was planning to terminate Abu Haydar but it turned out that he was aware of and fled from the house before Aliwai broke into the house himself, and it turned out that Hassan himself informed Abu Haydar but Aliwai did not suspect his friedn back then and continued to work with him<br><br>Aliawi confirmed that Hassan had joined the Abu Qaqaa group in Aleppo for a while and then returned to al-Tabaqa. It seems that this was a session to improve the skills of the young man in the art of penetrating Islamist groups asAbu Qaqaa was one of the flags of this "school".<br><br>Ali and his colleagues ended up in the air investigation branch and stood in front of Jamil Hassan, who was the dean back then. The phantom organization was no longer allowed, especially since its deceived members actually planned and were about to terminate the air force intelligence officer in al-Tabaqa Lieutenant colonel Jihad.<br><br>According to Aliawi, Hassan was interrogated by Jamil Hassan because of his visit to Jordan and his attempt to enter the Israeli embassy there more than once. Thus, everyone was transferred to Sednaya, Aliawi and his comrades on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization and Hassan on charges of apparent attempt to spy in favor of the Jewish state. But the truth is that he was detained to spy on the detainees of the Islamists in Sednaya.<br><br>In prison, Hassan was revealed to the organization's comrades as well as to the Islamists so his mission expired, and the regime transferred him to the PKK prison wing where he carried out acts of harassment that led him to be place in individual cells more than once.<br><br>Later, the regime transferred Aliwai and Hassan and others to to Al-Raqqa prison as a result of the overcrowding of the Sednaya prison, and Al-Raqqa prison, Hassan was detained with figures who later became leaders in ISIS. Hassan was then transferred to Aleppo Prison, according to the word Aliwai.<br><br>He confirmed that he met Hassan in one of the Turkish cities following his escape from Syria. The latter wanted to form a "political party" (he tried to meet there with a high profile people from othe opposition but failed), and showed no interest in religion.<br><br>In the context of the intensification of testimonies about him, our newspaper tried to communicate with one of Hassan's uncles in order to find out about other circumstances in the case of his nephew, especially that the uncle included in his personal page a publication about the transformation of Hassan "from al-Nusra front to Christianity," commenting: there is no sin after infidelity not after the infidel sin, but the uncle apologized with great respect.<br><br>The narrative of the previous close sources was confirmed and supported by the testimony of Abdul Karim Aliawi the close friend of Hassan since the years before the revolution. Aliawi told Zaman al-Wasl that Hassan was committed to one of the Sufi methods whose Sheikh was a military intelligence agent which paved the way for Hassan to be like his Sheikh an agent but working for air intelligence.<br><br>After a duration of time and upon orders by intelligence, Hassan left the ranks of his Sufi group and focused his attention on the group of "calling and reporting" (to regime) in his al-Tabaqa, but he was not of use in his city so he became a follower of Salafist Jihadist movements.<br><br>In order to complete his role fully, Hassan contributed to the formation of an organization called "Lions of Tawhid Jihad in the Levant" in 2008 in the al-Tabaqa. It is an organization that included among its members Aliawi himself, and aimed at fighting the Shiite tide in Raqqa province especially in the city of al-Tabaqa. He began his propaganda activity through the distribution of leaflets, and then moved to armed action.<br><br>The first target of the organization was one of the symbolic figures of Shiisim in al-Tabaqa. The organization was planning to terminate Abu Haydar but it turned out that he was aware of and fled from the house before Aliwai broke into the house himself, and it turned out that Hassan himself informed Abu Haydar but Aliwai did not suspect his friedn back then and continued to work with him<br><br>Aliawi confirmed that Hassan had joined the Abu Qaqaa group in Aleppo for a while and then returned to al-Tabaqa. It seems that this was a session to improve the skills of the young man in the art of penetrating Islamist groups asAbu Qaqaa was one of the flags of this "school".<br><br>Ali and his colleagues ended up in the air investigation branch and stood in front of Jamil Hassan, who was the dean back then. The phantom organization was no longer allowed, especially since its deceived members actually planned and were about to terminate the air force intelligence officer in al-Tabaqa Lieutenant colonel Jihad.<br><br>According to Aliawi, Hassan was interrogated by Jamil Hassan because of his visit to Jordan and his attempt to enter the Israeli embassy there more than once. Thus, everyone was transferred to Sednaya, Aliawi and his comrades on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization and Hassan on charges of apparent attempt to spy in favor of the Jewish state. But the truth is that he was detained to spy on the detainees of the Islamists in Sednaya.<br><br>In prison, Hassan was revealed to the organization's comrades as well as to the Islamists so his mission expired, and the regime transferred him to the PKK prison wing where he carried out acts of harassment that led him to be place in individual cells more than once.<br><br>Later, the regime transferred Aliwai and Hassan and others to to Al-Raqqa prison as a result of the overcrowding of the Sednaya prison, and Al-Raqqa prison, Hassan was detained with figures who later became leaders in ISIS. Hassan was then transferred to Aleppo Prison, according to the word Aliwai.<br><br><br>SPYING FROM EUROPE<br><br>Finally, Zaman al-Wasl headed to a senior leader in the Army of Conquest responsible for the administration of Idlib province to ask him about Hassan and the fact of affiliation to al-Nusra Front (Fatah Al-Sham Front, then the Sham Liberation Organization) or other organizations.<br><br>The leader confirmed he was in direct contact with Hassan, who was arrested for about a month (summer of 2015), and that Hassan was keen to learn the stories of "jihadists" and their experiences in Syria and Iraq, which helped him to weave some of his novels which appeared on the media.<br><br>He stressed Hassan was not affiliated in any way to any faction of the Army of Conquest that he does not have a name included among the elements of this army to the multiplicity of formations, and that no one saw Hassan carrying weapons and or stand at a checkpoint or guard headquarters, and this what proves Hassan is lying.<br><br>The leader pointed out that the affiliation of Hassan to any faction in the province of Idlib was almost impossible because he is unknown, and not recommended in terms of security.<br><br>The leader revealed that Hassan tried to circumvent his position to obtain a detailed list of the names of the fighters in several battalions on pretext he was seeking, from his place in Europe, to collect material support for them in order to finance and arm them. Such an attempt specifically intersects with the testimony of our intelligence source who confirmed that Hassan could not have cut his intelligence ties or stopped his work as an agent.<br><br>The leader provided Zaman al-Wasl with a series of voice messages addressed to Hassan without a recorded response, but there were written responses succinctly from Hassan confirming that he converted to Christianity and ridiculing this leader who helped him one day to cross to Turkey. he hosted and gave him money to be able to complete his journey to Turkey until it came to Hassan to address the leader saying: "should I send you the price of bread?”<br><br>* After:<br><br>In this survey, Zaman al-Wasl made sure to use the relevant parties to investigate Hassan, his history and activities and Zaman al-Wasl applied the techniques of verification, testimonies to provide their readers with a summary of reliable and documented testimonies.<br><br>Given the multiplicity of witnesses and the size of the testimonies they have given, it is now sufficient to publish what serves this investigation. Other data will soon find their way to publication when the conditions for their verification are completed, which may be much more dangerous than Hassan.<br><br>* General communication<br><br>Zaman al-Wasl considers this investigative report a public statement to the German authorities against Hassan as a well-known agent of Assad's intelligence, demanding that he be investigated for his various activities. Zaman al-Wasl is willing to cooperate in providing all the necessary testimonies and evidence in this dossier.</font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[90,000 Syrian militiamen to operate under Iran command: Assad approved]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25831</link>
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						<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2017 17:36:22 +0300</pubDate>
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						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[&nbsp;(Zaman al-Wasl)- Syrian regime President Bashar al-Assad agreed to a proposal submitted to him by his Defense Mnister and Chief of Staff through the head of the Organization and Administration Division to recruit tens of thousands of Syrians in the local defense forces militia under the comman]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>&nbsp;(Zaman al-Wasl)- Syrian regime President Bashar al-Assad agreed to a proposal submitted to him by his Defense Mnister and Chief of Staff through the head of the Organization and Administration Division to recruit tens of thousands of Syrians in the local defense forces militia under the command of the Iran which will arm and command the militia.<br><br>According to the memorandum obtained by Zaman al-Wasl, Head of the Division of Organization and Administration, Maj. Gen. Adnan Mhraz Abdo," a memo was sent to Bashar al-Assad as commander-in-chief of the army and the armed forces, informing him of the work of the committee charged with organizing the local defense forces under the Iranian command.<br><br>In the memo, Abdo included a table detailing the number of mercenaries organized by local defense forces and their distribution to the provinces, and categorizing them as fleeing, civilians, and settling their situation.<br><br>The table revealed that the total number of those proposed to be included in Iran's local defense forces is 88,733 mercenaries, of whom about 37,000 are civilians and more than 30,000 are late in regime army recruitment and 12,000 who settled their situation with the regime.<br><br>Regarding distribution of mercenaries in 11 provinces, Aleppo came in the forefront in terms of number by 26 thousand, followed by Damascus by about 20 thousand, and Hama by nearly 12 thousand, and Homs about 9 thousand.<br><br>A second table presented the number of military personnel proposed to be settled, equivalent to some 52,000 military personnel, who were recommended to be transferred, appointed and modified to the local defense forces and recruitment to those who had already been settled and engaged under the command of Iranians.<br><br>One of the propositions of the memorandum recommended that the subordination of former local defense forces to the Iranian side should remain under Iran command until the end of the crisis in Syria.<br><br>The most important item in the memorandum revealed that "the combat and physical insurance of all types of military and Syrian civilians working with the Iranian side rests with the Iranian side." The securing of the rights of the dead and wounded from working groups under the banner of Iran is also a duty on the Iranian side.<br><br>Memorandum No. 1455 dated 4-4-2017, recommended to be approved by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense, only one day after its date, to be approved by Bashar on 11-4-2017 and become effective.<br><br>The implementation of the contents of the memorandum appears to have begun immediately. It has been appended to all intelligence agencies, immigration and criminal security agencies, as well as the military police, asking them not to interfere with those working with the Iranian side who carry special temporary cards given to local defense militia until they are settled and given permanent cards.<br><br>The circular issued on April 22, 2017, noted Memorandum No. 1455, which Bashar had already approved, offering Iran a new token of friendship.<br></font></div><div><font><img></font></div><div><font><br></font></div><div><font><img></font></div><div><br></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Head of Syria's Chemical Weapons: Profile]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25201</link>
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						<pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2017 12:41:13 +0300</pubDate>
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						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25201</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[By Ethar Abdulhaq(Zaman Al Wasl) The son and brother of one of the most important officials responsible for the development of chemical weapons for the Syrian regime have British citizenship. This information came to light to add to Britain’s already existent record of scandals including it export]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font><br>By Ethar Abdulhaq<br><br>(Zaman Al Wasl) The son and brother of one of the most important officials responsible for the development of chemical weapons for the Syrian regime have British citizenship. <br><br>This information came to light to add to Britain’s already existent record of scandals including it exporting hundreds of tons of chemical weapons used by the regime and its scientists in creating Sarin gas.<br><br>According to a report by the leading British newspaper “The Times” published on Sunday, Bisher, Amr Armanazi’s son, and Gaith, his older brother both obtained British passports although Amr is included on the Britain and the USA’s sanction lists. Armanazi’s other son, Zaid, obtained British citizenship in 2009 and he works for a banking institution in London.<br><br><br>-Amr Armanazi-<br><br><br>Amr Armanazi is the Director General of the Center for Scientific Studies and Research, an institution subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, which is involved in supervising the modernization of various types of weapons, especially non-conventional ones (chemical, biological). As such, Armanazi holds the title of “head of chemical scientists” in Syria, or “chemical master” of the al-Assad regime.<br><br>The revelation that his son and his brother hold British nationality came as the world still reels from the news of the chemical massacre in the northern town of Khan Sheikhoun that left at least 103 people killed. It raises Britain’s level of scandal especially as Armanazi is still heavily supportive of the regime and developing weapons for the regime to use to kill civilians.<br><br>According to special data obtained by Zaman al-Wasl, Amr Armanazi was born in 1944 to a Mohammed Najib and Talaat. Muhammad Najib Armanazi was a prominent figure during the French mandate when he held the position of Chief Custodian of the Presidential Palace. Armanazi’s father was born in Hama in 1897, and his family had a well-known palace in the Afif area in central Damascus. <br><br>Muhammad Najib held several diplomatic posts including Syria's ambassador to Britain, India and Egypt, and he participated (representing Syria) in the meetings that led to the establishment of the Arab League and the United Nations.<br><br>Beyond his father’s influential positions and history, Armanazi is a long-standing close associate of Bashar al-Assad. <br><br>Zaman al-Wasl obtained information indicating that two’s relationship developed when Bashar became president of the so-called “Syrian Computer Society.” The association was originally started for Basel al-Assad, and with his death, Bashar became head of the society and many others as the heir to the throne. Amr Armnazi is also closely associated with Dr Emad Mustapha, the former ambassador to Washington, and Bashar’s godfather regarding his relations with the United States.<br><br>The Center for Scientific Studies and Research, which is currently headed by Amr Armanazi, was founded in 1969 and is a research entity directly affiliated to the Ministry of Defense. The affiliation confirms the military and clandestine nature of the research and applications developed in the Center. The Center is focused on developing Syria’s military defense capabilities including weapons of mass destruction.<br><br>It must be noted that many Syrians often confuse between the Center for Scientific Studies and Research and the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology due to the proximity of their locations and specializations (Barza and Masakin Barza).<br><br>As a result of his role in developing the weapons the regime is using to crush the Syrian revolution, Washington included Amr Armanazi on the list sanctioned persons and institutions subordinate to the regime. Following the American administration, Britain and the EU added Armanazi to their sanction lists.<br><br><br><br>-Al-Assad Supporters to the Bone-<br><br><br>Ghaith Armanazi, born in 1943, has served as the head of the Arab League mission in London. Ghaith is the executive director of the Syrian British Society, Bashar's front in Britain. The Society was founded in 2003 by Bashar al-Assad’s father-in-law Fawaz al-Akhras.<br><br>In February 2017, Ghaith announced the release of a book entitled “The Story of Syria,” published in English. Ghaith spoke about the content and some of the book chapters during a recent interview with the BBC. Ghaith devoted two separate chapters to talk about Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar’s reigns. He described Hafez al-Assad's coup in 1970 as “The corrective movement led by the late President Hafez al-Assad,” considering that the coup “brought the stability which many Syrians were hoping for.”<br><br>During the interview, Ghaith avoided all comments regarding the regime’s violations or crimes against the Syria people. He did not mention the sectarianism of the regime. He refused to consider the dominance of the Alawites of military institutions as a deliberate and planned act by the al-Assad family, but rather the result of circumstances and factors. He described the hereditary system in Syria as “the expected result.”<br><br><br>-Britain’s Influence on Syrian Affairs-<br><br><br>The British influence and intervention in Syrian affairs date back many years, but these interventions were established after the British Empire had places of direct and indirect occupation in the region. However, Britain has been influential in Syria’s contemporary history. Britain was a contributor to Syria Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power, and it later blessed Bashar succeeding as president.<br><br>In this regard, it is possible to mention Hafez al-Assad’s visit to Britain in 1965 on the pretext of receiving treatment. A British document revealed that meetings with British officials accompanied the visit.<br><br>About a quarter of a century later, Bashar al-Assad went to London to complete his medical school education, which some also consider was a cover for other activities. The issue is cast in further doubt since Bashar became President.<br><br>&nbsp;Regardless of Britain’s role as kingmaker in Syria, Britain is inviolably involved in the crimes against the Syrian people as it supplied the al-Assad regime with hundreds of tons of chemical used in the manufacturing of Sarin gas. Britain would never have allowed the Syrian regime to obtain such chemical capabilities unless it was certain that the regime would never use the gas against Israel.<br><br>In mid-2014, when the regime was in the middle of destroying its chemical stockpiles and Britain was involved in destroying this stockpile, documents were leaked from the British Foreign Office proving the involvement of British companies in selling chemicals to the regime in the 1980s.<br><br>According to this document, the al-Assad regime used chemical phosphate in the manufacture of the deadly sarin gas, and British companies supplied it along with Dimethyl Phosphate, Hexamine and Triethyl Phosphate. It is one of the main materials in the manufacture of Sarin. The British companies also sold hundreds of tons of chemicals and auxiliary devices to Damascus in 2003.<br><br>After there was no doubt about the credibility of the document, William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, was forced to acknowledge the truth, but he said that these dangerous materials were exported “legitimately”. He continued, “According to information we possess, we place a high probability that the chemical exported by the British companies were later used by the Syrians in their programs to produce nerve gases, including sarin.”<br><br>Hague acknowledged that the three shipments sent by British companies to the al-Assad regime between 1983-1986 included “a few hundred tons” of chemical material.<br><br>A spokeswoman for the British Foreign Office tried to mitigate Britain’s disgrace, saying that “The materials were exported 30 years ago.” In recent years, “There has been a comprehensive adjustment of export controls, a more rigorous legal framework and a more transparent process.” The comments came as a way of saying “let bygones be bygones” regardless of the price Syrians are paying today.</font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[Key opposition's funds and financial affairs in special reports]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/24853</link>
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						<pubDate>Sun, 02 Apr 2017 03:49:46 +0300</pubDate>
						<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
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						<description><![CDATA[&nbsp;(Zaman Al Wasl)- Zaman al-Wasl to start publishing a series of reports revealing and discussing the financial affairs and funds of the Syrian opposition's National Coalition.These reports draw on interviews with highly influential figures with the Coalition.Several high profile figures within ]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font><font>&nbsp;</font></font><font><br>(Zaman Al Wasl)- Zaman al-Wasl to start publishing a series of reports revealing and discussing the financial affairs and funds of the Syrian opposition's National Coalition.<br><br>These reports draw on interviews with highly influential figures with the Coalition.<br><br>Several high profile figures within the Coalition promised to speak with Zaman al-Wasl about the details of the Coalition’s financial transactions over the past two years, but refused to discuss any period prior on the basis they are not willing to talk about a past they were not a part of.<br><br>The financial affairs of the Syrian opposition is one of the unknown issues in the revolution although the Coalition has received support from half the countries in the world. Despite the visibility of the support the Coalition has received, many of the sums which came in and out of the Coalition accounts were not publicly announced or at least the transactions were not declared before the Coalition members or even in a meeting of the General Secretariat.<br><br>In this investigation, we inquire about why support for the Coalition and the Interim Government stopped, was it international pressure or a response to their financial mismanagement.<br><br>According to information obtained by Zaman al-Wasl, Turkey is the only state still providing the Coalition with minimal financial support sufficient to cover the costs of the headquarters in Florya, Istanbul and some other expenditures. Other countries have suspended their financial support entirely.<br><br>Zaman al-Wasl pledges to present this investigation without prejudice or suspicions. In each article, Zaman al-Wasl will present some of the evidences it has gathered for the consideration by the public and officials within this opposition institution.<br></font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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						<title><![CDATA[The shadow man of Assad regime who leads missile department - Profile]]></title>
						<link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/24819</link>
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						<pubDate>Sat, 01 Apr 2017 03:26:04 +0300</pubDate>
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						<category><![CDATA[الرئيسية]]></category>
						<category><![CDATA[Top Secret]]></category>
						<guid isPermaLink="false">https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/24819</guid>
						<description><![CDATA[By Ethar Abdulhaq(Zaman Al Wasl)- In a fancy apartment in the Adawi district of Damascus lives Abu Muhammad, one of the most vicious criminals of Bashar al-Assad's regime has shed a lot Syrian blood. Yet, to much irony, he is the shadow man of the Assad regime. To the extent that obtaining news of h]]></description>
						<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>By Ethar Abdulhaq<br><br>(Zaman Al Wasl)- In a fancy apartment in the Adawi district of Damascus lives Abu Muhammad, one of the most vicious criminals of Bashar al-Assad's regime has shed a lot Syrian blood. <br><br>Yet, to much irony, he is the shadow man of the Assad regime. To the extent that obtaining news of his or even a picture revealing his face is very difficult than finding a picture of a senior intelligence officer.<br><br>He is the man who contributed to the killing of tens of thousands of Syrians and the destruction of their property as he heads the artillery and missile directorate in the army of the regime.<br><br>According verified information of Zaman al-Wasl, Major General Jumaa al-Jassim, director of the artillery and missile department, was born in small village near Senjar town in northern Idlib province. He was supposed to retire in 2014, but regime’s trust in and its reliance on his criminal act prompted him to extend his term of office.<br><br>Juma al-Jassim (pictured) was born in 1954 to a father named Mohamed and a mother called Zeida. He belongs to the Hadideen tribe, the same tribe of the defense minister of the regime, Fahad Jassim al-Fareij, from Rihan in the countryside of Hama.<br><br>Fareij and al-Jassim have a tribal and family relationship, which in the end is only a detail of their close alliance in the framework of strict loyalty to the regime and strict implementation of its orders.<br><br></font><font><font>Activists and opposition figures from the Hadideen</font> tribe warned both Al-Farij and Al-Jassim of continuing to serve the regime, but the two men did not care about it at all and went on fighting and killing the Syrian people, including members of their clan who were scattered in large areas of Syria especially in the rural Idlib and Hama.<br><br>Al-Jassim is currently participating in the battles of the northern Hama countryside where the regime has been involved there as being the "best" in its view to fight the people of that region, and know the terrain of the land and the nature of its population.<br><br>The regime has already assigned to al-Jassim highly sensitive leadership positions and battles especially in the Homs and Hama villages.<br><br>Despite his very sensitive position and his role in directing guns and rockets throughout Syria, it was very strange and suspicious that al-Jassim would not be on the European or American sanctions lists. The lists which include names of hundreds of entities and personalities suspected of involvement in the killing of Syrians, and lower ranked figures may be included in these lists.<br><br>In the fall of 2016, Washington, through its Permanent Representative in the Security Council, vowed to prosecute and prosecute war criminals in Syria, referring to 12 officers by name, including three senior officers and rocket launchers: Major General Tahir Hamid Khalil, Major General Jawdat Mawas and General Adnan Hilweh without mentioning al-Jassim at all.<br><br>Al-Jassim has two sons. Mohamed </font><font><font>and Ahmad, </font></font><font><font><font><font>First Lieutenant</font></font> in the regime army.<br></font><br><div><img></div><br><br><br><div><img></div><br><br><br>-Self-distancing-<br><br><br>The relationship between some tribal leaders and their "leaders" in the Assad regime has always raised suspicion among Syrians, especially after the revolution, which was supposed to put these leaders and "dignitaries" automatically on the right side, but they chose notto take the path of the people and did not care about the unity of their clans.<br><br>Al-</font><font><font>Hadideen</font> is one of the most prominent tribes that have been distorted by figures such as al-Fareej and al-Jassim, and the son of the leader of the </font><font>Hadideen throughout Syria, Nuri Nawaf Saleh al-Jarkh who were executed by the formerly known Nusra Front, ex al-Qaeda branch in Syria.<br><br>In the summer of 2015, al-Nusra Front Nayef and Abdel Hadi, the son of the sheikh of the </font><font><font>Hadideen</font> sheikhs, on charges of working to extend the forces of the regime (regime forces were besieged then at the Abu Zuhur military airport) with food and water.<br><br>This move raised more doubts about the true affiliation of the tribe leaders and bring back to the forefront them following the Shiite like other prominent tribe leaders. Their affiliation to Ahl al-Bayt - regardless of the credibility of this affiliation - is an easy entry point for the process of becoming Shiites which lead to them standing on the side of the regime. Syrians have witnessed such behavior in the behavior of several people affiliated with famous tribes such as the Baggara, </font><font><font>Hadideen</font> and others who have become the buttocks of sectarianism.<br><br>The Hadidien is one of the tribes that came to Syria. Their homes were on the outskirts of Mosul, before they migrated from there due to conflicts according to unverified narratives.<br><br>Soon after their transformation from their original homes, the Hadidis chose to be distributed in the countryside of different governorates of Syria, such as Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Hassakeh.<br><br>In one of her most intriguing articles, Syrian novelist Lina Hoyan al-Hassan discusses the renewed old conflict between the Muawali and Haddid tribes, including the 40-year-long war that ended in many French-brokered times during their occupation of Syria.<br><br>Al-Hassan refers to the current and raging conflict between the "Muwali" and "the Hadidin tribes on the the background of their conflicting positions with or against the Syrian regime.<br><br>The novelist chronicles the biography of the father of Sheikh Al-Hadidiin, "Nawaf Al-Saleh" born in 1888, who assumed the presidency in 1915 and describes him as a "descendant of Constantinople" and an officer in the Turkish army. He then sought to join the Arab government formed in Syria following the "Great Arab Revolution" Membership of the Syrian National Assembly (parliament) in 1928.<br><br>Al-Hassan says that Nawaf was fluent in French and Turkish, and that his contact with General Gourou led to the tribe being excluded from the French tyranny. He was killed by a "slave of the Mawali tribe" in Aleppo in 1949 when he was leaving the Baron Hotel, .<br><br>At the end of her article published in 2013, al-Hassan concludes that Hadidin followed the policy of self-distancing since the Ottoman period through the French era to the current regime."<br><br>&nbsp;<br>This is in terms of the extension of Jumaa al-Jassim. As for the military, the officer who rarely appears publicly assumes the position of chief of the most deadly weapons of the regime artillery and rockets who killed and destroyed Syrians.<br>It is statistically proven that the regime power lies in the artillery (portable and trailer) and rockets (with its various ranges).<br><br>There are no exact numbers for the number of guns owned by the system, but it is estimated in the thousands, for example, 600 130-mm heavy-duty artillery, which modified the system at a range of up to 40 km, and the cannon has the ability to launch various types of missiles, including chemical.<br><br>Alongside the 130 field cannon, there are about 400 122-mm self-propelled artillery, about 50 pieces of the 152-mm giant propulsion, as well as hundreds of portable guns.<br><br>As for the missile weapon, Brigadier-General Ahmed Berri said in a brief review he published, "Syria is one of the largest missile forces in the developing world." There is no specific number of different types of missiles owned by the regime, but estimates go to the regime had Of surface-to-surface missiles (range between 300 and 700 km) about 500 rockets, before firing about half of the cities and Syrian countries.<br><br>On the side of these missiles are tactical missiles such as Luna and Tuchka, estimated to have about 500 rockets. The system is used in various battles and bombardment of areas beyond its control, as well as countless rocket launchers.<br><br>The regime relied on artillery and rockets in many of its destructive and deadly attacks, including the horrific chemical massacre in Al-Ghouta (summer 2013), where the missiles carried heads containing toxic gases before firing them at civilians while they were sleeping, killing about 1,500 people.<br><br>The effects of firing of long-range rockets into Syrian cities especially in Aleppo can still be seen, and it can be imagined that it is an area hit by a massive earthquake.</font></div>]]></content:encoded>
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