Dr. Abdul Baset Seda, a member in the political committee of the Syrian coalition criticized the opposition for not being able to draw a political line for the revolution.
The former president of the National Council, in an interview with Zaman Alwasl, said that when the national council was established in Istanbul, there was not any non-Syrian person in the hall, while when the coalition was founded the western diplomats were more than the coalition’s members.
“We call for overriding the negatives by leaving favoritism which has become one of the characteristic of the coalition’s political work”. Seda Said
Regarding his point of view toward the announcement of the Democratic Union party of the Interim Administration in some Kurdish areas in north of Syria, Seda explained that it is important involve all ethnic and religious components in Syria, but he wondered, if this administration is successful, then questioned why the migration continue from these areas?
The following are the details of the interview:
-Describe the political scene of the Syrian crisis after “Geneva 2 “?
We are now waiting for the report of UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi in his trip to the United Nations in the next few days.
In terms of the political scene, the Syrian regime is certainly not serious in finding a political solution, and even doesn’t have a negotiable project in “Geneva 2” except to stay in power.
In the same time, the regime is making progress on the ground while the international stance is semi far from the crisis and hasn’t provided any guarantees for Geneva 2.
And according to these current circumstances, we find that the Russian standpoint is getting stricter, which was obvious when the coalition delegation met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said:” the transitional government is a dream out of reach”.
- It seems that the coalition is not harmonious with the idea of going to “Geneva 2 " Is this true?
There are two approaches in the coalition toward “Geneva 2," the first calls the opposition to be self –reliant and not to go to the negotiations, and depend on field developments while supporting the fighters on the grounds.
And the other approach is betting entirely on regional and international interactions and on the international community’s decisions.
And from my point of view, we need to adopt the realistic direction by linking the two approaches, provided that the joining process is in accordance with a strategy that an effective political leadership adopts and works in coordination with inside Syria.
- You are a member of the National Council, which withdrew after the decision to go to Geneva and then returned. How do you explain this contradiction?
Personally, I’m not with the Council’s withdrawal from the coalition after going to Geneva and leaving the scene for others.
The council should have objected without withdrawal, but the reason why the Council retreated is the amount of pressure from the inside and the high number of deaths daily which made the Council takes this fact into consideration .
After that, the coalition decided to go to Geneva and an agreement was reached between the Council and the coalition to avoid media escalation during the time when the coalition is negotiating in Geneva.
I personally went to Geneva, away from the limelight in order to heal the rift and all the parties understood the need to unite in this situation, and this is what has been done by the council’s return to the coalition.
- The coalition now is exposed to severe criticism from all political and military parties in addition to Syrians inside the country because of his performance, what are the negatives of the coalition?
The problem with the coalition is that since its founding, it has always postponed its differences and negative points until the end of the Syrian crisis, and hasn’t done anything to solve the internal problems.
And because of this accumulated disregard, the problem now is that there are no political forces within the coalition who are able to draw a political line for the revolution, because the traditional political forces were not able to comprehend the democratic movement and that's what created a divided and sporadic opposition who lacks any political project.
The solution with the coalition’s negativity is that we should override any cronyism and stay away from the marketing logic, because there are many in the coalition who market themselves as the solution, and we need to take advantage of the opposition‘s first experiment, which the National council has gone through.
5 - But the council is no longer has the role that it played before?
On the contrary , the national council is a unified bloc and it was established on pure national Syrian basis , without any external interferences, and we signed on the establishment of the coalition , and entered the coalition as a first party , as a party , and not as a member of the coalition.
So the National Council is one party and the rest of components of the coalition are the other party, and the Council is an active party in the coalition.
- You said that the National Council is purely national what about the coalition, is it not?
No it’s , but the coalition is affected by the regional and international pressures, and let me inform you that when the collation was established in Qatar, the number of Arab and Western diplomats was more than the number of coalition’s members, while when the national council was established in Istanbul, there wasn’t any non-Syrian person in the hall.
The national council is the opposition‘s back line of defense in case the coalition fails, and we have witnessed many threats of coalition collapse recently.
7 – You spoke about the negative aspects of the coalition, but you are a member of the political body and you can suggest these solutions and concerns?
True, but the opinion of the political body is only advisory, and the people who established the coalition consider the executive office in the national council as a rival and a component that can’t be relied upon.
And I remember that in every proposal in the first phase of the coalition’s establishment, our brothers in the coalition’s governing body protested on any call to give executive powers to the political committee, and said: We do not want to reproduce the experience of the Syrian National Council in the Executive Office.
Here we must refer to the nature of the assigned roles , for it’s well known that the coalition’s secretariat , is mandated to administrative roles , but the reality is that it became a political player , for example, we see the President of the Coalition goes on a political mission accompanied by his deputies and the Secretary -General , while it’s supposed that the deputy and Secretary General run the coalition’s affairs, which was a customary procedure by the former president Mr. Muazz Al Kahteeb.
- Is it true that the National Council refused the Libyan military support at the beginning of the revolution?
Revolution militarization was not the decision of the political opposition, but a result of the evolution in the situation inside Syria, and it’s a purely field decision.
since the founding of the council, we believed in revolution pacifism, and during our visit to Libya to meet the Chairman of Libyan Transitional Council Mustafa Abdahalil, he expressed his readiness to support the Syrian revolution financially, morally and militarily, but we refused in the beginning in order to maintain a peaceful revolution, and then we received about 20 million dollars from Libya because our concerns were to address the aid and relief issues and support those affected.
however, we handed over about one million euros to the military leadership at the time, in addition to limited aid to the fighters as available at the time.
9 – You are a witness on the opposition establishment, in a constructive critical vision, what are the mistakes of the Syrian Opposition?
The first mistake the opposition committed is that it did not invest the national elements and pretended to respect the minorities, and there was ignorance in using the Kurdish and Alawite paper, which even affected the defection of officers.
If we were able to include the Kurdish element into the revolution, things would have been much better, especially since Kurds are an active mass population in Damascus, Aleppo and Hasaka .
One of the other mistakes committed, is that it
did not deal with the Kurdish issue in a national mature mentality, and those
who dealt with the Kurds case, were influenced unintentionally with Al Baath
conceptual system, and here the regime renewed its alliance with the PKK, which has
been weak in the beginning of the revolution, and it was prevailed in the
Kurdish circles that the regime is despotic and the opposition is chauvinist. Translation by Dani Murad
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