By Hamza Mustafa; Translation by Dani Murad)
In a previous article, we tackled the issue of “Al Nusra’s weak spot lies in ideology loyal to ISIS” which has discussed the problem of foreign jihadists (immigrants) in al-Nusra Front, the emergence of the Front and how it’s crystallized and dealt with the Syrian revolution, and later, the conflict with the Islamic State ”ISIS” which led to the "predominance of "immigrants” who transformed the Front’s structure gradually to become a “cloning” or an “imitation" of the state in its approach and military tactics.
Days have passed and the news came with the announcement of appointing Dr. Sami al-Uraydi as the general in-charge of Sharia in al-Nusra Front instead of "Abu Maria Al-Qahtani," which had held this position since its establishment (The position is equal to Mufti).
And in order to prevent further discussion and debates among the jihadi circles about the causes behind al-Qahtani’s dismissal, amid leaked information that al-Joulani was angry from al-Qahtani because of the military loss in the eastern region against ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra has announced that al-Uraydi will head the Legitimate Committee in the front, which includes in its members, "Abu Maria Al-Qahtani," and also "Abu Suleiman al-Muhajer."
However, Al Nusra fighters and supporters argue that al-Uraydi’s appointment who also known as Abu Mahmoud al-Shami (Jordanian, born in 1973), is merely a change in the positions, and that his scientific qualifications qualify him for this position, being a holder of a degree in law from the University of Amman, a Master in “Hadith” from the University of Jordan in 1997, and a PhD in Hadith from the Islamic University in Baghdad, in addition to his published books that include; the methodology of Imam al-Nasai in “Jarh Wat-Ta'deel”, the methodology of ibn Taymiyyah in curing epilepsy, magic, and envy, and Alroqia al sharia.
To support their argument and signify the status and importance of Sheikh al-Uraydi and the privileges he has among its leadership, these advocates have referred to the interview of Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, with Al Jazeera’s journalist Tayseer Allouni. And in that interview, when al-Joulni was asked about the doctrine and belief of Al Nusra Front, he referred to the interview of al-Uraydi to explain that, which was published by al-Manarah al-Bayda (The White Minaret) on October 2013.
However, this event can’t be underestimated with such simplicity, because the significance of this step involves many internal and external messages that Al Nusra wanted to convey at this time, which can be summarized according to the concerned parties as:
1- A message to its members and supporters:
We discussed previously the dilemma of exaggerated jihadi speech, which the Islamic state has resorted to in order to strengthen its influence in the face of the other factions. Of course, these speeches focus on emotions and evoke the feelings of jihadists, since it is relevant to their dreams and aspirations, particularly the arbitration law, the establishment of an Islamic state, and caliphate.
However, this speech has lost its influence, because many foreign fighters (immigrants) have abandoned Al Nusra and pledged allegiances with al-Baghdadi, the day after the declaration of the state of Iraq and al-Sham, on April 9/2013, and even those who stayed with the Front or joined it after the military confrontation with the state earlier this year, found themselves in a critical situation after the momentum military and moral gain of ISIS following the events of Mosul in June 10, 2014, and after the organization’s spokesperson "Abu Mohammed al-Baghdadi announced “ the Islamic Caliphate in June 29, 2014, and then the sermon made by al-Baghdadi early July 2014 at the Grand Mosque in Mosul.
And recently many fighters in Al Nusra, particularly immigrants have thought about leaving the group and joining the State of “New Caliphate” under the excuses that Al Nusra postpones the implementation of Sharia arbitration, while focuses on “deterring aggressors”, and cooperates with the battalions, regardless of their intellectual and ideological backgrounds at the expense of the ultimate goal, namely the establishment of an Islamic state.
Within this context, we understand the Front’s withdrawal from the legitimate bodies in Aleppo and Damascus, and the voice message of al-Golani declaring the “soon to be” Islamic Emirate, and also understand al-Uraydi’s appointment , because as he is known, inclined to applying Sharia arbitration and is urgent to do so, more than “ deterring aggressors”, which has manifested during his interview (referred to by Joulani) and titled( the doctrine and approach of Al Nusra)in which he said: “We took up arms to uphold the word of Allah and its arbitration , and deter aggressors, as stipulated by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah", and in another recording he said "Either Sharia arbitration or fighting for the sake of Allah”, and Accordingly, al-Uraydi’s appointment might be a goal in itself to overcome the internal criticism, and to stop excuses form people who want to abandon the Front and join the new State of ISIS.
2- Attracting new immigrants:
Despite the comprehensive nature and general objectives of the jihadist movements, yet regionalism has played an important factor in the structure of these organizations, and little examination of ISIS structure, reveals its "Iraqization" inside, however regionalism is not only limited to the regional structure, but it’s also related to the approach and practice, and as observed last year, the Islamic state has used "soft power" in Iraq, compared to "heavy-handed suppression" in Syria.
On the other hand, Al Nusra has tried at the beginning to be an organized Syrian jihadi group that coexists with the conditions around it, but after losing its military power for the state, it gradually abandoned “syrianizing” the group, and sought as much as possible to keep the immigrants in their ranks and restore dropouts, but also has failed.
Under these circumstances, and after Al Nusra’s loss of fighters, and with the tendency among immigrants from the Gulf, Maghreb and Europe to join ISIS, the Front aspired to attract more immigrants from the (Levant), especially Jordanians, and so the appointment of al-Uraydi, the well-known Sheikh among jihadi Jordanian circles, was to achieve this goal, and during his stay in Horan in the past two years, the Sheikh has spun good relations there and greatly stimulated the Jordanian jihadists to join the Front ,which enhanced his legitimacy and military position.
Based on the foregoing, Al Nusra is seeking to compensate its loss in attracting more Jordanians supported by (Palestinian -Jordanian) jihadist leaders such as "Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi”,"Abu Qatada", and Ayad Quneibi , and these Jordanian fighters are military qualified because of their environment whether tribal or civil, which allows to carry arms .
In another aspect, the Front wants to use al-Uraydi’s charisma to attract more fighters , promote and defend itself among the jihadi movements, and as it seems, Sheikh “al-Uraydi” is trying to imitate or "reincarnate" the famous Sheikh and jihadist “Abdullah Azzam”, whether in his way of dressing, speech, and even in his ideas.
3- A message to ISIS:
The gist of this message is linked to the dismissal of Abu Maria Al-Qahtani more than to the appointment of al-Uraydi , because “Al-Qahtani" is a hated personality by ISIS’s leadership, and was accused in more than once of inciting Joulani against al-Baghdadi, and because he has "engineered" the relationship between Joulani and al-Zawahiri, and pulled out al-Joulani from pledging allegiance with the Islamic State of Iraq and linked him independently under the leadership of al-Qaeda.
During the past two years, some leaked information came with contradictory stories regarding Al-Qahtani’s personality, which is surrounded with so much mysteriousness and a lot of uncertainty, and according to the Iraqi intelligence, he is Maysar Ali Mussa Abdullah Al Jabawi, an officer in the former Iraqi army, and one of the most prominent officers of Saddam Hussein, and has many titles such as Abu Maria "Harari" according to the place of his birth, and the “Baqal” or the "grocer" and others.
After the American invasion, and the resolution of the Iraqi army, Abu Maria joined al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (in 2004) under the leadership of "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," and was involved in military operations in the province of Nineveh. He was appointed after the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, as the "legitimate official” of Mosul.
And according to stories, al-Qahtani has held several positions in the Islamic State of Iraq and became the architect of relations with tribes who pledged allegiance to the organization secretly, then he managed the financial matters, or the so-called "Hisbah" in Mosul until his arrest late 2008, where he stayed for approximately two years in prison, to be released in mid-2010.
And in response to this story, the Global Jihad Observatory denies some information, and confirms most of it, like it refuses that Qahtani was an officer in the Iraqi army and confirms that he and his father (Abu Maysar were opponent to Al Baath party and his members, but the US department of treasury confirmed these stories and in 2012 imposed financial sanctions against him, in addition to putting him in the lists of “Most Wanted Terrorists”.
However, differences between Abu Maria and ISIS began after his release from prison, when he refused to join the organization again, and went to Syria, ostensibly retired from militant activity and opened a shop "grocery" in Deir Ezzor.
But what angered the leadership of ISIS is that Abu Maria remained in touch with the leaders of jihad in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Afghanistan, and tried to convince the elders and Sheikhs in the organization to defect from ISIS and form an alternative New jihad, which made ISIS leaders accuse him of treason, and named him " the traitor grocer."
The state believes that after the start of the Syrian revolution, Abu Maria contacted al-Joulani offering him assistance due to his strong network inside Syria , Iraq, and with the leaders of the global jihad, and soon was appointed by al-Joulani as al-Nusra’s Sharia Official without consulting the leadership of ISIS, and then he was able to provide al-Joulani with direct contact with al-Zawahiri, to free him from the pressures of al-Baghdadi and his men, whom he appointed in the Front’s Shura Council .
Therefore, the appointment of al-Qahtani can be understood as a message to ISIS to defuse the tension between the two groups and contain the armed confrontation, and it is noteworthy that some members in Al Nusra explicitly accused al-Qahtani of implicating them in the fighting with the state, using terms such as: “ personal grudges” and “ his revenge”, and of course al-Joulani can’t get rid of al-Qahtani due to his strong relations and positions, but he might “freeze” him, as what Al Assad has done to the former Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa.
A message to the factions of the Syrian opposition:
During the past few years, al-Nusra’s relation with the majority of armed opposition factions in Syria has been relatively good, with no side clashes and cooperation and coordination with the various factions , particularly those affiliated with the Islamic Front, in order to achieve their ultimate goal of toppling the regime, as al-Uraydi described in his interview, but with the increasing pace of jihadist speeches and pressures, al-Nusra started to accuse some factions of blasphemy or criticize them, especially those affiliated with the Coalition.
And the Revolutionary Charter which was announced by some factions, including the Islamic Front, was the turning point in the relations between al-Nusra and other factions, and differences surfaced to the public, when al-Uraydi criticized the charter, accusing the signatories of being ( West-complaint) .
Based on the above, it can be said that Al-Qahtani’s dismissal has many indications, starting with Al Nusra’s withdrawal from the legitimate bodies of Damascus and Aleppo, working individually to expand its influence, its campaign in Idlib’s countryside to “ deter corruptors”, all of that mean that more tension and confrontations might take place between al-Nusra and other factions, and that what urged the announcement of the unified command of military Syrian Revolution, which includes 17 factions, including factions active in the Islamic Front, such as “army of Islam” and the “Suqour al-Sham” Brigades, in a protective step to address the accumulating threats coming from the regime, state, and in a later stage , Al Nusa in case it changed its approach.
There is no doubt that we are facing a new reality and a new strategy for al-Nusra, which has been forced to make changes within its organizational structure, and all the indications reveal that this strategy will not be in interest of the Syrian revolution nor will face its challenges.
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